### Summary The upload-by-URL path did not enforce `NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE` against either the remote file's advertised `Content-Length` or the decoded length of a `data:` URI, allowing an authenticated user to bypass the configured per-file size limit. ### Details The attachments service now checks `NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE` against both the HEAD response's `content-length` and the decoded length of a `data:` URI body before fetching. The local storage plugin additionally sets `maxContentLength` on the axios download so a malicious server cannot stream past the limit. ### Impact Authenticated users with upload permission could attach files larger than the operator-configured limit, defeating storage and bandwidth caps. ### Credit This issue was reported by [@bugbunny-research](https://github.com/bugbunny-research).
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