CVEs

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: handle unreadable frags sashiko reports: When an skb with unreadable fragments (such as from devmem TCP, where skb_frags_readable(skb) returns false) is processed by the u32 module, skb_copy_bits() will safely return a negative error code [..] xt_u32: bail out with hotdrop in this case. gather_frags: return -1, just as if we had no fragment header. nfnetlink_queue: restrict to the linear part. nfnetlink_log: res

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ebtables: zero chainstack array sashiko reports: looking at ebtables table translation, could a sparse cpu_possible_mask lead to an uninitialized pointer free? If cpu_possible_mask is sparse (for example, CPU 0 and CPU 2 are possible, but CPU 1 is not), the allocation loop skips CPU 1. If vmalloc_node() fails at CPU 2, the cleanup loop will blindly decrement and call vfree() on newinfo->chainstack[1]. Not a

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ A network attacker who can reach an etcd TLS listener can open many TCP connections and never send a ClientHello. Each connection spawns a goroutine in the etcd server process that blocks indefinitely inside tls.Conn.Handshake(), and each is tracked in the pending map. Unbounded goroutine and map growth exhausts memory in the etcd process, causing loss of availability for the etcd cluster (and, when etcd backs Kubernetes, the contr

### Summary The AWS Bedrock AgentCore Python SDK (bedrock-agentcore) provides tools for building AI agents, including a Code Interpreter client that installs Python packages into a managed sandbox. An issue exists where, under certain circumstances, improper neutralization of argument delimiters in the install_packages() method allows a remote authenticated user to execute arbitrary commands within the Code Interpreter sandbox via crafted package name arguments. ### Impact Insufficient input v

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ A user granted READ permission on a single, exact key can use the Watch gRPC API with `clientv3.WithFromKey()` (an open-ended, "from this key to the end of the keyspace" watch) to receive watch events for every key lexicographically greater than or equal to their permitted key — not just the one key they were granted. This is an authorization bypass in etcd's RBAC enforcement for the Watch API; Range/Get and DeleteRange requests

### Summary The yamux stream multiplexer in py-libp2p does not validate incoming DATA frame lengths against the receive window before reading the frame body. Any peer that completes a standard libp2p handshake can send a single 12-byte frame claiming a 4 GB body, causing the victim's yamux read loop to block indefinitely. This affects the default `new_host()` configuration and requires no special setup on either side. ### Details In `libp2p/stream_muxer/yamux/yamux.py` (lines 915 to 926), the `

### Summary Oh My Posh re-renders the resolved path string, which contains the raw folder names taken from the filesystem, through the Go `text/template` engine. That engine's function map exposes a `cmd` function that runs arbitrary OS commands. A directory whose name contains a Go template expression is therefore evaluated when the prompt renders, giving arbitrary command execution as the current user as soon as the shell is inside (or below) that directory. The built-in default configuration

## 1. Forged combined-resource IDs `CombinedResourceInfo` accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check, inflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource identifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded tests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1; about 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache entries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malforme

### Impact This impacts users of Shescape that have flag protection enabled, which is on by default, regardless of the API being used. An attacker can cause a runtime quadratic in the input size, causing denial of service for large inputs. ```javascript import { Shescape } from "shescape"; // 1. Prerequisites const options = { //flagProtection unspecified // Or flagProtection: true, }; // 2. Payload let payload = "\u0000-".repeat(32000); // 3. Usage const shescape = new Shescap

## Summary The AWS API MCP Server is an open source Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that enables AI assistants to interact with AWS services and resources through AWS CLI commands. It provides programmatic access to manage your AWS infrastructure while maintaining proper security controls. It includes an optional, user-configured security policy that can deny or gate specific AWS operations. An issue exists where, if the data used to enforce this policy fails to initialize at server startup,

### Summary The `/api/fs/batch_rename` handler validates and authorizes only the requested source directory. It rejects path separators in `new_name`, but it does not validate `src_name`. The handler concatenates `src_dir` and attacker-controlled `src_name`, then passes the result to the filesystem rename layer, where the path is normalized. An authenticated user with rename permission can set `src_name` to traversal segments such as `../../ab/secret.txt`. When the user's base path is `/team/a

## Summary `http4s-blaze-server` aggregates the fragments of an incoming WebSocket message with no limit on total size or fragment count. A client that completes a WebSocket handshake can send an unterminated fragmented message and drive unbounded heap growth in the server JVM, resulting in denial of service via `OutOfMemoryError`. ## Impact Any http4s application serving WebSocket routes over `BlazeServerBuilder` is affected; no non-default configuration is required, and `maxWebSocketBufferS

### Summary blaze-server can merge HTTP/1.1 chunked-body trailer fields into `Request.headers`. Because trailer fields are attacker-controlled, an unauthenticated remote client can inject arbitrary header names/values (e.g. `X-Forwarded-For`, internal-auth headers) that a fronting proxy sanitized from the request-header section, bypassing header-based trust decisions in the application. ### Impact Any http4s application using `BlazeServerBuilder` over HTTP/1.1 whose routes or middleware t

### Summary Five independent HTTP/1.1 conformance laxities in blaze's hand-written Java parser (`http/src/main/java/org/http4s/blaze/http/parser/`) cause request-boundary disagreement with a stricter intermediary. All are reachable from a default `BlazeServerBuilder` with no non-default configuration. ### Impact Actual exploitability depends on the fronting proxy — a boundary disagreement requires a *pair* of parsers that disagree. Where the proxy forwards the malformed bytes and derives a di

### Summary Five independent HTTP/1.1 conformance laxities in blaze's hand-written Java parser (`http/src/main/java/org/http4s/blaze/http/parser/`) cause request-boundary disagreement with a stricter intermediary. All are reachable from a default `BlazeServerBuilder` with no non-default configuration. ### Impact Actual exploitability depends on the fronting proxy — a boundary disagreement requires a *pair* of parsers that disagree. Where the proxy forwards the malformed bytes and derives a di

## Preface Poweradmin maps OIDC identities into local users through `oidc_user_links.oidc_subject` plus `provider_id`. In the MySQL schema, the OIDC link table explicitly uses `utf8mb4_unicode_ci`, which is case-insensitive and accent-insensitive. OIDC `sub` is a stable external subject identifier and should be matched byte-for-byte within the issuer/provider scope. The confirmed local PoC used two different OIDC users: - Victim subject: `victim-login` - Attacker subject: `victím-login` (`í`,

## Affected software - Product: Poweradmin (web front-end for PowerDNS) - Version tested: master, commit 7f28c3a97 (also reachable in the 4.x release line — the record-edit code is the same) - Component: record editing (web UI) - Vulnerability type: Broken Access Control / Insecure Direct Object Reference ## Severity Any authenticated user who owns at least one zone can tamper with records in every other zone on the server. In a shared/multi-tenant Poweradmin install this is effectively a cro

### Summary The REST API user-update endpoint (`PUT/PATCH /api/v2/users/{id}` and the V1 equivalent) does not enforce two authorization rules that the web interface enforces. A user who holds the `user_edit_others` permission but is not a superuser can: 1. edit user accounts that belong to a superuser, and 2. set the password of any account, even without the `user_passwd_edit_others` permission. Because of this, a non-admin "user manager" role can send a single API request that changes the ad