NocoDB: Missing File Size Enforcement in Upload-by-URL Allows Denial of Service via Disk Exhaustion

NVD Description

### Summary The `uploadViaURL` path in the v1/v2 attachment API did not enforce `NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE` against the remote `content-length` or against the response stream. An authenticated user (Editor+) could direct the server to download arbitrarily large files, exhausting disk space and causing denial of service. ### Details In `packages/nocodb/src/services/attachments.service.ts`, the HEAD probe read `content-length` but never compared it to `NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE`; the subsequent `storageAdapter.fileCreateByUrl()` performed the download without `maxContentLength`. The v3 service (`v3/data-attachment-v3.service.ts`) already enforced the limit, but the v1/v2 endpoints (`POST /api/v1/db/storage/upload-by-url`, `POST /api/v2/storage/upload-by-url`) did not. This is distinct from GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9 (blind SSRF via HEAD) — same code area, different class. ### Impact - Authenticated DoS via disk exhaustion. Editor role suffices. - Cascading failures once disk fills: blocked DB writes, log rotation, application crash. ### Credit This issue was reported by [@ik0z](https://github.com/ik0z).

Affected Packages (1)