## Root Cause File: `internal/corazawaf/transaction.go`, lines 834–866. ```go parsedURL, err := url.ParseRequestURI(uri) query := "" if err != nil { tx.variables.urlencodedError.Set(err.Error()) path = uri tx.variables.requestURI.Set(uri) /* tx.Variables.VARIABLE_URI_PARSE_ERROR.Set("1") posRawQuery := strings.Index(uri, "?") if posRawQuery != -1 { tx.ExtractArguments("GET", uri[posRawQuery+1:]) path = uri[:posRawQuery] query = uri[posRawQuery+1:] } else { path = uri } tx.Variables.RequestUri.Set(uri) */ } else { tx.ExtractGetArguments(parsedURL.RawQuery) // only path that populates ARGS_GET tx.variables.requestURI.Set(parsedURL.String()) path = parsedURL.Path query = parsedURL.RawQuery } ... tx.variables.queryString.Set(query) ``` When `url.ParseRequestURI(uri)` returns an error — which Go's stdlib does for any URI containing raw control bytes (`\x00`, `\n`, `\r`, `\t`, other `0x00–0x1F`, `0x7F`) — the error branch silently produces an empty `QUERY_STRING` and an empty `ARGS_GET` collection. The fallback logic that should split on `?` and populate the GET arguments from the raw tail is already present in the source as a commented-out block, referencing a `VARIABLE_URI_PARSE_ERROR` variable that was never wired up. Consequences on the error branch: - `ARGS_GET` / `ARGS_GET_NAMES` / `ARGS` (union) are **empty** — `ExtractGetArguments` is never called. - `QUERY_STRING` is **empty** (initial `query := ""` at line 835 persists through to `queryString.Set(query)` at line 866). - `REQUEST_FILENAME` / `REQUEST_BASENAME` contain the entire URI including any `?…` query suffix (because `path = uri` at line 838 bypasses the parse, and the subsequent `strings.LastIndexAny(path, "/\\")` runs over the raw URI). - `URLENCODED_ERROR` is set to the Go error message. That variable is *also* set by the urlencoded body processor on body-decode failures, so an operator cannot distinguish "malformed URI" from "malformed request body" without string-matching the error text. - `REQUEST_URI_RAW` (set unconditionally at line 822, before the parse) **is** populated correctly. Any rule targeting `ARGS_GET`, `ARGS`, `ARGS_NAMES`, `ARGS_GET_NAMES`, or `QUERY_STRING` — which is the default target set for the vast majority of OWASP CRS GET-side signature rules — does not fire against attacker content that reaches Coraza via a URI Go's `net/url` rejects. ## Reachability This issue **does not affect the standard `coraza/v3/http` + `net/http` integration**. Go's `http.ReadRequest` calls `url.ParseRequestURI` first and rejects malformed URIs with `400 Bad Request` before `ProcessURI` is invoked. Verified experimentally against a Coraza-wrapped `net/http` server — a raw request with a control-byte-laced URI produced `HTTP 400`, and the handler was never reached. The bug is reachable when an integration forwards raw URI bytes to `tx.ProcessURI` directly, bypassing Go's HTTP parser: - **`coraza-spoa`** — HAProxy SPOP agent. Receives URI from HAProxy, which permits bytes `net/http` rejects. - **`coraza-proxy-wasm`** — Envoy WASM filter. Passes the `:path` pseudo-header from Envoy. - Custom FFI/WASM hosts and any embedder calling `tx.ProcessURI(rawURI, method, httpVersion)` with bytes not pre-validated by Go's URL parser. This gates the attack to Attack Complexity:High — a standard Go HTTP deployment is not exposed. ## Proof of Concept Direct-API reproduction (simulating the non-net/http integration path): ```go waf, _ := coraza.NewWAF(coraza.NewWAFConfig().WithDirectives(` SecRuleEngine On SecRule ARGS_GET "@contains ATTACK_HERE_XYZ" "id:9001,phase:1,deny,status:403" SecRule QUERY_STRING "@contains ATTACK_HERE_XYZ" "id:9002,phase:1,deny,status:403" `)) for _, uri := range []string{ "/search?q=ATTACK_HERE_XYZ", // baseline "/search?q=ATTACK_HERE_XYZ\x00&y=1", // NUL byte "/search?q=ATTACK_HERE_XYZ\ninjected: header", // bare LF "/search?q=ATTACK_HERE_XYZ\rhdr: x", // bare CR "/search?q=ATTACK_HERE_XYZ\tx=1", // tab } { tx := waf.NewTransaction() tx.ProcessURI(uri, "GET", "HTTP/1.1") it := tx.ProcessRequestHeaders() // inspect tx.Variables().QueryString().Get() and tx.Variables().ArgsGet().FindAll() tx.Close() } ``` Observed: | URI | `QUERY_STRING` | `ARGS_GET` | interrupted? | |---|---|---|---| | `/search?q=ATTACK_HERE_XYZ` | `q=ATTACK_HERE_XYZ` | 1 entry | **yes (403)** | | `/search?q=ATTACK_HERE_XYZ\x00&y=1` | `""` | 0 entries | **no — BYPASS** | | `/search?q=ATTACK_HERE_XYZ\ninjected: header` | `""` | 0 entries | **no — BYPASS** | | `/search?q=ATTACK_HERE_XYZ\rhdr: x` | `""` | 0 entries | **no — BYPASS** | | `/search?q=ATTACK_HERE_XYZ\tx=1` | `""` | 0 entries | **no — BYPASS** | `REQUEST_URI_RAW` is populated correctly in every case (line 822 sets it before the parse), so a rule written against `REQUEST_URI_RAW` still catches the attack. CRS and most operator-written rules target `ARGS_GET` / `ARGS` / `QUERY_STRING` — those do not fire. HTTP-layer reachability check (stock `net/http`): ``` $ printf 'GET /?q=ATTACK_HERE_XYZ\x00&y=1 HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n\r\n' | nc 127.0.0.1 8092 HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request ``` Confirms the exposure is limited to non-net/http integrations. ## Mitigation Recommended fixes, in order: ### 1. Re-enable the existing fallback and wire up `URI_PARSE_ERROR` The code to fix this is already present as a commented-out block at `transaction.go:840–851`. Re-enable it, promote the referenced `VARIABLE_URI_PARSE_ERROR` to a real transaction variable, and populate `ARGS_GET` / `QUERY_STRING` from the raw `?…` tail: ```go if err != nil { tx.variables.urlencodedError.Set(err.Error()) tx.variables.uriParseError.Set("1") // new variable tx.variables.requestURI.Set(uri) if i := strings.Index(uri, "?"); i != -1 { path = uri[:i] query = uri[i+1:] tx.ExtractGetArguments(query) // populate ARGS_GET } else { path = uri } } else { ... } ``` ### 2. Ship a companion rule in `coraza.conf-recommended` ```conf SecRule URI_PARSE_ERROR "@eq 1" \ "id:'200010',phase:1,t:none,log,deny,status:400,msg:'URI failed to parse'" ``` This gives operators a fail-closed default (analogous to rule 200003 for multipart strict error and rule 200002 for body-parse error), so non-net/http integrations at least stop the request regardless of downstream rule coverage. ### 3. Do not overload `URLENCODED_ERROR` The current code uses `URLENCODED_ERROR` for URI parse failures. That variable is also set by the urlencoded body processor on body-decode errors; operators cannot distinguish the two causes without string-matching the error text, and any rule they add will fire on both classes of failure. A dedicated `URI_PARSE_ERROR` variable (per the commented-out TODO) is the right shape. ## Affected versions All releases on the v3 branch (`>= 3.0.0, <= 3.7.0`); the silent-drop behavior has been present since the first v3 release. Only deployments using non-net/http integrations (coraza-spoa, coraza-proxy-wasm, custom FFI) are exposed in practice. ## References - `internal/corazawaf/transaction.go` lines 834–866 (ProcessURI error branch) - `internal/corazawaf/transaction.go` line 822 (`REQUEST_URI_RAW` is populated before the parse, which is why `REQUEST_URI_RAW`-targeted rules still catch the attack) - Commented-out fallback at lines 840–851 referencing `VARIABLE_URI_PARSE_ERROR` - CWE-20 — Improper Input Validation - CWE-436 — Interpretation Conflict ### Severity (revised 2026-10-02) `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N` (4.0, Medium). Attack Complexity stays High: the bypass only applies to integrations that pass Coraza a raw URI that Go's URL parser rejects, which `net/http` does not. The previous vector scored Integrity High (6.8); it is scored here like Coraza's other inspection bypasses. Impact metrics follow the convention used across Coraza's WAF-bypass advisories: the vulnerable component is Coraza, but the impact lands on the protected application, so Scope is Changed. The bypass hides a payload from inspection; the application still has to be vulnerable to it, so Integrity is Low and Confidentiality is not scored separately. _AI involvement in this section: Claude Opus 5.5 (Anthropic), via Claude Code, re-derived the CVSS vector from the project's triage guidance (AGENTS.md, "CVSS preconditions get verified, not copied from the report") and drafted this text. A human maintainer (fzipi) chose the `S:C/I:L` impact convention and directed this update._
PoC: node2shell-scanner
High fidelity detection mechanism for node2shell (CVE-2026-111497)
PoC: http2shell-CVE-2026-111497
PoC for CVE-2026-111497, a buffer overflow in Google Brotli 1.0.3–1.2.0 that may cause memory corruption, data disclosure, DoS, or RCE when processing crafted compressed data.
PoC: runcloud-php2shell-patch
Build script for PHP (7.2 - 8.1) binaries mitigating PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619) on RunCloud Ubuntu servers.
PoC: php2shell-scan
A deliberately limited, read-only security scanner for assessing exposure to CVE-2026-109618 (RFC 1867 multipart OOM memory corruption) and CVE-2026-109619 (stale global state use-after-free) in PHP deployments.
PoC: CVE-2026-98260-OnePlus16-PYB110-Jailbreak
CVE-2026-98260 (exec: posix CPU timer UAF) - one-command temporary root for OnePlus 16 (PYB110) from uid 2000 shell, with KernelSU/FinaSU handover
PoC: php2shell-wordpress-rce-fullchain
Pre-auth RCE against WordPress (7.1.2/7.1.3) via PHP2Shell CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619
PoC: php2shell-scanner
Audit & Vulnerability Detection Scanner for PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 & CVE-2026-109619) with Hardening Guidelines
PoC: php2shell-wordpress-check
A read-only Site Health check that compares the PHP version your site is running with the releases that fix PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619)
PoC: CVE-2026-111497
Non-invasive Python detector for CVE-2026-111497 with Brotli/Node.js version checks, JSON inventories, and CI-ready reports.
PoC: AI-Threat-Detection-PHP-CGI-Vulnerabilities
A curated, deep-dive guide to leveraging Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Large Language Models (LLMs) to detect, analyze, and neutralize advanced web application threats—with a specific focus on recent, critical PHP CGI Argument Injection vulnerabilities (such as CVE-2024-4577) and similar Remote Code Execution (RCE) breaches.
PoC: php2shell-doctor
The safe checker for the php2shell PHP RCEs (CVE-2026-109618/109619). Local, offline, vendor-backport aware.
PoC: node2shell-lab
Node2Shell (CVE-2026-111497, Node.js Brotli decoder OOB write) black-box pentest lab — crash-gated double flag, agent-calibrated. Part of the *2Shell lab series. EN/中文/日本語.
PoC: php2shell-ioc
Curated IoCs, detection engineering rules, and automated threat intel feeds for PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 & CVE-2026-109619).
PoC: php2shell-toolkit
CVE-2026-109618 PHP session.upload_progress detection & authorized testing toolkit
PoC: HTTP2Shell-PoC
PoC for CVE-2026-111497 (HTTP2Shell)
PoC: cve-2024-10441-synology-rce
Writeup y PoC educativo de CVE-2024-10441 (RCE pre-auth como root en Synology DSM via synoplugind). CVE ya parcheado; uso autorizado/defensivo.
PoC: php2shell-migration
Agent Skills skill to detect, patch and verify PHP apps affected by PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619) or outdated PHP. Works with Claude Code, Codex, Copilot, Cursor, Gemini CLI, OpenCode.
PoC: php2shell
CVE-2026-109618 exploit tool — RCE via OOM ghost bucket in PHP POST parsing (CVSS 9.2)
PoC: php82-ubuntu2404-backport
PHP 8.2.35 rebuild (CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619 fix, no telemetry) for Ubuntu 24.04 hosts running php8.2 8.2.7-1ubuntu1
PoC: CVE-2026-109618-109619-php2shell
CVE-2026-109618-109619 PHP2shell
PoC: php2shellscanner-web
Browser-based terminal-style UI for assetnote's php2shell-scanner (CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619), with live per-probe SSE activity log and JSON export. Detection engine by assetnote; original discovery by Calif.
PoC: php2shell-research-public
Reproducible local Docker lab for CVE-2026-109618 PHP-FPM validation
PoC: PHP2shell
PHP2Shell — Unauthenticated RCE chain exploiting CVE-2026-109618 (OOM memory corruption) + CVE-2026-109619 (stale global state) in PHP.
PoC: B63-POC-CVE-2026-20131
CVE-2026-20131 (Cisco FMC): pre-auth Java deserialization to root — VERIFIED-AT-PRIMITIVE showcase artifact (rebuilt twins; appliance not executed, entitlement-gated)
PoC: B63-POC-CVE-2026-75650
CVE-2026-75650 (StyleSmuggler): unauthenticated RCE via template injection in Magento Open Source / Adobe Commerce 2.4.4–2.4.9 — b63 showcase, lab-verified with patched-build negative test
PoC: CVE-2026-98260-pudding-android
Target-specific Android CVE-2026-98260 research port for Xiaomi 17 (pudding)
PoC: node2shell-detector
node2shell-detector - local + network detections for Node2Shell (CVE-2026-111497) by IONSEC. Python CLI: runtime posture, Brotli decoder fingerprints, dependency exposure, log fingerprints, opt-in self-test; plus Sigma, Suricata, ModSecurity, YARA rules and edge/app snippets.
PoC: hdu-is-work1
Secure REST API with CI/CD security scanning (Bandit SAST + pip-audit SCA) and a reproducible CVE-2017-1000028 lab (GlassFish 4.1)
PoC: php81-el7-php2shell
Unofficial CentOS 7 (EL7) rebuild of Remi php-8.1.34-6 with the PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619) mitigation
PoC: sl0ppy-riftscan-CVE-2026-42945
riftscan module for metasploit msf for cve CVE-2026-42945
PoC: CVE-2026-84589-macOS-TCC-Bypass
CVE-2026-84589: macOS TCC privacy bypass via FaceTime impersonation. Technical PoC analysis, Apple disclosure timeline, and patch coverage.
PoC: php2shell-fixer
Claude Code plugin: audit and patch PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618/109619) on Debian/Ubuntu PHP servers
PoC: PHP-CVE-2026-115560-Cheker-v-1.0
PHP alerta de CVE-2026-115560 PERO SABES SI TUS SISTEMAS SON VULNERABLES? Bueno amigos hice un script que checa si eres vulnerable y te dice exactamente que parámetros modificar para no estar vulnerable pero la buena noticia es que, según el propio proyecto, se trata de un riesgo poco probable en la práctica.
PoC: test-php
Controlled lab pinned to PHP 8.3.35 for reproducing/patch-verifying PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619)
PoC: CVE-2026-109618
CVE-2026-109618 - PHP session.upload_progress Heap UAF Pre-Auth RCE (CVSS 9.2)
PoC: CVE-2026-109619
CVE-2026-109619 - PHP session.upload_progress File Poisoning + LFI RCE (CVSS 9.2)
PoC: http2shell-check
Offline Brotli / HTTP2Shell (CVE-2026-111497) exposure and inventory checker across verified ecosystems. Python 3.10+, no dependencies or exploit payloads.
PoC: php2shell-behind-nginx
php2shell (CVE-2026-109618/9) behind nginx: measurements, lab, and an app-LFI chain that survives a proxy
PoC: CVE-2026-116106
CVE-2026-116106 - HeyCyan App 1.0.103 (Android) controle de acesso incorreto no FileProvider (CWE-284) - VulDB VDB-426174
PoC: CVE-2026-116105
CVE-2026-116105 - HeyCyan App 1.0.103 (Android) transmissao em texto claro / cleartext transmission (CWE-319) - VulDB VDB-426173
PoC: C-A-S
C.A.S-Exploit — Python-based security research and proof-of-concept toolkit for CVE-2017-5689 (Intel AMT authentication bypass), featuring Shodan discovery, HTTP/WS-Management testing, batch scanning, and vulnerability logging.
PoC: php2shell-monitor-rz
PHP2Shell Monitor - Real-time detection for CVE-2026-109618/109619 exploitation attempts
PoC: msgpack-CVE-2021-23410-test.hpp
the improve SourceInfo UX around server:
PoC: php2shell-unchained
Isolated Docker adversary-emulation lab: PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618/619, CVE-2026-115560) exploit chains, 11-scenario patch & WAF audit, Sliver C2, Cloudflare Quick Tunnel + Tor egress, guided mitigation validation.
PoC: Root-My-Galaxy-Payloads-SM-S928B
SM-S928B / S928BXXU6EZIF port of the CVE-2026-43499 app payload - work in progress, not yet rooted
PoC: CVE-2026-0073
CVE-2026-0073: Android adbd TLS auth bypass PoC. Exploits a logic bug where OpenSSL's EVP_PKEY_cmp() returns -1 on key type mismatch (EC vs RSA), incorrectly evaluating to true and granting access. Includes functional Python and standalone C exploits to gain unauthenticated remote shell on Android devices with Wireless Debugging enabled.
PoC: CVE-2025-26326
CVE-2025-26326 - vulnerabilidade critica em add-ons de conexao remota do NVDA (recuperado)
PoC: CVE-2024-6387-how-to-fix
Guia de correcao e mitigacao da CVE-2024-6387 (regreSSHion / OpenSSH) (recuperado)
PoC: Cloudflare-Exploits-CVE-2026-14440-CVE-2026-3125-CVE-2025-0651
PoC e exploits para CVE-2026-14440 (Universal SSL CAA Bypass), CVE-2026-3125 (OpenNext SSRF), CVE-2025-0651 (WARP Windows Privesc) | By Gh0st-Bx1
PoC: Bigfix-PHP-Vulnerability-Scanner-Content-CVE-2026-109618-CVE-2026-109619
Bigfix PHP Vulnerability Scanner Content (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619) for Windows, Linux and Mac.
PoC: PHP2Shell
A local Docker-based research lab for investigating PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619), comparing PHP 8.4.26 and 8.4.27, and validating upstream security fixes and regression tests.
PoC: Galaxy-Tab-S10FE-Root
One-command ADB root for Samsung Galaxy Tab S10 FE (SM-X520, X520XXSACZH6): CVE-2026-43499 GhostLock exploit + KernelSU late-load. No bootloader unlock.
PoC: Fortinet-Exploits-CVE-2026-39808-106173-107656
PoC e Exploits completos para CVE-2026-39808 (FortiSandbox RCE), CVE-2026-106173 (FortiSIEM gRPC Path Traversal RCE) e CVE-2026-107656 (FortiSandbox Auth Bypass) - CVSS 9.6-9.8
PoC: bug-free-broccoli
CVE-2026-59248
PoC: php2shell-checker
Check PHP for PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619): fixed PHP and Ubuntu/Debian/AlmaLinux packages, plus a read-only version check script.
PoC: http2shell-checker
Check Node.js, Bun, Python Brotli and libbrotli for HTTP2Shell / Node2Shell (CVE-2026-111497): fixed versions and a read-only version check script.
PoC: CVE-2026-109618-109619-checker
CVE-2026-109618 / 109619 checker
PoC: CVE-2026-106781
CVE-2026-106781 CH341SER Driver Installer Privilege Escalation
PoC: CVE-2026-112900-PoC
Proof of Concept (PoC) demonstrating Argument Injection in Pillow's Ghostscript call (Pillow < 13.0.0) potentially leading to arbitrary command execution (RCE).
PoC: Root-My-Galaxy-S4
Root the Samsung Galaxy S4 on official firmware via CVE-2015-1805 & KNOX e-fuse stays intact
PoC: ksu-root
在 REDMI K90 Max（代号 prague / OS4.0.0.14）上，从手机端一键开一个临时 root。利用 CVE-2026-64560（posix-cpu-timers UAF）加载 KernelSU LKM，重启即失效。不需要电脑、不刷机、不解锁 Bootloader。
PoC: CVE-2026-115560
PHP session.upload_progress Enabled - CVE-2026-115560 Precondition
PoC: php2shell
php2shell(CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619) EXP
PoC: cve-2026-98260-vivo-gki-research
Research notes: porting CVE-2026-98260 to vivo/iQOO GKI 6.6.127 (no exploit code; coordinated disclosure planned)
PoC: brotli-cve-check
Agent skill + script to scan projects for CVE-2026-111497 (Brotli), rate criticality and suggest fixes
PoC: php2shellX
Next-generation exploit orchestrator for CVE-2026-109618/619 — adds Cloudflare WAF bypass, flexible target specification (URL/host/port/path/batch), multi-format output (JSON/CSV/table), resume capability, and lab automation (Docker restart). Authored by TESTERXMA.
PoC: a12-ghostlock
One-click root for the Samsung Galaxy A12 (SM-A125F) via CVE-2026-43499 (GhostLock) - KernelSU-compatible userspace stack, grant dialog, verified root in Neo Backup / App Manager / Shizuku
PoC: o3root
Shizuku-driven CVE-2026-98260 root + KernelSU runtime LKM loader for Xiaomi yingtian / lhasa (kernel 6.18.21)
PoC: homebrew-php2shell-doctor
Homebrew tap for php2shell-doctor - the safe checker for the php2shell PHP RCEs (CVE-2026-109618/109619)
PoC: php-fpm-docker-PHP-7.4-CVE-2026-109618-109619-free
php:7.4-fpm-CVE-2026-109618-109619-free
PoC: cve-2026-25262-poc
CVE-2026-25262 (Qualcomm BootROM) deep-dive on the Black Hat Asia 2026 'A journey through Sahara' talk + read-only Sahara/EDL recon harness. GPLv3.
PoC: CVE-2026-74580
CVE-2026-74580 vhost: reset the vring metadata cache on vring reconfiguration - Exploit
PoC: php2shell
Патчи безопасности и сканер аудита для FastPanel и Debian PHP против уязвимостей CVE-2026-109618 и CVE-2026-109619 (PHP 5.2–8.1). Пошаговые руководства по сборке.
PoC: log4shell-audit-4
Quarterly security briefing research notes and remediation tracking for Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228).
PoC: CEV-2020-25213_wp-file-manger_exploit
CVE-2020-25213 - Unauthenticated RCE exploit for WP File Manager plugin (≤ 6.0) | Educational purposes only
PoC: php-vulns-discovered-23-10-2026
Patch temporanee per sistemi con versioni di PHP inferiori a 8.2.35 contro CVE-2026-109618 - CVE-2026-109619 - CVE-2026-115560
PoC: CVE-2026-109618-php56-public
Exact-build PHP 5.6 research and reproducible labs for CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619
PoC: Compiled-CVE-2023-21752
Compiled version of Wh04m1001's exploit for iwr/wget delivery to VM.
PoC: CVE-2026-83548
CVE-2026-83548 — SonicWall SMA1000 Work Place pre-auth SSRF
PoC: CVE-2026-64849
CVE-2026-64849 — MLflow SSRF
PoC: CVE-2026-21627
CVE-2026-21627 proof of concept and exploit script
PoC: php8.1-cve-109618-109619-fix
php:8.1.34-fpm-alpine + official PHP patch for CVE-2026-109618/109619
PoC: php7.4-cve-109618-109619-fix
php:7.4.33-fpm-alpine + official PHP patch for CVE-2026-109618/109619
PoC: php2shell
Exploit & analysis for PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619). Demonstrating memory disclosure, ASLR bypass, and RCE via session.upload_progress memory bailout dangling pointers.
PoC: php2shell-demo
🛡️ Hands-on defensive Docker lab for the October 2026 RCE week — PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618/619), Node.js Brotli & Next.js sharp. See the attack surface and blast radius, and learn to shut them down. No exploits.
PoC: CVE-2026-115560
CVE-2026-115560: PHP session upload-progress serialize_handler mismatch → pre-auth object injection → RCE. Check/exploit/verify scripts + Docker lab + Suricata/Sigma detection rules.
PoC: CVE-2026-86426
CVE-2026-86426 CHECK
PoC: php-radar
Detection-only exposure scanner for PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618/109619): finds PHP across repositories, hosts, a network perimeter, and AWS, and grades each install by version and config without triggering the bug.
PoC: spip-cve-2026
PoC for CVE-2026-72708 (blind SQLi) and CVE-2026-109378 (SSRF) in SPIP, both fixed in 4.4.18
PoC: php2shell
PHP2Shell: finding and patching affected PHP CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619
PoC: php2shell-audit
Exposure scanner, patch verifier and threat hunter for CVE-2026-109618/9, with a cyberpunk TUI.
PoC: DFRoot
Fork of datfooldive/DFRoot (DirtyFrag CVE-2026-43284, ReSukiSU) + GitHub Actions APK build
PoC: php8-cve-109618-109619-fix
php:8.0.30-fpm-alpine + official PHP patch for CVE-2026-109618/109619
PoC: brotli-secfix
Security backport toolkit for CVE-2026-111497 on Ubuntu 24.04, featuring upstream patch verification, custom Debian package builds, and offline remediation procedures.
PoC: CVE-2026-88009-PoC
CVE-2026-88009 — Traefik forwards a rootless opaque request target that routing/forwardAuth see as '/'. Auth bypass + access-log evasion, verified v3.7.10 / v3.7.13.
PoC: CVE-2026-85595-PoC
CVE-2026-85595 — Traefik digestAuth authentication bypass (unknown username => empty HA1). Lab-verified: v3.7.10 bypass, v3.7.11 401.
PoC: CVE-2026-85168-PoC
CVE-2026-85168 — n8n Git node RCE from repo-local filter.*.clean / merge-driver config on add|commit|checkout. Verified v2.35.3 / v2.36.2.
PoC: CVE-2026-86076-PoC
CVE-2026-86076 — n8n expression sandbox escape via class-field __sanitize rebinding (backend RCE). Verified v2.37.6 (uid=node) / v2.37.7.
PoC: CVE-2026-109618-CVE-2026-109619-php2shell-
MOSTAFA JR7 - Custom security research framework targeting PHP 8.4.26 Apache Prefork RCE and ASLR bypass.
PoC: CVE-2026-111497-node2shell
CVE-2026-111497 Node2Shell — Node.js Brotli OOB Write RCE PoC (CVSS 9.2)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N
Get alerted for CVEs like this
Register your stack and get notified within minutes when a matching CVE drops.
Start monitoring free