CVEs

### Impact A CoreWCF service hosted on Unix Domain Sockets with the PosixIdentity client credential type (UnixDomainSocketBinding with Security.Mode = TransportCredentialOnly and Security.Transport.ClientCredentialType = PosixIdentity) does not require the client to perform the application/unixposix stream upgrade before dispatching messages. ### Patches Fixed in CoreWCF v1.8.1 and v1.9.1 ### Workarounds Restrict filesystem access to the UDS socket file using owner/group/mode (e.g. chmod 0660

### Impact A CoreWCF service is running and listening on a Kafka topic receiving a null-value record will stop processing new records from that topic. #### Preconditions The attacker has produce/write permission on a topic that CoreWCF is consuming from. If the broker permits anonymous publishes, no authentication is required. ### Patches Fixed in CoreWCF v1.8.1 and v1.9.1 ### Workarounds Only allow authenticated writes to a topic

### Impact An unauthenticated remote attacker who can place a SOAP header lexically before `wsse:Security` can embed a `ds:Signature` of their choosing inside that header and cause the server to verify the attacker-supplied signature instead of the one carried in the security header. #### Preconditions Exploitation requires the endpoint be configured with an endorsing supporting token binding, and the attacker constructs a `ds:Signature` whose `KeyInfo` resolves through the receive-side token r

### Impact Given a malformed `{% case %}` tag without associated `{% when %}` or `{% else %}` block, and no terminating `{% endcase %}` tag, Python Liquid hangs in an infinite loop at parse time. This allows malicious template authors to craft templates for a denial of service attack. ### Patches The issue is fixed in version 2.2.1 with the correction of the `liquid.TokenStream.eof` attribute. The `kind` and `value` of the special EOF token are now the same, so either can be tested against `liq

### Summary `Oj.load` in `:object` mode reads uninitialized stack memory (and, for long keys, reads out of bounds) when parsing a JSON object whose key is 254 bytes or longer. The interned bytes can surface to the caller, disclosing process stack memory. ### Details In `ext/oj/intern.c`, `form_attr()` handles the long-key path by allocating a heap buffer `b`, populating it with the attribute name, and then freeing it — but it passed the **uninitialized stack buffer `buf`** (not `b`) to `rb_in

## Impact containerd's CRI checkpoint import process contains a vulnerability where it fails to validate the image references specified within a checkpoint image's configuration. An attacker with permissions to create pods can use a crafted checkpoint image to force containerd to pull a malicious image and assign it an arbitrary local tag, thereby poisoning the node's local image cache. Subsequently, if other pods on the same node attempt to use the poisoned tag with an `IfNotPresent` (or `Never

### Impact A relation query using the `$relatedTo` operator could read the membership of a `Relation` field even when that field was hidden from the requesting client by `protectedFields`, and even when the object owning the relation was not readable by the client under its ACL or class-level permissions. The request requires only the public API credentials that Parse clients normally carry — no user session, master key, or Cloud Code is needed. As a result, an unauthenticated client who knows

### Impact Apps that enable MFA and deny `get` on the `_User` class via Class-Level Permissions could expose sensitive user data through the `/login` and `/verifyPassword` endpoints. These endpoints re-fetch the user through the access-controlled query pipeline (CLP, `protectedFields`, auth-adapter sanitizers) before responding. When that re-fetch was denied by the `_User` `get` permission, the server fell back to the raw database row, exposing raw `authData` (including MFA TOTP secrets and re

### Description The Stimulus controller shipped with `symfony/ux-autocomplete` renders AJAX response items into the dropdown by interpolating the `text` field directly into HTML template literals (`<div>${item[labelField]}</div>`) inside `_createAutocompleteWithRemoteData()`. The value is parsed as HTML rather than text, so any markup contained in the AJAX response is executed by the browser. When the dropdown values are derived from user-supplied content, an attacker can craft a string that t

### Description `Symfony\UX\Autocomplete\Doctrine\EntitySearchUtil::addSearchClause()` builds the `LIKE` expression used by the autocomplete endpoint by wrapping the client-supplied query in `%...%` without escaping the SQL `LIKE` wildcards (`%`, `_`, `\`). The value is passed as a bound parameter, so this is not SQL injection, but a client can send `%` to match every row or use `_` as a single-character wildcard. Because `searchable_fields` defaults to every property of the entity and the aut

### Description `Symfony\UX\LiveComponent\Util\ChildComponentPartialRenderer::createHtml()` interpolates the `$childTag` argument directly into the HTML output as a tag name, without escaping or validation. The value originates from client-controlled JSON (`children[id].tag`) parsed by `LiveComponentSubscriber` and propagated through `InterceptChildComponentRenderSubscriber`, so an attacker who can reach the Live Component endpoint can inject arbitrary HTML, including `<script>` tags, on any re

### Impact The `routeAllowList` server option restricts external client access to a configured list of REST API routes. The check is only enforced as Express middleware against the outer HTTP request URL, so the `/batch` handler dispatches each sub-request to the internal router without re-running the allow-list check. An external caller whose outer route matches `batch` can issue batch sub-requests to any REST API route that the operator omitted from the allow-list. Authentication, ACL, CLP,

### Impact A vulnerability in containerd allows a maliciously crafted image to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) condition. When creating a container from this image, memory exhaustion occurs, leading to an Out Of Memory (OOM) kill of the containerd process. This renders the container runtime API unavailable and can disrupt clients such as the Docker Engine or Kubernetes control-plane components. ### Patches This bug has been fixed in the following containerd versions: * 2.3.2 * 2.2.5 * 2.1.9 *

### Description When a `#[LiveProp]` is typed as a `DateTimeInterface` and no explicit `format` is configured, `Symfony\UX\LiveComponent\LiveComponentHydrator::hydrateObjectValue()` falls back to `new $className($value)`. The `DateTime` / `DateTimeImmutable` constructors accept relative strings such as `"now"`, `"tomorrow"`, or `"+10 years"`, so a writable, format-less date prop can be pushed to an arbitrary point in time by the client. Components that rely on a date prop to gate time-based bus

### Impact Blind SQL injection vulnerability in `UpdateQueryBuilder` and `SoftDeleteQueryBuilder` affecting MySQL and MariaDB users. `UpdateQueryBuilder` and `SoftDeleteQueryBuilder` (including their `addOrderBy` variants) do not validate the `order` parameter against an allowlist of permitted values (`ASC`/`DESC`). The caller-supplied value is stored verbatim and concatenated directly into the generated SQL string without quoting or parameterization. `SelectQueryBuilder.orderBy` performs this

**Affected versions:** v0.123.0 through v0.163.0. Earlier versions are not affected. **Fixed in:** v0.163.1. **Severity:** Medium. Requires the attacker to be able to place (or convince a site author to place) a symlink inside a mounted directory — for example, inside a locally-vendored theme under `themes/`. Themes mounted as Go modules from GitHub have symlinks stripped on download and are not affected. Multi-directory walks (e.g. content/asset walking) were not affected either; only direct lo

Hugo's default code-block renderer wrote the Markdown code-fence language / info-string into the `<code class="language-…" data-lang="…">` wrapper without HTML escaping. A fence info-string containing a quote and a `<script>` payload breaks out of the attribute and injects a live script element. This is not an issue if you fully trust every file under /content and every content adapter you load.

### Summary `Nokogiri::XML::NodeSet#[]` (and its alias `#slice`) checked the requested index against the node set's bounds using a 32-bit-truncated copy of the index. A large negative index could pass the check and then be used at full width, reading outside the node set's storage. On CRuby this is an out-of-bounds read that typically crashes the process; on JRuby it is not memory-unsafe but returns an incorrect node. Nokogiri 1.19.4 performs the bounds check against the full-width index. ###