### Impact When Perses is using the file system database, on the list endpoints, the project value is bound from the request into the resource `Query` struct and is never validated against directory-traversal characters (validation/Flatten only runs for Create/Update bodies, not list queries). The path is then used to retrieve files in the database directly. Attacker can read arbitrary YAML/JSON files from the server host and can bypass the security constraints to get access to other resources contained in the file database. For example `https://localhost:8080/api/v1/dashboards?project=../projects` returns the list of the project while it must not return anything. ### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_ ### Workarounds Avoid using the file system database in production. Use SQL database instead.
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