### Summary: 2 findings — `safe_user_path()` accepts any path under `Path.home()` or `Path.cwd()`, which inside the shipped root container resolves to `/root` and `/app` (so all of root's home, including `/root/.ssh/id_rsa`, `/root/.aws/credentials`, `/root/.kube/config`, and `/app/agent/.env`, passes the check) (F9). `read_document()` has no sandbox call at all and returns the full content of any path the FastAPI process can read, including `/etc/shadow`, `/etc/passwd`, `/proc/self/environ`, and any secret file mounted into the container (F10). F10 is strictly broader than F9 but they have different fix scopes (F10 = a missing `safe_path()` call in one function; F9 = the envelope definition in `path_utils.py`), so both must be patched. --- ### Shared baseline (applies to both findings) The container has no `USER` directive (Dockerfile:15 — `FROM python:3.11-slim AS runtime`, no subsequent `USER`), so the FastAPI process runs as `uid=0(root)`. The two file-read tools described here are members of the auto-discovered LLM tool registry. Combined with GHSA-1 / F1, they are reachable from any anonymous TCP client to port 8899, but the same defects also apply to authenticated sessions and to prompt-injection in any document the agent processes. See GHSA-1's shared reproducer block for the install steps; the same `docker compose up -d` setup applies here. > **Note on the `HOST` placeholder used throughout the per-finding "Steps to observe" blocks below**: replace `HOST` with the address you reach the docker host on — typically `localhost` (or `127.0.0.1`) if you are running the reproducer on the same machine as the container. All `curl` commands below assume this substitution. --- ### Finding 9 — High: safe_user_path() accepts the entire user home directory and process CWD, allowing LLM tool calls to read /root credentials - **Severity**: High - **CVSS v3.1**: 7.5 — `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N` - **CVSS v4.0**: 8.7 — `AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` - **CWE**: CWE-22 (Path Traversal); CWE-552 (Files Accessible to External Parties) **Affected file**: `agent/src/tools/path_utils.py` - line 52 — `def safe_user_path(p: str) -> Path:` - line 73-77 — `if resolved.is_relative_to(home) or resolved.is_relative_to(cwd): return resolved` — `home = Path.home()`, `cwd = Path.cwd()` **Intent vs actual**: `safe_user_path()` is intended to permit journal and shadow-account tools to open broker export files the operator may have placed anywhere under their home directory or the project folder. The intended invariant is that only user-owned broker data files are accessible — not system credential files or SSH keys. The actual envelope check accepts any path whose resolved form is inside `Path.home()` or `Path.cwd()`. Inside the shipped Docker container, `Path.home()` resolves to `/root` and `Path.cwd()` resolves to `/app`. Every file under either subtree passes the check, including: - `/root/.ssh/id_rsa` and any other SSH key files - `/root/.aws/credentials`, `/root/.kube/config`, `/root/.docker/config.json` - `/app/agent/.env` (the file containing the operator's real `OPENROUTER_API_KEY`, `TUSHARE_TOKEN`, and any other secrets) A runtime probe inside the container confirmed that `safe_user_path('/root/.aws/credentials')` returned the path without raising `ValueError`. `ExtractShadowStrategyTool` was then invoked against `/root/secrets/aws.csv` (a planted credential file) and returned an error message containing the first line of the file via the parse-error channel. **Steps to observe**: 1. Per GHSA-1 shared reproducer, start the server with a working LLM API key and create an unauthenticated session. 2. (Setup for safe demo: inside the container, `docker exec` a planted file: `docker exec <container> sh -c 'mkdir -p /root/secrets && printf "broker_id,api_key,api_secret\nDEMO,FAKE_KEY,FAKE_SECRET\n" > /root/secrets/aws.csv'`.) 3. `curl -s -X POST "http://HOST:8899/sessions/$SID/messages" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"content":"Analyze the trade journal at the path /root/secrets/aws.csv and tell me what you find."}'` 4. Poll `curl -s "http://HOST:8899/sessions/$SID/messages"`. Observe the agent invoke `ExtractShadowStrategyTool` with `journal_path="/root/secrets/aws.csv"`, which passes `safe_user_path()` and attempts to parse the file as a trade journal CSV. 5. Observe the error response — when the file's structure does not match the expected journal schema, the parse error often includes the first line (column names) verbatim, leaking the file's first line. 6. Repeat with `journal_path="/app/agent/.env"` to confirm the `.env` file is within the accepted envelope. **Impact**: Any unauthenticated caller can instruct the LLM to attempt to parse any file under `/root` or `/app` as a trade journal, extracting the file's first line via the parse-error message channel. Files with valid CSV-like first lines may leak multiple bytes. In the shipped root container, `/root` encompasses all credentials a careless operator may have mounted into the home directory; `/app` includes the agent's own secrets and any operator-staged data files. --- ### Finding 10 — High: read_document() opens any server-readable file with no sandbox enforcement, returning full content of /etc/shadow and /proc/self/environ - **Severity**: High - **CVSS v3.1**: 7.5 — `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N` - **CVSS v4.0**: 8.7 — `AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` - **CWE**: CWE-22 (Path Traversal); CWE-552 (Files Accessible to External Parties); CWE-200 (Information Exposure) **Affected file**: `agent/src/tools/doc_reader_tool.py` - line 259 — `def read_document(file_path: str, pages: str = "") -> str:` - line 270 — `path = Path(file_path)` — followed only by `path.exists()` and `path.is_file()` checks before dispatching to format-specific readers - No call to `safe_path`, `safe_user_path`, or any other sandbox enforcement appears anywhere in the function **Intent vs actual**: `DocReaderTool` is intended to allow the LLM agent to read documents and data files provided for analysis. Like other file-reading tools in the project, it should apply a sandbox check before opening the file. The actual implementation takes the LLM-emitted `file_path` string, runs only `path.exists()` and `path.is_file()`, and dispatches to the appropriate reader. No call to `safe_path` or `safe_user_path` exists in the function. A runtime probe confirmed: - `read_document('/etc/passwd')` returned HTTP 200 with 839 characters of content - `read_document('/etc/shadow')` returned the full shadow password file - `read_document('/proc/self/environ')` returned the full process environment, including `OPENROUTER_API_KEY` and `TUSHARE_TOKEN` in plaintext This is strictly **wider** than F9: F9 is bounded to `/root` + `/app` via the (overly-broad) envelope; F10 has no envelope at all and reaches `/etc`, `/proc`, `/var`, and any other path the FastAPI process can read. **Steps to observe**: 1. Per GHSA-1 shared reproducer, start the server with a working LLM API key and create an unauthenticated session. 2. `curl -s -X POST "http://HOST:8899/sessions/$SID/messages" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"content":"Please read and summarize the document at /proc/self/environ"}'` 3. Poll `curl -s "http://HOST:8899/sessions/$SID/messages"`. Observe the agent invoke `read_document` with `file_path="/proc/self/environ"` and return the full process environment in the message stream. 4. Observe `OPENROUTER_API_KEY`, `TUSHARE_TOKEN`, and any other variables in `agent/.env` appearing in plaintext. 5. Repeat with `file_path="/etc/shadow"` to confirm shadow password file access. **Impact**: An unauthenticated caller can retrieve any file the server process can read. Running as root, that includes `/etc/shadow`, `/etc/passwd`, `/proc/self/environ` (full plaintext API keys), `/root/.ssh/id_rsa`, and any secret files mounted into the container. This is the broadest file-read primitive in the codebase and provides a credential-extraction path that does **not** require shell execution — endpoint monitoring tuned to BashTool / shell signatures will miss it entirely. --- ### Why F9 and F10 are listed separately A maintainer might be tempted to fix only one, on the theory that F10 dominates F9. Two reasons to fix both: 1. **Different fix scope** — F10's fix is a single missing call (`safe_path(file_path)` in `read_document` before line 270). F9's fix is in `safe_user_path()` itself: the envelope must be replaced with a strict allowlist of operator-configured directories, *not* `Path.home() ∪ Path.cwd()`. A fix that adds the missing `safe_user_path` call to `read_document` is **insufficient** because `safe_user_path` itself accepts `/root` and `/app/agent/.env`. Both surfaces need work. 2. **Different reachability classes** — F9 is reachable through tools that already gate on `safe_user_path` (`ExtractShadowStrategyTool` and several journal tools), so even a hypothetical F10 fix that switched `read_document` to use `safe_user_path` would still leak `/root/*` because the envelope is broken. F9 is the structural defect; F10 is the missed call. --- ### Suggested remediation 11. **F9** — In `safe_user_path()` at `path_utils.py:52-77`, replace the `Path.home() ∪ Path.cwd()` envelope with a strict allowlist of operator-configured directories (e.g. an explicit `BROKER_EXPORTS_DIR` env var defaulting to `/app/data/broker_exports/`). Reject `/root`, `/app/agent/.env`, and `/app/agent/uploads/` (the latter to prevent F3-uploaded files from being subsequently parsed as a credential-leak vector via the parse-error channel).' 12. **F10** — Add a `safe_path()` (or `safe_user_path()`) call at `doc_reader_tool.py:270` before the existing `path.exists()` / `path.is_file()` checks. Once F9 is patched, the same allowlist will apply uniformly to both `read_document` and the `safe_user_path`-gated tools. 13. **Defense-in-depth** — Drop the FastAPI process to a non-root user. Add a `RUN useradd -m vibe && chown -R vibe /app` step to the Dockerfile and `USER vibe` before `CMD`. This does not fix the Path Traversal but materially reduces the credential-extraction blast radius of any successful exploit (and benefits every other finding in GHSA-1 and GHSA-2). See GHSA-1 / shared baseline for the matching `USER` recommendation. ---
PoC: CVE-2026-112445
CVE-2026-112445: The Simplest macOS Local Privilege Escalation to Date
PoC: CVE-2026-43664
AirPods Bluetooth MAC Address Disclosure via NSUserDefaults
PoC: OtherActivityToken
Exploit for CVE-2025-0098, Activity token leak due to pid-only check and then use of that token for arbitrary startActivity()
PoC: CVE-2026-112706-CoreMedia-fd-leak
Independent discovery & coordinated disclosure: CoreMedia bytestream XPC (mediaplaybackd) vended live file descriptors for protected paths to any sandboxed app on iOS 26.5–27.0.1. Fixed in iOS 27.2 as CVE-2026-112706. PoC + evidence.
PoC: CVE-2026-98260-GhostKey
GhostKey - CVE-2026-98260 一键提权工具（Shizuku + NDK Native）
PoC: CVE-2026-98260-vivo-x-fold6-poc
CVE 2026 98260 vivo x fold6 poc
PoC: CVE-2026-98260-PMX110-Root618-Jailbreak
CVE-2026-98260 (exec: posix timer UAF) LKM jailbreak for OPPO Find X10 Pro Max (PMX110) and OnePlus 16 (PYB110): one-command root via shell uid 2000, with KernelSU / FinaSU / SukiSU / KernelSU-Next handover. Release build Root618 1.5.12 (R8-obfuscated).
PoC: CVE-2026-98260-GhostKey
GhostKey - CVE-2026-98260 一键提权工具（Shizuku + NDK Native）
PoC: brotli-node2shell-check
Vulnerability checker and remediation guide for CVE-2026-111497 vulnerability in Google's Brotli decoder
PoC: php2shell-lab
Lab reproduction, exposure probe and detection content for CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619 (PHP2Shell). Defensive research; no exploit.
PoC: php2shell
🐘 Ansible CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619 scanner
PoC: CVE-2026-26026-GLPI
Minimal source comparison and local lab files for CVE-2026-26026 in GLPI 11.0.5 and 11.0.6
PoC: CVE-2026-98432
Linux kernel IPv4 SYN IP-options use-after-free CVE-2026-98432 Mitigation work (Ansible Role)
PoC: cve-2026-98432-mitigation
Temporary mitigation for CVE-2026-98432 (Linux IPv4 TCP ireq_opt use-after-free): drop IPv4 TCP with IP options, disable MPTCP. Tested scripts + verification. EN/KO.
PoC: kpatch-cve-2026-98432
kpatch livepatch for CVE-2026-98432 (and CVE-2026-99999) on AlmaLinux and Rocky Linux 8, 9 and 10
PoC: phishing-analysis-thm
SOC-style investigation of a Netflix phishing email, CVE-2017-11882 exploitation, IOC extraction, and detection engineering mapping.
PoC: CVE-2026-33439
Pre-auth RCE exploit for OpenIdentityPlatform OpenAM <=16.0.5 via Java deserialization of the jato.clientSession parameter (CVE-2026-33439, CVSS 9.8). Comparator-based gadget chain with in-band command output through Tomcat ApplicationFilterChain thread-locals.
PoC: FBI-Tor-Exploit-CVE-2013-1690
Academic cybersecurity research project analyzing and restoring the FBI's 2013 Tor Browser deanonymization exploit, focusing on CVE-2013-1690, Firefox use-after-free vulnerabilities, exploit mechanisms, and historical forensic analysis.
PoC: Bootjack
CVE-2026-97631 C
PoC: CVE-2026-48907
Adapted PoC for CVE-2026-48907 - Joomla! JCE extension < 2.9.99.5
PoC: cve-2026-98432-audit
cve-2026-98432 audit script (ipv4 TCP inet_opt/ireq_opt use-after-free)
PoC: php2shell-poc
CLI scanner and PoC for CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619 (PHP OOM heap corruption and session upload-progress injection, CVSS 9.2). Affects PHP 5.4.0-8.5.11; patched in 8.2.35, 8.3.36, 8.4.27, 8.5.12. No external dependencies.
PoC: CVE-2026-88804
PoC CVE-2026-88804 (Rancher)
PoC: php2shell-poc
CVE-2026-109618/109619 — 5 RCE chains + detection rules (Suricata, Sigma, ModSecurity). PHP session.upload_progress pre-auth exploit research.
PoC: CVE-2026-98260-dada-android
Verified CVE-2026-98260 Android port for Xiaomi 15 dada OS4.0.0.22.XOCCNXM
PoC: CVE-2025-4960
Local Privilege Escalation via Improper Authorization Handling in EPSON Printer Controller Installer
PoC: ghostlock-kirkwood
CVE-2026-43499 (GhostLock) port for the Google TV Streamer (kirkwood / MT8696): single-file, per-boot temporary root + interactive root shell, with a build-matching case study and adaptation guide.
PoC: node2shell
Node2Shell (CVE-2026-111497) detection-only scanner + lab — RedSide Security
PoC: CVE-2026-97555
CVE-2026-97555: heap overflow in the Linux SMB client DACL rewrite (cifs.ko) — analysis, POC, and an arm64 exploit chain ending in a uid-0 credential overwrite on the reference build
PoC: cve-2026-110311-gitea-lab
Local Gitea CVE-2026-110311 reproduction: vulnerable vs patched comparison, Python verifier, recorded evidence, and Turkish report.
PoC: nginx-rift-cve-2026-42945-lab
Interactive NGINX CVE-2026-42945 educational simulation built with HTML, CSS, and JavaScript. Features vulnerable and patched modes, synthetic request inspection, memory visualization, event logging, and security recommendations. No real exploit execution.
PoC: CVE-2026-12118-POC-
POC for CVE-2026-12118
PoC: CVE-2026-104286
Exploit for CVE-2026-104286 — FortiMail: Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Write → Code Execution
PoC: node2shell
Scanner to checking (CVE-2026-111497) vulnerability
PoC: PHP2Shell
CVE-2026-109618 & CVE-2026-109619 — Pre-Auth RCE in PHP Core (session.upload_progress). Scanner, exploit verifier, and full technical analysis.
PoC: CVE-2026-50053
Offline Python detector for CVE-2026-50053 version exposure in Zimbra Collaboration Suite.
PoC: CVE-2026-115889
Offline Python detector for CVE-2026-115889 version exposure in Wasmtime.
PoC: CVE-2026-53921
Offline Python source-pattern auditor for CVE-2026-53921 in odhcpd.
PoC: gitlab-rce-toolkit
CVE-2026-97229 + CVE-2026-110264 — GitLab Onigmo RCE Exploit Toolkit (CVSS 10.0)
PoC: CVE-2026-101259
Reproducer for CVE-2026-101259 — Apache Camel camel-coap consumer sent the exception message to the CoAP client as a 5.00 payload (CWE-209). Camel Spring Boot + Camel Quarkus.
PoC: CVE-2026-71569
Reproducer for CVE-2026-71569 — Apache Camel camel-a2a push-notification webhook guard accepted an IPv6 unique local address (fc00::/7) reached through a host name (CWE-918). Camel Spring Boot + Camel Quarkus.
PoC: RDPBleed
CVE-2026-56190 - Windows RDP Server Uninitialized Resource leads to RCE
PoC: CVE-2026-94386
Reproducer for CVE-2026-94386 — Apache Camel camel-oauth cross-scope token reuse via a JVM-global token cache keyed only on endpoint+clientId (CWE-524). Camel Spring Boot + Camel Quarkus.
PoC: CVE-2026-95629
Reproducer for CVE-2026-95629 — Apache Camel camel-docling passed the CamelDoclingOutputFilePath header to docling's --output verbatim (CWE-22). Camel Spring Boot + Camel Quarkus.
PoC: php2shell-advisory-response
PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619) advisory response: inventory, patch, Wazuh hunt mapping, attestation outline.
PoC: CVE-2026-95628
Reproducer for CVE-2026-95628 — Apache Camel camel-docling custom-argument path validation did not reject absolute paths, an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-40047 (CWE-22). Camel Spring Boot + Camel Quarkus.
PoC: CVE-2026-95663
Reproducer for CVE-2026-95663 — Apache Camel camel-keycloak served a cached token introspection result past the token's expiry (CWE-613). Camel Spring Boot + Camel Quarkus.
PoC: CVE-2026-97798_LPE_Windows
CVE-2026-97798 PoC — WER Time Travel Debugging argument injection to SYSTEM (Windows 11 LPE), with an adaptive faultrep.dll resolver.
PoC: CVE-2026-95664
Reproducer for CVE-2026-95664 — Apache Camel camel-aws2-s3 evaluated a header-supplied object key as a Simple expression (CWE-917). Camel Spring Boot + Camel Quarkus.
PoC: woff2shell
poc of CVE-2026-111497 delivered as a WOFF2 file
PoC: wiz-bulb-tool
WiZ smart bulb LAN security tool - auto-discovery, CVE-tagged audit, intel recon & device control. Extends CVE-2019-18980 to new hardware. No credentials required.
PoC: CVE-2026-90885
Reproducer for CVE-2026-90885 — Apache Camel camel-saxon XQuery XML External Entity via an already-built javax.xml.transform.Source (CWE-611, HIGH). Camel Spring Boot + Camel Quarkus.
PoC: cve-2026-109618-cve-2026-109619-poc
pHp2Shell CVE 2016 109618 - 109619
PoC: php2shell
Realistic multi-version lab + toolkit for the PHP php2shell pre-auth RCE (CVE-2026-109618/109619): detect, blindly prove, and understand it. No shared mounts, no planted files, no LFI.
PoC: secure-api-cve-2024-23897
Work 1 — secure Flask REST API, three-stage CI, and CVE-2024-23897 (Jenkins CLI) analysis
PoC: charla-php2shell
PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618/109619): demos reproducibles y guia de parcheo paso a paso.
PoC: PHP2shell
CVE-2026-109618_CVE-2026-109619
PoC: waffers
The layer that protects you. Proactive defense-in-depth Web Application Firewall mitigating recent critical PHP engine vulnerabilities including PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618/9), PHP-CGI Argument Injection (CVE-2024-4577), iconv Filter Chains (CVE-2024-2961), and stream wrapper abuse.
PoC: node2shell-inventory-scanner
Local inventory triage for Node2Shell (CVE-2026-111497): grade every Node, Bun and Brotli copy on disk. Detection-only, no network probes, no payloads.
PoC: php2shell-check
A Claude Skill that passively checks whether a website (and optionally its subdomains) runs PHP, confirms the version where possible, and flags exposure to PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619)
PoC: CVE-2026-98260-GhostKey
GhostKey - CVE-2026-98260 一键提权工具（Shizuku + NDK Native）
PoC: CVE-2026-97631-PoC
An educational laboratory for studying a PXE network-boot vulnerability in EDK II / OVMF. It builds a pinned EDK II revision, boots a UEFI virtual machine in QEMU, and includes Python proof-of-concept scripts for investigating denial of service (DoS) and memory corruption.
PoC: practica-integradora-ciberseguridad
Práctica Integradora de Ciberseguridad (Comisión 1) - Investigación, análisis técnico y laboratorio práctico de CVE-2021-41773 (Apache HTTP Server)
PoC: node2shell-audit
Read-only audit for Node2Shell (CVE-2026-111497): Node.js/Bun Brotli decoder out-of-bounds write
PoC: cve-2026-111497-wordpress-poc
CVE-2026-111497 RCE PoC for one pinned Docker Official Image for WordPress
PoC: demo-zip-rce-sandbox
Live demo: the same vulnerable Rust zip crate (RUSTSEC-2026-0367 setuid + CVE-2026-115905 zip cloaking) contained by a deny-by-default Cosmonic WebAssembly sandbox.
PoC: php2leak
Remote Zend MM ASLR leak testbed (PHP CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619)
PoC: CVE-2026-101767-research
Research notes on CVE-2026-101767 — unauthenticated vulnerability in Oracle Application Object Library (E-Business Suite)
PoC: threat-intelligence-log4shell-analysis
Cybersecurity research project analyzing threat intelligence feeds, Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228), attack progression, remediation, incident response, and threat hunting.
PoC: CVE-2026-15723
Offline Python detector for CVE-2026-15723 version exposure in self-managed GitLab CE/EE, with CSV/JSON inventories and auditable reports.
PoC: CVE-2026-105014
Offline Python applicability detector for CVE-2026-105014 in Azure Pipelines, with strict CSV/JSON inventories and auditable reports.
PoC: CVE-2026-114625
Offline Python detector for CVE-2026-114625 exposure in on-premises VeloCloud Orchestrator, with train-specific build checks and auditable reports.
PoC: CVE-2026-97785
Offline Python applicability detector for CVE-2026-97785 in Microsoft Entra application proxy, with CSV/JSON inventories and auditable reports.
PoC: CVE-2026-83938
Offline Python applicability detector for CVE-2026-83938 in Azure Kubernetes Configuration Service, with CSV/JSON inventories and auditable reports.
PoC: CVE-2026-110063
Offline Python applicability detector for CVE-2026-110063 in Azure VM Inspector, with strict CSV/JSON inventories and auditable reports.
PoC: php56-amzn1-security
Security-patched php56 RPMs for Amazon Linux 1 (AMI 2018.03): PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619) and post-5.6.40 fixes backported from deb.sury.org
PoC: CVE-2026-109618-exploit
[PHP2Shell] Golang exploit for CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619: Unauthenticated RCE in PHP 5.4–8.5.11 via OOM corruption + session.upload_progress UAF
PoC: CVE-2026-93903
Security advisory for CVE-2026-93903 affecting LiteSpeed Web Server.
PoC: s25u-ghostlock-kernelsu-lkm
Galaxy S25 Ultra (SM-S9380): GhostLock/CVE-2026-43499 memory-only root + KernelSU LKM via kallsyms prelink; Zygisk findings
PoC: cve-2026-98260-uaf
CVE-2026-98260 (posix-cpu-timers exec UAF) exploit research: S9280 Android 14 GKI 6.1 — UAF trigger + zero-write primitive + SELinux Permissive. Handoff doc in HANDOFF.md
PoC: copy-fail-CVE-2026-31431-aarch64
Linux 4.19 aarch64 PoC for CVE-2026-31431 (Copy Fail) - AF_ALG/authencesn page-cache write
PoC: aia-pdfjs-poc
CVE-2024-4367 PDF.js FontMatrix PoC - authorized pentest artifact
PoC: CVE-2025-10035
CVE-2025-10035 is a critical vulnerability in Fortra GoAnywhere MFT that may allow attackers to execute commands remotely on a vulnerable server.
PoC: CVE-2026-35223-Joomla-Access-Control
Proof of Concept for CVE-2026-35223 – Joomla Improper Access Control
PoC: php2shell-audit
Non-intrusive detector for PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619) - scans codebases and live hosts for vulnerable PHP versions and risky config. Detection, not exploitation.
PoC: TimerRoot
Android front end for CVE-2026-98260: root shell + KernelSU late-load through Shizuku
PoC: php2shell-fixed-images
Reproducible RHITE fixed PHP runtime images for CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619
PoC: php-worker-pin
Multi-worker exploitation of the PHP 8.5 OOM-to-RCE chain (CVE-2026-109618/109619): pool pinning, measured
PoC: PHP2SHELL-Lab
Laboratorio para detectar y explotar las vulnerabilidades CVE-2026-109618 y CVE-2026-109619
PoC: CVE-2026-79397-Authenticated-OS-Command-Injection-in-ONT-4GE-RFDW-Ping-Diagnostics
Authenticated OS command injection in ONT-4GE-RFDW’s Ping diagnostics exploitable via default credentials.
PoC: rw-salon
CVE-2024-4442
PoC: rw-tutor
CVE-2024-4223
PoC: CVE-2026-111497-DOS-
CVE-2026-111497 DOS
PoC: rw-stock
CVE-2024-36779
PoC: php2shell-nse-scanner
Advanced Nmap Scripting Engine (NSE) script designed to identify PHP2Shell vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619). Features multi-layer Black-Box analysis resilient against WAF, proxies, and header stripping.
PoC: rw-web-directory-free
CVE-2024-3552
PoC: cve-2025-27740
Proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2025-27740 Subject Key Identifier injection in Active Directory Certificate Services
PoC: rw-country-state-city-auto-dropdown
cve-2024-3495
PoC: rw-fluentform
CVE-2024-2771
PoC: CVE-2023-42824
PoC / exploit archive for CVE-2023-42824
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Get alerted for CVEs like this
Register your stack and get notified within minutes when a matching CVE drops.
Start monitoring free