sigqueue(2) was marked as permitted in capability mode with the introduction of Capsicum in 2011, but the implementation of kern_sigqueue did not include a capability mode check restricting signal delivery to the calling process's own PID. A process in capability mode can use sigqueue(2) to send signals to any process it could signal following standard Unix permissions, bypassing the Capsicum sandbox restriction. A compromised sandboxed process could interfere with other processes, for example by sending SIGKILL or SIGSTOP. This could be any process running as the same user, or any process, for a superuser sandboxed process.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H
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