Security Feed

## Summary `(*backend).createDependentVolumesFromBackup` in [`internal/server/storage/backend.go`](https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/d768f81c0a1d985f35ae56219519822b080bf5e3/internal/server/storage/backend.go) contains a cluster of unguarded pointer derefs on every dependent-volume entry's `VolumeSnapshots[i]`, `Volume`, and `Pool` sub-fields. An authenticated user with `can_create_instances` permission on any project can crash the `incusd` daemon by uploading an instance backup tarball whose `

The `fluent-plugin-s3` plugin (specifically the `in_s3` input plugin) supports reading and decompressing heavily compressed files (such as `gzip`, `lzma2`, and `lzop`) from Amazon S3. It was discovered that the plugin read the entire decompressed payload into memory at once without enforcing a strict size limit. If an attacker has sufficient permissions to upload files to the monitored S3 bucket, they can upload a maliciously crafted, highly compressed file. When Fluentd attempts to decompress

### Impact Affects: Anyone who generates the UNIX man pages in Fuji <= `0.8.0` build with the `dev` crate feature. Consequences: `/usr/share/man/man8` may be entirely removed & re-created without any of the previous entries. ### Patches At the time of writing, no new version has been released on crates.io, due to an unrelated CI/CD publishing issue. Due to the same unrelated publishing issue, no new GitHub Releases version has been released. ### Workarounds Do not run `fuji manual` on non-`dev

## Summary The `/list_relationships` and `/retrieve_graph_neighborhood` endpoints call `getAuthenticatedUserId` (confirming a valid session exists) but do not pass the resolved user ID into the Supabase query as an `.eq("user_id", userId)` filter. As a result, queries return rows from all users rather than scoping to the authenticated caller's data. ## Affected code **`/list_relationships`** (`src/actions.ts`): - Calls `getAuthenticatedUserId` but does not apply `.eq("user_id", userId)` to th

## Summary The `ValidateArgumentType` RPC endpoint in `service/internal/api/api.go` does not perform any authentication or authorization checks. Unlike all other data-returning API endpoints, it does not call `auth.UserFromApiCall` or `checkDashboardAccess`. When `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin` is enabled (the security-conscious configuration), this endpoint remains accessible to unauthenticated users and can be used as an oracle to enumerate valid action binding IDs and their argument configuration

### Impact Snipe-IT S3 signature image retrieval lacks authorization before temporary URL. On S3-backed deployments, authenticated users who know a signature filename can obtain a 5-minute signed S3 URL because the S3 branch returns before the `authorize()` call used by the local-file branch. ## Key evidence `routes/web.php:135-143`; `app/Http/Controllers/ActionlogController.php:16-44`; `app/Http/Controllers/Account/AcceptanceController.php:160,175`; `app/Listeners/LogListener.php:56`; `app/H

### Impact A vulnerability was identified in Snipe-IT v8.4.0 (build 21280-g91a95dbc6) that allows any authenticated user with generic asset edit permissions to delete files attached to any asset in the system, regardless of ownership or company assignment. This constitutes an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability caused by a class-level authorization check in the file deletion endpoint, where an instance-level check is required. The vulnerability exists in both the web and API c

### Summary Attachment passwords are hashed using SHA-1, a cryptographically broken algorithm. SHA-1 has been vulnerable to collision attacks since 2017 (SHAttered). ### Details **Affected File** : `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Attachment/AbstractAttachment.php` <img width="810" height="427" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6499a008-3ece-4291-8296-f1d3303ba35c" /> ### Impact - An attacker can generate SHA-1 collisions to bypass attachment protection - Risk of password

GNU SASL before 2.2.4 lacks sanitization of a short challenge in _gsasl_ntlm_client_step in the NTLM client, which could result in memory disclosure via a crafted server.

HCL Connections contains a broken access control vulnerability that may allow an unauthorized user to view data in a single specific scenario.

### Summary Special template of issue index pattern may cause panic. ### Details in internal/markup/markup.go ```go link = fmt.Sprintf(`<a href="%s">%s</a>`, com.Expand(metas["format"], metas), m) ``` Issue index pattern is rendered to link with `com.Expand`. However, `com.Expand` is not safe. ```go i = strings.Index(template, "}") if s, ok := match[template[:i]]; ok { ``` when `{` is found but `}` not found, i comes to 1, template[:-1] will be called, and then panicked ![image](https://

## Summary Certain federation endpoints do not consistently apply output encoding when rendering user-supplied parameters into HTML responses. Under a non-default configuration used in some clustered deployments, this inconsistency can result in reflected XSS in the OpenAM origin without authentication.

## Summary A malicious container can crash or destabilize the privileged Inspektor Gadget process when a **gadget using USDT probes** is deployed. The vulnerability is in the USDT note parser (`pkg/uprobetracer/usdt.go`) which is invoked when a gadget with a `SEC("usdt/...")` section attaches to a target binary. An unprivileged process can place a crafted ELF binary at the expected library path, triggering one of two attack vectors: 1. **Panic (immediate crash):** A stapsdt note with a small `

### Impact A Parse Server LiveQuery subscriber can receive object field values they are not authorized to read when a single `save` changes both an object field and the subscriber's ACL read access to that object. When such a save removes the subscriber's read access, the resulting `leave` event still carries the post-update object body, disclosing the new field values the subscriber is no longer permitted to read. The symmetric case applies to the `enter` event: when a save grants read access,

### Impact A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability affected the Markdown/RichText field preview renderer in Sveltia CMS. The DOMPurify sanitization configuration used for Markdown previews explicitly permitted `iframe` elements without enforcing a `sandbox` attribute or restricting iframe sources. Sanitized Markdown output was then inserted into the CMS preview DOM as raw HTML. Because no sandboxing or source validation was applied, a Markdown field containing an `iframe` whose src p

### Impact Under concurrency, `CheckPermission` and `CheckBulkPermissions` can return `PERMISSIONSHIP_HAS_PERMISSION` for a (resource, permission, subject) whose correct answer is `PERMISSIONSHIP_CONDITIONAL_PERMISSION`. You are impacted if **all** of the following hold: 1. Your schema has a permission combining relations with an intersection or exclusion, where a subject reaches it through a caveated branch and a non-caveated branch. For example: ```zed definition user {} caveat

### Summary A user that is granted namespace management (`/sys/namespaces`) capabilities within a non-root namespace ("the victim namespace") can abuse special handling of the literal path `"root"` in namespace path canonicalization to manage the victim namespace itself. ### Details Several endpoints under `/sys/namespaces/*` accept a namespace path segment that is canonicalized and then appended to the path of the sys mount's containing namespace (set via path prefix or `X-Vault-Namespace`

### Summary OpenBao users with access to the `sys/leases/revoke/:lease_id` endpoint in any namespace can revoke leases in any other namespace as long as the lease identifier is known to them, bypassing ACLs that should apply for cross-namespace revocations. ### Impact OpenBao's namespaces provide multi-tenant separation. A tenant who intentionally leaks lease identifiers can have their lease and underlying credential revoked by a user in another tenant. ### Patch This will be fixed in OpenB

### Summary `Concurrent::ReadWriteLock#release_write_lock` does not verify that the calling thread acquired the write lock. Any thread with access to the lock object can release an active write lock held by another thread. A second writer can then enter its critical section while the first writer is still running. `Concurrent::ReadWriteLock#release_read_lock` also decrements the shared counter even when no read lock is held. Calling it on a fresh lock changes the counter from `0` to `-1`, after