openhole-server vulnerable to path traversal via URL-decoded request path

NVD Description

## Summary openhole-server forwarded the URL-decoded request path (`r.URL.Path`) to tunnel clients instead of the original request-target. Percent-encoded dot-segments (`%2e`) and separators (`%2f`) were decoded to `../` and `/` before reaching the local service. Go's ServeMux rejects literal `../` paths, but percent-encoded traversal sequences bypassed this and were delivered to backends as working path traversal. ## Impact An unauthenticated remote attacker could read files outside the published web root on tunneled local services that resolve paths without canonicalization. Example: - `/%2e%2e/secret.txt` → file outside web root - `/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd` → sensitive files Encoded slashes (`/a%2fb`) could also bypass path-based access controls. ## Fix v0.1.2 forwards `r.URL.EscapedPath()` on the server and preserves the request-target on the CLI client. Users should upgrade both openhole-server and the openhole CLI to v0.1.2 or later.

Affected Packages (1)