CVEs

Let's Chat 0.3.0 through 0.4.8 contains a broken access control vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to download file attachments from private and password-protected rooms they are not a member of by exploiting missing room membership checks in the file retrieval route. Attackers can enumerate adjacent MongoDB ObjectIds derived from a known file ID to recover files uploaded by other users, as the GET /files/:id/:name route in app/controllers/files.js only enforces login authenticati

Let's Chat 0.3.0 through 0.4.8 contains an improper authorization vulnerability that allows any authenticated user to archive any room on the server by sending a DELETE request to the rooms handler without ownership verification. Attackers can enumerate room IDs via the rooms listing endpoint and permanently archive private or password-protected rooms they cannot access, with no application-level recovery path requiring direct database intervention to restore.

Rouille 0.1.6 through 3.6.2 contains a reachable assertion vulnerability in the Request::remove_prefix function that allows remote unauthenticated attackers to crash the server by sending a crafted percent-encoded URL. Attackers can send a request whose decoded path matches a configured prefix while the raw percent-encoded path does not, causing the assert! to fail and triggering either a 500 error or full process termination depending on the panic configuration.

Rouille 0.3.3 through 3.6.2 contains an HTTP request smuggling vulnerability that allows remote attackers to desynchronize HTTP message boundaries by exploiting improper header forwarding in the proxy implementation. The proxy in src/proxy.rs forwards the client's Transfer-Encoding header to upstream backends unchanged while transmitting a body already de-chunked by tiny_http, enabling CL.TE desynchronization attacks where attackers control where the backend believes the request body ends.

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.4, the `/api/v1/*` route surface trusts the bearer token alone for authorisation on most endpoints. The codebase itself admits this at `internal/api/hosts.go:384`: "API trusts the bearer token for authorisation; per-CA ownership is enforced only in the Web layer." The Web UI gates state-changing routes through `loadAccessibleCA` (`internal/web/cas.go`); CA-management endpoints in `inter

Rouille 0.3.3 through 3.6.2 contains an HTTP request smuggling vulnerability that allows remote attackers to bypass access controls by injecting bare line feed characters (0x0A) into client-supplied request header values that are copied verbatim to upstream connections without validation. Attackers can craft a header value containing a complete additional HTTP request that is interpreted as a separate request by backends such as Go net/http and Python http.server, causing the backend to process

TinyWeb through 0.0.8 contains a memory leak vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to exhaust available memory by sending ordinary well-formed HTTP requests. Each request causes HttpParser::execute() to allocate Url objects, HttpHeaders objects, and HttpHeader instances via raw new expressions that are never freed due to missing destructors and unreachable delete calls, causing worker resident memory to grow monotonically by approximately 20 to 28 kB per request until the worker pr

TinyWeb through 0.0.8 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files by submitting ../ sequences in the URL path, which are concatenated directly to the configured web root in HttpBuilder::buildResponse() without normalization, dot-segment removal, or boundary checks. Attackers can craft a single request with ../ sequences that pass through the URL parser unchanged and reach the filesystem call via HttpFile::setFile(), exposing sensitive fil

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.7, internal/pki/resolver.go:36-64 constructs a CAManager with the plaintext ed25519.PrivateKey after unwrapping via the master key; internal/pki/ca.go:13-16 stores it. Callers at internal/api/enroll.go:116, internal/api/updates.go:297, and internal/api/mobile_bundle.go:40 use the manager for one Sign() and drop the reference on function return — but the underlying slice contents are not

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.3, every /ui/* POST / PUT / PATCH / DELETE route processes the request as soon as the session cookie validates. SameSite=Lax on the session cookie prevents most cross-site form submits but does not protect: top-level form-submit navigations from third-party pages (some browsers still send Lax cookies on top-level POSTs); same-registrable-domain attackers (sibling-subdomain XSS, subdomai

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.2, internal/api/audit.go:12 — handleGetAuditLog does no admin check. The route is bearer-auth gated only; any operator API key returns the full audit log via store.ListAuditEntries (up to limit=1000). This includes cross-tenant actor names, host/CA/operator IDs, action timestamps, and masked-IP entries from rate-limit refusals — enough surface for a tenant to enumerate the server's acti

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.2, newly-minted operator API key exposed in redirect URL (Referer, history, proxy logs). This issue has been patched in version 0.3.2.

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.2, internal/web/session.go and internal/web/oidc.go set HttpOnly and SameSite=Lax on every cookie but never Secure. A single plaintext request to the origin (operator on a LAN, mistyped URL, HTTP→HTTPS not strictly enforced, reverse proxy misconfiguration) discloses the session. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.2.

Nebula Mesh is a self-hosted control plane for the Slack Nebula mesh VPN. In versions 0.3.5 and below, the web UI (/ui/*) does not apply the per-operator CA scoping employed by the JSON API. This was partially addressed by GHSA-598g-h2vc-h5vg, but the changes were not implemented in the web read/mutation surface. Any authenticated non-admin operator (for example, one created via self-registration or OIDC) can access resources belonging to other operators. The host create/edit/mobile-bundle/netwo

SuperPlane before 0.27.0 contains a broken object-level authorization vulnerability in the CanvasService gRPC handlers that allows authenticated users with viewer-level access to one organization to access resources belonging to other organizations by supplying arbitrary canvas or queue UUIDs without organization scoping. Attackers can read cross-tenant execution history and event payloads containing sensitive secrets, write queue items and canvas events into victim organizations, delete arbitra

Cal.com (repository calcom/cal.diy) in versions <= 4.7.15 is vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS) on the publicly accessible single booking view (e.g., /booking/<id>). Booking question (form field) labels are rendered via React's dangerouslySetInnerHTML without proper input sanitization or CSP, so an attacker who can create an event type with a malicious booking question label can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes when a victim visits the booking view URL. Self-hosted instances

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.2, `internal/configgen/generator.go:86,108,119` interpolates the operator-supplied `ListenHost` and `TunDevice` fields raw into a `text/template` that produces the agent's `config.yml`. `internal/web/advanced.go:20-35` accepts both with only `strings.TrimSpace` — no character or shape validation. Version 0.3.2 fixes the issue.

Cal.com (calcom/cal.diy) versions through 4.7.15 contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability. The single booking view (e.g., https://app.cal.com/booking/<id>) renders booking-question field labels via React's dangerouslySetInnerHTML without sanitizing or escaping user input. An attacker who can create an event type with a malicious booking-question label can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes when a victim opens the crafted booking URL. The issue is fixed in v4.7.16.