http4k: Unbounded gzip decompression in `ServerFilters.GZip` / `RequestFilters.GunZip` allowed memory-exhaustion DoS

NVD Description

### Impact `ServerFilters.GZip` and `RequestFilters.GunZip` (and the underlying `Gzip` functions used to decompress request bodies) did not impose any cap on the decompressed size. A small malicious gzip-encoded request body (on the order of kilobytes) could decompress to gigabytes, exhausting the JVM heap and denying service to other clients. **Who is affected:** any http4k server that accepts gzip-encoded requests via `ServerFilters.GZip` or `RequestFilters.GunZip`. Exploitable by any unauthenticated client. The vulnerability was introduced on 2017-08-01 (commit `2618fe08f9`) and was present for ~9 years. ### Patches | Line | Fixed in | Edition | |------|----------|---------| | v6.x (Community) | **6.49.0.0** | Community | | v5.x (LTS) | **5.42.0.0** | Enterprise — contact [enterprise@http4k.org](mailto:enterprise@http4k.org) | | v4.x (LTS) | **4.51.0.0** | Enterprise — contact [enterprise@http4k.org](mailto:enterprise@http4k.org) | The fix caps decompression at 10MB by default; oversized requests through `ServerFilters.GZip` / `RequestFilters.GunZip` now return `413 Request Entity Too Large`, and decompressing elsewhere throws `SizeLimitExceededException`. The keyed `hmacSHA256` helper and other safe paths are unaffected. ### Workarounds For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately: - Replace the `GZip` / `GunZip` filters with custom versions that wrap the decompressed `InputStream` in a size-limited reader, or - Strip gzip-encoded request support at the edge (CDN, reverse proxy, or load balancer). ### References - Vulnerability introduced: [`2618fe08f9`](https://github.com/http4k/http4k/commit/2618fe08f9) - Fix release: [v6.49.0.0](https://github.com/http4k/http4k/releases/tag/6.49.0.0) - Background: [CWE-409 — Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/409.html)

Affected Packages (1)