CVEs

## Summary pnpm's patch application pipeline (`@pnpm/patch-package`) performs no path validation on file paths extracted from `.patch` files. An attacker who contributes a malicious patch file via a pull request can write attacker-controlled content to or delete arbitrary files on the filesystem during `pnpm install`, as the user running the install. The `diff --git` header paths containing `../../` sequences traverse out of the package directory, and the traversal is difficult to catch in code

## Summary pnpm can send user-level unscoped npm authentication credentials to a registry chosen by a repository-local `.npmrc` file. In the reproduced case, the user's npm config contains a default registry and an unscoped `_authToken`. The repository does not provide a token-bearing auth line. It only sets `registry=` to a different registry URL. During normal pnpm metadata/install workflows, pnpm binds the user-origin unscoped credential to the repository-selected registry and sends it as a

## Summary pnpm allows a transitive dependency alias from registry package metadata to contain path traversal segments. During install, pnpm later uses that alias as a filesystem path when linking dependency nodes. As a result, a registry package can cause `pnpm install - ignore-scripts` to replace paths in the current project with symlinks to attacker-controlled dependency package directories. `.git/hooks` is only one useful target. The same primitive can replace other project-local paths tha

## Summary pnpm passes the lockfile-controlled git `resolution.commit` value to `git fetch` without a `--` separator or commit-format validation. For git dependencies fetched through the shallow-fetch path, a malicious lockfile can replace the expected 40-character commit hash with a Git option such as `--upload-pack=<command>`. For SSH and local transports, `--upload-pack` can execute the supplied command. HTTPS transports ignore `--upload-pack`, so the practical attack surface is primarily SS

## Summary pnpm's tarball extraction worker skips integrity verification when the `integrity` field is absent from the lockfile resolution. If an attacker can both modify `pnpm-lock.yaml` to remove the `integrity:` field and cause the referenced registry URL to serve altered package content, `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` can install the altered package without an integrity error. npm's `npm ci` enforces integrity by default; pnpm's behavior of silently skipping verification is a pnpm-specifi

While it is unclear whether this should be classified as a vulnerability, it is being reported through this channel because the current behavior may represent an unsafe default. ## Summary `pnpm install` in non-frozen mode can accept new remote package content after detecting that the downloaded tarball does not match the integrity recorded in `pnpm-lock.yaml`. When a package is already locked with an `integrity` value, and the registry later serves different metadata and tarball content for

### Summary `ExAws.SNS.verify_message/1` fetches the signing certificate from the `SigningCertURL` field of the incoming SNS message without validating that the URL uses HTTPS or that its host is an AWS-owned SNS certificate domain. An unauthenticated attacker who can POST to any endpoint that calls `verify_message/1` can supply an attacker-controlled `SigningCertURL`, sign a forged SNS message with their own RSA key, and cause the function to return `:ok`, completely bypassing SNS signature ve

### Summary `js-toml`'s interpreter checks whether a key already exists in a parser-built container with `if (object[key])` instead of `if (key in object)`. When the prior value is a falsy primitive — `false`, `0`, `0n`, `0.0`, `-0`, or `""` — the duplicate-key branch is skipped and the value is silently overwritten by a later sub-table, dotted-key sub-table, or array-of-tables sharing the same name. Per the TOML 1.0.0 spec ("Defining a key multiple times is invalid"; "You cannot define any key

Credentials for a registry may be inadvertently leaked to external servers. A prerequisite for this attack is a malicious registry server, a malicious blob store, or a registry that does not restrict the external URLs for foreign blobs. ## Example attack A malicious registry serves an OCI image manifest containing a layer descriptor with a `urls` field pointing to an attacker controlled host: ```json { "mediaType": "application/vnd.oci.image.layer.v1.tar+gzip", "digest": "sha256:...", "

### Impact **CVSSv4 Baseline Score:** Low 2.4 **CVSSv4 Weighted Score:** Low 1.3 The full CVSSv4 Vector for this vulnerability is: > CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:H/IR:L/AR:L/MAV:N/MAC:H/MAT:P/MPR:L/MVC:L/MVI:N/MVA:N/MSC:L/MSI:N/MSA:N/S:N/AU:Y/R:U/V:D/RE:L/U:Amber **CVSSv3.1 Baseline Score:** Low 3.1 **CVSSv3.1 Overall Score:** Low 3.4 The full CVSSv3.1 Vector equivalent for this vulnerability is: > CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N/E:P

### Summary In nezha **v1.14.13–v1.14.14** and **v2.0.0–v2.0.9**, the WebSocket endpoints `GET /ws/terminal/:id` and `GET /ws/file/:id` authenticate the caller only by the presence of a valid stream UUID, with no ownership check tying that UUID to the user who created the stream. Any authenticated dashboard user (including a `RoleMember`) who learns a live stream UUID can attach to the session and gain interactive shell access or full file-manager control on the target server — i.e. cross-tenan

Blnk API key endpoints had an authorization issue that allowed non-master API keys to perform key-management actions outside their intended authorization boundary. In affected versions, API key operations trusted caller-controlled request values for owner and scope decisions. As a result, a non-master API key could potentially manage keys for another owner by supplying a different owner value, or create a more privileged API key by requesting broader scopes than it already had. This has been f

### Summary YARD's static cache lookup reads a request path before the router's path cleanup runs. When a server is configured with a document root, a traversal path such as `/../yard-cache-secret.html` is joined against that root and can return a readable sibling `.html` file outside the intended static tree. The potential security risk seems low, as only html-ending files can be read, but still the risk of reading arbitrary html files is a confiendtiality issue in itself, which is why we dec

### Summary `@microsoft/kiota-http-fetchlibrary`'s `RedirectHandler` is documented as stripping `Authorization` and `Cookie` from cross-origin redirect targets, but the default `scrubSensitiveHeaders` callback in `RedirectHandlerOptions` uses case-sensitive property deletion (`delete headers.Authorization`, `delete headers.Cookie`) on a headers object that `FetchRequestAdapter.getRequestFromRequestInformation` has already lower-cased. The delete therefore targets keys that do not exist, the scr

## Summary `js-toml` versions up to and including **1.1.0** parse hexadecimal / octal / binary integer literals via a hand-written `parseBigInt` loop that multiplies a `BigInt` accumulator by the radix once per input digit. Each iteration performs a `BigInt * BigInt` operation on an accumulator that grows linearly with the number of digits already consumed, so the whole loop is **O(n²)** in the literal length. The lexer regex places **no upper bound on the literal length**, so a single TOML doc

## Summary Four authorization bypass vulnerabilities in Symfony LiveComponent actions allow any authenticated user within a company to access, modify, or delete other users' API tokens and notification transport settings. The root cause is that LiveComponent actions accept entity IDs without verifying ownership, while the listing methods correctly filter by user. ## Findings ### 1. Cross-User API Token Revocation (MEDIUM) **File:** `src/UserBundle/Twig/Components/ApiTokens.php`, lines 50-55

### Impact The fix for GHSA-4jjr-vmv7-wh4w was incomplete. It addressed the issue in the query builder, but the same protection was not applied to in-memory collection sorting. Manipulating sort parameters could result in the loss of content and assets. This requires a front-end template that passes request input into a tag's sort parameter. It is not exploitable by default — a template would need to be explicitly set up to sort by a visitor-controlled value. ### Patches This has been fixed

### Impact An authenticated Control Panel user could view metadata and content for resources they don't have permission to view, including entries, assets, users, roles, groups, and other configured resources. Depending on the resource, this could expose titles, custom field values, entry content, asset metadata, and the existence of users, roles, and groups. No data could be modified. ### Patches This has been fixed in 5.73.23 and 6.20.0.

### Summary `pontedilana/php-weasyprint` fetches the content of option values server-side via `file_get_contents()` when the value looks like a URL, without restricting the URL scheme. The `attachment` option of `Pdf` is the reachable sink: any value that passes `isOptionUrl()` (`filter_var(..., FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)`) is downloaded by the PHP process and embedded into the generated PDF. Because `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` accepts `http`, `https`, `ftp`, `file` and PHP stream wrappers such as `php://`