Feed/CVE-2026-49753
CVE-2026-49753MEDIUMCVSS 0.0

mint: Content-Length header accepts non-RFC "+" sign prefix

Published Jul 9, 2026·Updated Jul 9, 2026

NVD Description

### Summary Mint's HTTP/1 client accepts `Content-Length` header values with a leading `+` sign (e.g. `+0`, `+123`), which RFC 7230 forbids (`Content-Length = 1*DIGIT`). On a connection shared with a strict fronting proxy or load balancer, this parser disagreement is a response-smuggling primitive: the proxy frames the body one way, Mint frames it another, and bytes meant for one response leak into the next consumer's response stream. ### Details `'Elixir.Mint.HTTP1.Parse':content_length_header/1` in `lib/mint/http1/parse.ex` parses the header value with `Integer.parse/1`. By design, `Integer.parse/1` accepts an optional `+` or `-` sign prefix. The `length >= 0` guard rules out negatives, but inputs such as `"+0"`, `"+123"`, or `"+1"` pass through and are returned as valid lengths. A strict proxy or load balancer rejects or reframes `Content-Length: +0\r\n`, while Mint silently treats it as `0`. When Mint reuses the socket (keep-alive, pipelining, or any pooled connection) and the connection is shared with a proxy that frames the same bytes differently, trailing bytes the proxy attributes to response N are attributed by Mint to response N+1. Across trust boundaries (shared pools, multi-tenant fronting) this enables response smuggling. ### PoC 1. Stand up a raw TCP server that returns `HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: +0\r\nConnection: keep-alive\r\n\r\n<smuggled bytes>`. 2. Connect a Mint HTTP/1 client to the server and issue a request. 3. Observe that Mint reports the response as status 200 with `Content-Length: "+0"` and an empty body, leaving the smuggled bytes sitting in the socket buffer for the next response. ### Impact Response-smuggling / request-response desync primitive in Mint's HTTP/1 client parser. Anyone using Mint (directly or via Finch, Tesla's Mint adapter, Req, etc.) to talk through a shared or pooled connection where a fronting proxy enforces RFC 7230 strictly while Mint does not is exposed. The attacker is the response producer (a malicious or compromised upstream, or anything that can inject bytes into a shared origin response); exploitation into a cross-request data leak additionally requires the deployment to share a Mint connection across trust boundaries. ## Resources * Introduction commit: https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/65e0e86d799a6d3b08e4372fccdd9747535e0dd6 * Patch commit: https://github.com/elixir-mint/mint/commit/47e48027480228e4e32a0b4df39db497b4804921

Affected Packages (1)

mintHEX
Fixed in 1.9.0

References

View on NVD Search GitHub Search Google

Get alerted for CVEs like this

Register your stack and get notified within minutes when a matching CVE drops.

Start monitoring free