### Summary The Budibase AI chat-link handoff flow (`GET/POST /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff`) binds an **external chat identity** (Slack/Discord/MS Teams/Telegram) to a **Budibase user account**. The confirmation endpoint is on a **public route** (no CSRF middleware, no auth-group gate) and the only credential it checks is a `confirmationToken` that is **already rendered in plaintext into the HTML confirmation page** the victim views. There is no binding between the confirmation token and the requester's Budibase session at preparation time, and no CSRF token on the POST. Consequently, an attacker who creates a chat-link session for **their own** external chat identity (or any identity they can mint in their chat platform) can induce a victim Budibase user (same tenant) to submit the confirmation POST -> for example by sending them a link that auto-submits, or by XSS/CSRF on a co-tenanted page -> and the victim's `globalUserId` becomes bound to the attacker's external identity. The attacker then sends messages to the AI agent from their chat platform and is **acting as the victim user** inside Budibase automations/agent operations, inheriting the victim's permissions on agent operations, knowledge sources, and any downstream automation steps keyed off the linked identity. --- ### Affected | Component | Path | Lines | |---|---|---| | Public handoff routes (no auth-group middleware) | `packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts` | `23` (`GET /api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff`), `27` (`POST .../handoff`) | | Confirmation controller | `packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts` | `124-177` (`confirmChatLinkSession`); the binding at `153-173` | | Confirmation token rendered into HTML | `packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts` | `40-60` (`renderLinkConfirmationPage`); the hidden input at `55` | | Session creation (attacker side) | `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts` | `138-171` (`createChatIdentityLinkSession`), `173-188` (`prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation`) | | Upsert of identity link | `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts` | `201-250` (`upsertChatIdentityLink`) | **Affected versions:** `master` at commit `3c8d1b4023`. **Reachable over HTTP by:** the GET and POST are on `publicRoutes` (no auth-group middleware). The POST requires `ctx.isAuthenticated` at runtime (`controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:142`) -> so the victim must be logged into Budibase when the POST fires (achievable via standard CSRF if cookies are sent cross-origin, or via phishing that lures the victim to submit). --- ### Root cause **Issue 1 -> The handoff routes are public and unauthenticated at the middleware layer.** ```ts // packages/server/src/api/routes/chat.ts:23, 27 publicRoutes.get("/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff", ai.handoffChatLinkSession) publicRoutes.post("/api/chat-links/:instance/:token/handoff", ai.confirmChatLinkSession) ``` `publicRoutes` has **no group middleware** (`endpointGroups/standard.ts:24-25` calls `endpointGroupList.group()` with no middleware and then `.lockMiddleware()`). The routes do not have a per-route `authorized(...)`. There is **no CSRF middleware** on these routes -> Budibase's CSRF synchroniser token is enforced only for state-changing verbs on authenticated routes that are not in `NO_CSRF_ENDPOINTS`; the public-routes path bypasses it. **Issue 2 -> The confirmation token is exposed to anyone who views the GET page.** ```ts // packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:40-60 const renderLinkConfirmationPage = (session, action) => { ... return `<!doctype html>... <form method="post" action="${helpers.escapeHtml(action)}"> <input type="hidden" name="confirmationToken" value="${helpers.escapeHtml(session.confirmationToken)}"> <button type="submit">Confirm</button> </form> ...` } ``` The `confirmationToken` (a `newid()` UUIDv4 generated by `prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation`) is rendered into a hidden form input. Anyone who loads the GET page sees the token in the page source. **Issue 3 -> The POST binds the **currently-authenticated user** to the external identity based solely on the confirmation token.** ```ts // packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:124-177 export async function confirmChatLinkSession(ctx) { ... if (!ctx.isAuthenticated) { throw new HTTPError("Authentication is required to link chat identity", 401) } if (!session.confirmationToken || ctx.request.body?.confirmationToken !== session.confirmationToken) { throw new HTTPError("Link confirmation is invalid or has expired", 400) } const currentGlobalUserId = getCurrentGlobalUserId(ctx) // <- victim's ID const consumedSession = await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.consumeChatIdentityLinkSession(token) ... await sdk.ai.chatIdentityLinks.upsertChatIdentityLink({ provider: consumedSession.provider, externalUserId: consumedSession.externalUserId, // <- attacker's chat identity externalUserName: consumedSession.externalUserName, ... globalUserId: currentGlobalUserId, // <- bound to victim linkedBy: currentGlobalUserId, }) ... } ``` There is **no binding between the session and the requester's Budibase identity at preparation time**. `prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation` (`sdk/workspace/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:173-188`) stores the `confirmationToken` keyed by `token` with no user-id field. Whoever is authenticated when the POST fires (and supplies the correct `confirmationToken`) gets bound. **Issue 4 -> `assertSessionMatchesInstance` only checks workspace ID, not user.** ```ts // packages/server/src/api/controllers/ai/chatIdentityLinks.ts:17-27 const assertSessionMatchesInstance = ({ workspaceId, instance }) => { if (!workspaceId || workspaceId !== instance) { throw new HTTPError("Link token is not valid for this workspace", 400) } } ``` The check confirms the session belongs to the same workspace as the URL `instance` param -> useful for preventing cross-workspace confusion but useless against same-tenant identity confusion. --- ### Reproduction **Step-by-step attack** 1. **Attacker (tenant T) provisions a chat-link session for their own external identity.** Via the agent channel provisioning flow (e.g. `POST /api/agent/:agentId/slack/provision` or via the Discord/MS Teams/Telegram provisioning endpoints), the attacker obtains a chat-link `token` bound to **their own** Slack user ID. The session is stored in Redis keyed by `token`, scoped to tenant T. 2. **Attacker triggers `prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation`.** Either by GETting the handoff page themselves (if they have a Budibase session) or via an internal API. The `confirmationToken` is generated and stored. 3. **Attacker crafts a phishing/auto-submit page** that POSTs to `/api/chat-links/<instance>/<token>/handoff` with the leaked `confirmationToken` in the body. Example: ```html <form id="f" method="post" action="https://victim.budibase.app/api/chat-links/app_xxx/linktoken/handoff"> <input name="confirmationToken" value="<leaked-token>"> </form> <script>document.getElementById('f').submit()</script> ``` 4. **Victim (a Budibase user in tenant T, e.g. an admin) is lured to the attacker page** while logged into Budibase. Their browser sends the POST cross-origin. If the Budibase auth cookie is sent on cross-site requests (`SameSite=Lax` by default allows top-level POST navigations, which a form-submit is), the request is authenticated as the victim. 5. **The victim's `globalUserId` is now bound to the attacker's Slack identity.** When the attacker DMs the AI agent from Slack, the agent's operations run as the victim user -> with the victim's permissions on agent operations, knowledge sources, file uploads, and any downstream automation steps keyed off the linked identity. **Mitigating factors:** - `SameSite=Lax` cookies block cross-site POSTs from sub-resources (fetch / XHR) but **allow** top-level form-POST navigations. A phishing page that submits the form via `document.form.submit()` (a top-level navigation) succeeds. So the CSRF works with the default cookie policy. - The attack is **same-tenant only** (`session.tenantId !== context.getTenantId()` is checked in the sdk). - The attacker must induce the victim to click a link (standard phishing). No silent drive-by. --- ### Impact | Capability | Available | |---|---| | Bind an attacker-controlled chat identity to a victim's Budibase account | ✅ | | Send messages to the AI agent as the victim user (Slack/Discord/MS Teams/Telegram) | ✅ | | Inherit the victim's permissions on agent operations | ✅ | | Trigger automations / agent operations that the victim is authorised for | ✅ | | Read knowledge sources the victim has access to | ✅ | The severity depends on what the agent can do as the victim. For an admin victim, this is full tenant administration via chat. For a regular user, it is impersonation within the agent subsystem. The bound identity persists until manually unlinked, so the attacker retains ongoing access. This is a same-tenant, user-interaction-required primitive. It is below the "unauthenticated RCE" threshold but above "hardening" -> it is a real authentication-confusion vulnerability on a sensitive identity-binding operation. --- ### Fix **Recommended layered fixes:** 1. **Bind the confirmation token to the requester's Budibase session at preparation time.** In `prepareChatIdentityLinkSessionConfirmation`, store the `globalUserId` of the requester alongside the `confirmationToken`. In `confirmChatLinkSession`, verify that `getCurrentGlobalUserId(ctx)` matches the stored requester. This breaks the CSRF / cross-user confusion. 2. **Add a CSRF token to the confirmation POST.** The standard Budibase CSRF synchroniser token (`x-csrf-token` header, validated against the session's `csrfToken`) should be enforced on `POST /api/chat-links/.../handoff`. Move the route out of `publicRoutes` to an authenticated route group so CSRF applies (the GET can remain public for the redirect-to-login flow; the POST should be authenticated + CSRF-protected). 3. **Add a per-session nonce that is bound to the requester's browser** (e.g. a signed cookie set on the GET, validated on the POST) to prevent cross-origin submission even when `SameSite=Lax` allows it. 4. **Require user re-authentication (re-entry of password / step-up auth)** for sensitive identity-binding operations, similar to how password change requires re-auth.
PoC: CVE-2026-38192
pluck-CMS-4.7.20-code-injection-vulnerability
PoC: cve-2024-55591-poc
Educational implementation in Go for CVE-2024-55591 (Fortinet FortiOS Authentication Bypass). Designed for security research, vulnerability assessment, and understanding WebSocket-based auth bypass mechanisms.
PoC: cve-2026-82329-jfrog-artifactory
CVE-2026-82329 JFrog Artifactory unauthenticated auth-bypass: reproducible Docker lab + URL-parameter validator PoC + patch-diff analysis
PoC: CVE-2026-82592
D-Link DIR-825M formDiskFormat stack overflow + command injection RCE PoC (CVE-2026-82592); for authorized security testing
PoC: My-Exploits
Metasploit modules, Python PoCs and throwaway Docker labs for four platform CVEs: Keycloak (CVE-2026-18963), Apache NiFi (CVE-2026-39816), HashiCorp Vault (CVE-2026-5006), HashiCorp Nomad (CVE-2026-7474).
PoC: CVE-2025-66478-PoC-Reverse-Shell
CVE-2025-66478 PoC
PoC: cve-writeups-and-pocs
CVE-2026-80724 PoC + full write-up — Linux kernel ptp/vmclock read-only mapping becomes writable (VM_MAYWRITE). Discovered, reported & fixed by Abdifatah Suruur (suruurism)
PoC: CVE-2026-79483-FastGPT-NoSQL-Injection
FastGPT Community Edition NoSQL Injection PoC (CVE-2026-79483)
PoC: givewp-cve-2026-82222-rce-lab
Authorized Docker lab and clean PoC for validating CVE-2026-82222 RCE in GiveWP 4.16.5.1 and the 4.16.7.2 fix.
PoC: CVE-2026-19745
Learn how I found my first two CVEs by pure accident.
PoC: cve-2026-23989-opencloud-lab
Reproduction lab (A/B Docker) for CVE-2026-23989 — OpenCloud / ownCloud Infinite Scale public-link scope-validation bypass in Reva
PoC: CVE-2026-21962-Blog
CVE-2026-21962 Açığı için blog sayfası oluşturdum.
PoC: PoC-and-yara-rules-of-CVE-2025-59528-Flowise-has-Remote-Code-Execution-vulnerability
poc and yara rules
PoC: CVE-2026-33017
CVE-2025-62593 — Ray Unauthenticated RCE Exploit is an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in the Ray distributed AI compute engine.
PoC: CVE-2026-13753-poc
Poc of CVE-2026-13753
PoC: CVE-2026-82221
PoC for Unauthenticated Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in RegistrationMagic WordPress Plugin
PoC: ActiveMQ-CVE-2023-46604
Exploit POC for Apache ActiveMQ CVE-2023-46604
PoC: gha-lab-0ba60e6456
Authorized security-research lab reproducing CVE-2024-39700 / GHSA-45gq-v5wm-82wg (JupyterLab extension-template update-integration-tests pwn request)
PoC: CVE-2026-36130
CVE-2026-36130
PoC: CVE-2026-31321
CVE-2026-31321
PoC: postgresql-cve-2026-14662
PostgreSQL の全文検索(tsvector/tsquery)に見つかった範囲外書き込み脆弱性 CVE-2026-14662 を、修正前(18.4)と修正後(18.6)を Docker で並べて動かして検証した記録と発表資料
PoC: CVE-2026-27472-and-CVE-2026-27474
PoC for CVE-2026-27472 and CVE-2026-27474
PoC: CVE-2026-27475
PoC for CVE-2026-27475
PoC: CVE-2026-18963
Unauthenticated account takeover via reset-credentials flow bypass
PoC: CVE-2026-0768
CVE-2026-0768 - Draft or TODO
PoC: CVE-2026-82329
CVE-2026-82329 - Draft or TODO
PoC: tomcat-line-check
CVE-2026-24880: does Apache's upgrade advice actually apply to your Tomcat? Detects the fix by class presence, not version comparison. Covers 7.0/8.0/8.5/9.0/10.0/10.1/11.0 lines.
PoC: log4j2-vuln-lab
CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell) 漏洞复现靶场 | SpringBoot + Log4j2 2.14.1 | 3 个攻击向量 PoC 验证
PoC: CVE-2021-3493-Exploit
It's a CVE-2021-3493 Exploit written in C
PoC: gha-lab-8e9316151c
Controlled security-research lab reproducing CVE-2024-1540 (GitHub Actions command injection in gradio-app/gradio deploy+test-visual.yml) — flattened snapshot of gradio-app/gradio @ f35f615e33a5dd90bfeb106b6f5dca689849fcef
PoC: gha-lab-6255f5fc33
Security-research lab reproducing CVE-2023-6572 (GHSA-gqvf-3hgp-5hxv): command injection in gradio-app/gradio's workflow_run handling of generate-changeset.yml
PoC: nextcloud-cve-2023-49792-research
A project analysis of CVE-2023-49792, inspired by a HackerOne report I have recently come across.
PoC: CVE-2026-30252
The ZenShare Suite application is vulnerable by a Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability, affecting web application login and recovery password functionalities.
PoC: CVE-2026-30251
A reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the login_newpwd.php endpoint of Interzen Consulting S.r.l ZenShare Suite v17.0 allows attackers to execute arbitrary Javascript in the context of the user's browser via a crafted URL injected into the codice_azienda parameter.
PoC: gha-lab-fb32aba4a3
Authorized lab reproduction of CVE-2023-26493 (GHSL-2023-027): command injection via github.head_ref in cocos-engine's <Web> Interface check pull_request_target workflow
PoC: CVE-2018-14667_Lab_POC
Demonstration of the expression language (EL) injection vulnerability CVE-2018-14667 using the photoalbum lab under Jboss application server
PoC: weakrng-sweep
Weak-RNG stream-sweep research (CVE-2026-71851 class): PRNG schemes x seeds -> BIP39 -> victim set membership
PoC: cve-2022-29117-assessment
CVE-2022-29117 (.NET Cookie-Handling DoS) Assessment, Understanding & Questions Framework
PoC: POC-CVE-2026-0073
Security research PoC for CVE-2026-0073: ADB authentication bypass verification
PoC: gha-lab-232af4821f
Security-research lab reproducing CVE-2021-4281 (GHSA-3796-3f93-cfvx): shell command injection via PR head-branch name in .github/workflows/combine-prs.yml (snapshot of BraveUX/for-the-badge @ 409c1fda). Do not use; authorized reproduction only.
PoC: CVE-2026-82222
GiveWP <= 4.16.7.1 Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection → RCE
PoC: CVE-2026-76569
Reflected XSS via search GET Parameter in Phoca Download
PoC: activemq-cve-lab
ActiveMQ CVE-2015-5254 模拟靶场 - 用于 CVE 测试评测和 SCA 扫描演示
PoC: ghostlock-x200-app
vivo X200 设备端一键 root App（Shizuku 授权 shell 域执行，CVE-2026-43499）
PoC: gha-lab-b9842b12c0
Authorized security-research lab reproducing CVE-2021-21423 (GHSA-gg2g-m5wc-vccq): projen rebuild-bot pwn request via issue_comment
PoC: gha-lab-e4a85583c3
Security-research lab reproducing CVE-2020-36762 (GHSA-h9gr-83jq-f3xc): bash command injection via github.event.comment.body in the comment workflow of ONSdigital/ras-collection-instrument
PoC: Root-My-Galaxy
KSU installer for supported Samsung Galaxy firmware with CVE-2026-43499
PoC: CVE-2026-78905-Facebook-Account-Takeover
Social Media Infrastructure Vulnerability Research. CVE-2026-78905: OAuth token reuse and session hijacking in Facebook's Graph API.
PoC: CVE-2026-78904-Digital-Dinar-Drain
CBDC Infrastructure Vulnerability Research. CVE-2026-78904: Infinite mint and redemption bypass in central bank digital currency APIs.
PoC: CVE-2026-78903-SWIFT-Kick-to-the-Creds
Offensive Research & Exploit Development. Vulnerability research, PoC development, and offensive tooling for financial infrastructure.
PoC: CVE-2026-60004-Gitea-RCE-PoC
🫖 Direct single-target Gitea CVE-2026-60004 RCE validation PoC
PoC: CVE-2026-60004-Gitea-Validator
🫖 Contract-correlated discovery and authorized validation tool for Gitea CVE-2026-60004
PoC: cve-2026-67363-67364
Balboa form Command Injection POC
PoC: Simulation-d-attaque-BlueBorne-sur-v-hicule-connect-
Simulation complète d'une attaque Bluetooth (CVE-2017-1000251) sur un véhicule autonome via CARLA Simulator ; exploitation de la vulnérabilité BlueBorne pour accéder au bus CAN et déclencher un freinage brutal, en environnement isolé (Kali Linux VM / VMware / Python).
PoC: CVE-2026-76581-Detector
Safe passive detector for identifying WPMU DEV Dashboard versions affected by CVE-2026-76581.
PoC: htb-machine-ringdown
Detailed design & exploitation writeup for Ringdown—an original Debian/Asterisk vulnerable machine featuring CVE-2024-42365 (AMI), PJSIP pre-hash cracking, and Fail2ban POSIX ACL privilege escalation.
PoC: gha-lab-83342297e0
Authorized security-research lab reproducing CVE-2024-41127 (GHSA-wcjf-5464-4wq9): poisoned pipeline execution via artifact-controlled code injection in ci-failure-comment.yml. Snapshot of monkeytypegame/monkeytype @ deeea0f.
PoC: WP2Shell-Scanner
Read-only CLI to check whether a WordPress site is exposed to WP2Shell (CVE-2026-63030 / CVE-2026-60137)
PoC: phpBB-CVE-2026-48611
Automated PoC for CVE-2026-48611 — phpBB OAuth login_link authentication bypass
PoC: Project-CVE-2026-45833
CVE-2026-45833 ChromaDB
PoC: CitrixBleedCVE-2026-8452-2025-5777
CitrixBleed Exploit Tool - CVE-2025-5777 & CVE-2026-8452. Unauthenticated remote memory read from Citrix NetScaler ADC & Gateway. Steal admin session tokens, extract nsroot hashes, dump secrets, and bypass MFA. Python 3 exploit with full memory parsing.
PoC: CVE-2026-76581
CVE-2026-76581
PoC: drupalgeddon2-cve-lab
Drupalgeddon2 CVE-2018-7600 vulnerable Drupal 7 lab
PoC: shellshock-cve-lab
Shellshock CVE-2014-6271 vulnerable CGI lab
PoC: log4shell-cve-lab
Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 vulnerable lab
PoC: CVE-2026-18741
PoC CVE-2026-18741
PoC: CVE-2026-12513
CVE-2026-12513 Vulnerability Advisory & PoC — Discovered by Huynh Kien Minh (MinhHK).
PoC: ghostlock-oppo-watch3pro
CVE-2026-43499 on OPPO Watch 3 Pro
PoC: cve-2026-82222-poc
Public PoC for CVE-2026-82222
PoC: zk-xml-probe
Static XML fixtures for authorized bug bounty testing of XML parser behaviour (CVE-2026-45071).
PoC: SOC335-CVE-2024-49138-Investigation
SOC investigation of a CVE-2024-49138 exploitation alert using log analysis, threat intelligence, and endpoint containment.
PoC: papercut-toolkit
#PaperCut CVE-2026-81578 + CVE-2026-82078 Defense Toolkit 2 3 A **defensive** toolkit to check and understand exposure to the chained
PoC: PaperCut-CVE-2026-81578-82078
Security research tool for PaperCut CVE-2026-81578 & CVE-2026-82078
PoC: vankyo-s30-bootloader-unlock
Vankyo MatrixPad S30 (Unisoc SC9863A) — Bootloader unlock via CVE-2022-38694 FDL1 method
PoC: CVE-2026-21962-Blog
CVE-2026-21962 Açığı için blog sayfası oluşturdum.
PoC: hdwebmobile-formula-pricing
WooCommerce plugin: safe formula-based product pricing, closing CVE-2026-4001's eval()-based RCE
PoC: CVE-2026-82286-gpt-crawler-Arbitrary-File-Write
CVE-2026-82286 — gpt-crawler <=1.5.1 unauthenticated arbitrary file write via outputFileName (POST /crawl). PoC + self-contained Docker lab. CVSS 8.6, CWE-22.
PoC: CVE-2026-24061-payload
A PoC exploit for CVE-2026-24061 - GNU InetUtils telnetd Argument Injection Authentication Bypass
PoC: CVE-2026-66384
CVE-2026-66384 - Draft or TODO
PoC: CVE-2026-33017-PoC-Reverse-Shell
CVE-2026-33017 PoC Reverse Shell
PoC: CVE-2026-33057---Mesop-Unauthenticated-RCE-PoC-and-yara-rules
CVE-2026-33057 - Mesop Unauthenticated RCE PoC and yara rules
PoC: CVE-2026-10036-speechbrain-rce
SpeechBrain < 1.1.1 checkpoint metadata RCE via unsafe PyYAML parsing of CKPT.yaml.
PoC: CVE-2025-55182-poc
I know you are probably here from Hack the Box, if so, yes this one actually works.
PoC: Project-CVE-2026-50751
IKEv1 VPN scanners, attempts a Check Point authentication-bypass exploit, and includes internal network scanning and reverse-shell features.
PoC: CTT-Enhanced-CVE-2026-46339-Exploit-Engine
A specialized Python framework that executes unauthenticated remote code execution via the 9Router Model Context Protocol (MCP) bridge by deploying a 33-layer temporal phase cascade, Riemann-Hadamard dispersion, and an 11 ns wedge filter to bypass traditional proxy and process-monitoring defenses.
PoC: Zimbra-CVE-2026-73570-Rules
Wazuh Rules for Detection Zimbra (CVE-2026-73570).
PoC: CVE-2022-46169
Cacti 1.2.22 unauthenticated command injection
PoC: CVE-2024-23897
Jenkins CVE-2024-23897 — CSRF-crumb aware PoC
PoC: CVE-2025-10952-ml-logger-AFR
PoC for CVE-2025-10952 — ml-logger unauthenticated arbitrary file read. CVSS 5.3
PoC: CVE-2026-65643
CVE-2026-65643 - Draft or TODO
PoC: cve-2023-23397-detection-lab
Detection and mitigation research lab for CVE-2023-23397 using network and endpoint security telemetry.
PoC: fastjson-cve
fastjson-cve-2026-16723
PoC: CVE-2026-23751-poc
Patched RemotingClient to exploit CVE-2026-23751 (Tungsten Automation - Kofax Capture Unauthenticated File Read/Write and SMB coercion via .NET HTTP Remoting)
PoC: CVE-2023-27350-CVE-2023-27351
CVE-2023-27350, CVE-2023-27351 - PaperCut - Draft or TODO
PoC: Project-CVE-2026-33017
CVE-2026-33017 - Langflow Unauthenticated RCE Exploit
PoC: CVE-2026-70463
Testing CVE-2026-70463 by Fyyre
PoC: 2025-Oracle-SSO-LDAP-Attack-Post-Incident-Written-Report
Post-incident report analyzing the Oracle Cloud SSO/LDAP supply chain attack (CVE-2021-35587). Details the exploitation of legacy server infrastructure, impact across 140,000+ cloud tenants, root-cause findings, and phased mitigation strategies.
PoC: CVE-2026-20131-Post-Incident-Written-Report
Post-incident report on CVE-2026-20131 (CVSS 10.0), a Cisco FMC insecure deserialization vulnerability exploited by Interlock ransomware. Details root-cause analysis, lateral movement tactics, and emergency containment strategies.
PoC: ghostlock-pfem10
GhostLock (CVE-2026-43499 / IonStack) research for OPPO Find X5 Pro (PFEM10): exploit chain, progress, blocker log, and OPPO 5-series kernel notes
PoC: htb-labs-connected
Hack The Box Connected machine write-up featuring enumeration, CVE-2025-57819 exploitation, reverse shell, and privilege escalation to root via FreePBX and incron.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
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