Req vulnerable to unbounded archive/compression extraction triggered by response content-type

NVD Description

### Summary Req's default response pipeline auto-decodes archive and compressed bodies based on the server-supplied `content-type` (or URL extension) and materialises the full decompressed contents in memory with no size cap. An attacker who controls (or can redirect a victim into) an HTTP endpoint reached by `Req.get!/1` can return a tiny "decompression bomb" that expands to many gigabytes on the client and exhausts the BEAM's memory. ### Details **1. Archive auto-decoding.** `Req.Steps.decode_body/1` in `lib/req/steps.ex` dispatches on the response `content-type` (or URL extension) and calls Erlang's archive libraries with `:memory`, returning a `[{name, bytes}]` list of every entry fully decompressed in RAM: `application/zip` → `:zip.extract(body, [:memory])`, `application/x-tar` → `:erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory])`, `application/gzip` / `.tgz` → `:erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory, :compressed])`. No byte cap is enforced before decoding and no per-entry size limit is passed to `:zip` / `:erl_tar`. **2. content-encoding chaining.** `Req.Steps.decompress_body/1` walks the `content-encoding` header and chains `:zlib` / `:brotli` / `:ezstd` decoders, so a response advertising `content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip, …` inflates through multiple layers without bound. **3. Default-on, attacker-chosen decoder.** Both steps are part of Req's default pipeline. The caller does not need to opt in, and the attacker chooses which decoder fires by setting `content-type` and `content-encoding` on their own server (or on any host reached via Req's automatic redirect following). ### PoC 1. Run an HTTP server that responds 200 with `content-type: application/zip` and a body that is a zip archive whose single entry is ~400 MB of zero bytes (compressed wire payload: a few hundred KB). 2. From the victim process, call `Req.get!(url)` against that server (no special options, no opt-in to archive decoding). 3. `decode_body/1` dispatches on `content-type`, invokes `:zip.extract(body, [:memory])`, and the response body becomes `[{~c"bomb.bin", <<400 MB of zero bytes>>}]`. A sub-MB request produces hundreds of MB resident memory; layering gzip on the `content-encoding` path or increasing entry size scales arbitrarily. ### Impact Memory-exhaustion denial of service against any Elixir application that uses Req with its default step pipeline to fetch URLs influenced by an untrusted party, including webhook senders, link previews, OAuth/OIDC discovery clients, package mirrors, image proxies, and any `Req.get!/1` call that may follow redirects to attacker-controlled hosts. No authentication is required; a single response can crash the BEAM and take down unrelated workloads on the same VM.

Affected Packages (1)