Coder vulnerable to OIDC account takeover via email-based user matching and email_verified bypass

NVD Description

### Summary Two flaws in Coder's OIDC login chained into account takeover: email-based user matching fell back to linking by email without checking for an existing link to a different IdP subject and the `email_verified` claim was only enforced when present as a boolean `false` so an absent or non-boolean claim was treated as verified. ### Impact An attacker who could authenticate at the configured OIDC provider with an email matching a victim's Coder account could log in as that victim and gain full access to their workspaces, templates and resources. This required OIDC authentication, attacker control of a matching email at the IdP and a victim account not yet linked to a different IdP subject. ### Patches The fix restricts the email fallback to first-time and legacy linking and defaults `email_verified` to false when the claim is absent or of an unexpected type. The fix was backported to all supported release lines: | Release line | Patched version | |---|---| | 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) | | 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) | | 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) | | 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) | ### Workarounds Configure the OIDC provider to disallow self-registration or to require email verification before issuing tokens. ### Resources - Fix: #25712, #25713 ### Credits Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22450) for independently disclosing this issue!

Affected Packages (1)