CVEs

The function `ext.NativeTypes(ParseStructTag("json"))` does not honour the `encoding/json` skip directive `json:"-"`. Fields tagged `json:"-"` are registered in the CEL type system under the literal name `"-"` and are readable from any user-submitted CEL expression via `dyn(obj)["-"]`. Additionally, `newNativeTypes` silently registers every nested struct reachable from the type passed to `NativeTypes`, including types from third-party dependencies the developer never examined. ## Root cause

### Summary Parsing a small YAML document can take exponential time. An application that calls `load()` or `loadAll()` on untrusted input can be hung by a payload under 200 bytes. ### Details When an entry in a flow sequence turns out to be a `key: value` pair, the parser rewinds and parses that entry a second time as the key. If the key is itself a nested flow sequence of the same shape, every level is parsed twice, so the total work is O(2^n) in the nesting depth. The default `maxDepth` of 10

### Summary A malicious SSH server can crash a `russh` client session with a single malformed key-exchange reply, causing a pre-authentication Denial-of-Service before the server host key is verified. The embedding process itself stays up, but the connection is killed deterministically. ### Details Every *other* kex path in `russh` validates the peer ephemeral length before cloning: - `Curve25519Kex::server_dh` (`russh/src/kex/curve25519.rs:61-65`) checks `if pubkey_len != 32 { return Err(cr

## Summary A post-authentication denial-of-service panic in `russh` 0.62.2 (commit `c4be19f1915c8682f4615c3fd50008512b474491`, current default branch `main` as of 2026-07-22). An authenticated client sends a `pty-req` channel request carrying more than 130 terminal-mode records. The parser uses a fixed `[(Pty::TTY_OP_END, 0); 130]` array but increments its counter `i` for every valid record (logging "too many pty codes" without returning), then slices `&modes[0..i]` — an out-of-bounds slice tha

A pre-authentication denial-of-service panic in `russh` 0.62.2 (commit `c4be19f1915c8682f4615c3fd50008512b474491`, current default branch `main` as of 2026-07-22). An unauthenticated client sends a single `SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT` whose `Q_C` is 32 zero bytes. russh's Curve25519 KEX does not reject the all-zero peer public value, so `server_dh()` computes the all-zero shared secret and `compute_exchange_hash()` then calls `encode_mpint(&shared.0, ...)`, which indexes `s[i]` at `i == s.len()` and *

This is a follow up to CVE-2026-22030 to address related CSRF flows in unstable RSC code paths. > [!NOTE] > This only affects your application if you are using the unstable RSC APIs

## Summary The AWS Cloud Development Kit (AWS CDK) is an open-source software development framework for defining cloud infrastructure in code and provisioning it through AWS CloudFormation. We identified an issue in which explicitly setting `encrypted: true` on the `S3LoggingOptions` property of an AWS CodeBuild project construct produces the opposite of the intended behavior, disabling encryption on CodeBuild build logs stored in S3. ## Impact The `S3LoggingOptions.encrypted` property in the

## Summary GitPython's `check_unsafe_options` guard (the control introduced by CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-2f96 and hardened since) can be bypassed for **every** guarded method (`clone`/`clone_from`, `fetch`/`pull`/`push`, `ls_remote`, `iter_commits`, `blame`, `archive`) by smuggling an option token inside the VALUE of a single-character kwarg. In the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration this yields arbitrary command execution via `--upload-pack`. ## Root Cause The guard builds its cand

## Summary GitPython's `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist omits `--template`. `git clone --template=<dir>` copies `<dir>/hooks/` into the new repository and runs them (`post-checkout` fires during clone), so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command execution in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration. ## Root Cause `base.py:145-152` defines `unsafe_git_clone_options = ["--upload-pack","-u","--config","-c"]` — `--template` is absent. The guard candid

## Summary `Diffable.diff()` forwards `**kwargs` straight into `diff`/`diff_tree` with **no** `check_unsafe_options` guard. `Diffable` is mixed into `Commit`, `Tree`, `IndexFile`, and `Submodule`, giving a broad surface. `git diff --output=<path>` writes real patch content to an attacker-chosen path, enabling arbitrary file overwrite. ## Root Cause `diff.py:188-283` builds and runs the diff command with no `check_unsafe_options` anywhere in the method (grep-confirmed). Additionally `diff.py:265

## Summary `node-tar` (npm `tar`) contains an uncontrolled-recursion stack-exhaustion DoS in the internal `mapHas` helper used by `filesFilter`. When a consumer calls `tar.t(...)` or `tar.x(...)` with a non-empty member-selection list, node-tar installs a filter that closes over the recursive `mapHas` (`src/list.ts:33-44`). `mapHas` walks an entry path upward one `path.dirname()` call per recursion **with no segment cap**. A single crafted tar with a GNU-`L` (or PAX-`x`) long-path header can del

## Vulnerability Details **File**: `lib/previous-map.js` **Line**: 87-98 (`loadFile`), 129-144 (`loadMap`) ### Root Cause PostCSS auto-detects a `/*# sourceMappingURL=... */` comment inside the CSS text it is asked to parse and, unless the caller explicitly passes `map: false`, attempts to load that path from disk as a "previous source map." This happens on every `postcss.parse()` / `postcss().process()` call by default (opt-out, not opt-in). `loadMap()` builds the candidate path via `join(d

## Summary The TypeScript Nunjucks renderer evaluated untrusted `.prompty` template bodies with unrestricted JavaScript member access. An attacker-controlled template could traverse constructor and prototype properties to execute JavaScript in the host Node.js process. ## Affected packages - npm `@prompty/core` versions `<= 0.1.4` - npm `@prompty/core` versions `<= 2.0.0-beta.4` ## Impact Applications that render untrusted, community-supplied, cloned, or LLM-generated `.prompty` files with the

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ Prototype pollution in update casting: passing a user-controlled update to a Mongoose update, like `MyModel.updateOne(filter, req.body)`, can cause Mongoose to set `$fullPath` and `$parentSchemaDocArray` on `Object.prototype`. Example: ```javascript const mongoose = require('mongoose'); console.log('before:', Object.prototype.$fullPath); // undefined const User = mongoose.model('User', new mongoose.Schema({ name: Stri

### Summary In GitPython `<= 3.1.52`, the config writer neutralizes only CR, LF, and NUL in configuration **names**, but writes section names into the `[...]` header with no other escaping. A section/subsection name that contains `] [ "` closes the intended header and opens a second same-line section, injecting an arbitrary config directive — with no newline required. Because a submodule **name** is attacker-controlled data (it comes from a repository's `.gitmodules`, or from an application tha

### Summary Remote Code Execution (RCE) in velocityjs v2.1.6 via property-read to the Function constructor. This bypasses the fix for GHSA-j658-c2gf-x6pq ("Prototype Pollution in #set path assignment") — that advisory blocked constructor/__proto__/prototype only in the #set assignment handler (set.cjs), but property read expressions are unfiltered. Any application rendering attacker-controlled Velocity templates is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution on the server. ### Details GHSA-j658-c2

### Impact The allowlist matching used by the experimental dynamic client registration and client ID metadata document (CIMD) features in `@backstage/plugin-auth-backend` matched glob patterns against the full URL string. A * wildcard could therefore match across URL component boundaries: a pattern such as `https://*.example.com/callback`, intended to allow subdomains of a trusted host, would also match an attacker-controlled URL such as `https://attacker.example/x.example.com/callback`. This ap

### Impact The Trix editor, in versions prior to 2.1.18, is vulnerable to XSS when crafted HTML is pasted into the editor. The `HTMLParser` processed a mock attachment, a `<span>` carrying an empty `data-trix-attachment="{}"`. The empty attachment object caused the element to bypass attachment handling, so its `data-trix-attributes` were applied to a plain string piece. The pre-2.1.18 `StringPiece.fromJSON` accepted the `href` without validation, so an attacker-supplied `javascript:` URI was ca