CVEs

## Summary The `RealIP` middleware in `go-chi/chi` is vulnerable to IP spoofing because it blindly trusts the first (leftmost) element of the `X-Forwarded-For` HTTP header. This allows a remote attacker to bypass IP-based access control lists (ACLs) and rate-limiting mechanisms by providing a spoofed IP address in the header. ## Details In `middleware/realip.go`, the `realIP` function parses the `X-Forwarded-For` header and extracts the first comma-separated value: ```go func realIP(r *http.Re

### Summary The `/api/auth/login` endpoint does not implement rate limiting, account lockout, or progressive backoff for repeated authentication failures. As a result, an attacker can perform unlimited login attempts against the endpoint. When combined with the username enumeration timing vulnerability, valid accounts can be identified and then brute-forced without restriction. The risk is further increased by a weak default password policy that only enforces a minimum length of five characters.

# justhtml: to_markdown() code-span blank-line breakout enables XSS ### Summary In `justhtml` 0.9.0 through 1.21.0, `to_markdown()` renders `<code>` text (and `<pre>` text inside a link) as an inline Markdown code span whose only protection is backtick-fence length. A blank line (`\n\n`) in that text terminates the inline span in any compliant Markdown renderer, so attacker-controlled text that survived HTML sanitization is emitted **unescaped** after the blank line and is re-parsed as live ra

The Claude Code `/copy` command wrote responses to a hardcoded, predictable path (`/tmp/claude/response.md`) without UID isolation, randomness, or symlink protection. The file was created world-readable (0644) in a world-traversable directory (0755), allowing any local user to read a privileged user's Claude response, which could contain secrets or credentials. Additionally, because the path was static and predictable, a local attacker could pre-create the directory and plant a symlink at the ex

### Description The `filterToDefinedArgumentsOnly` function in the executor is intended to discard any arguments not explicitly defined in the action's configuration. However, a special case allows any argument whose name starts with `ot_` to bypass this filter. While two system arguments (`ot_executionTrackingId` and `ot_username`) are injected by OliveTin and overridden, all other `ot_`-prefixed arguments supplied by the user pass through unmodified. These bypassed arguments are: 1. **Not t

### Impact The `store()` method in both the web and API `UsersController` only strips the superuser permission when a non-superuser creates a user. It does not strip the admin permission. This allows any authenticated user with the `users.create` permission to create a new user with full admin privileges. The `users.create permission` may commonly be delegated to HR staff, department leads, or similar roles. ### Patches Patched in [aea3877718](https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/commit/ae

### Impact The `BulkAssetsController::update()` method accepts `company_id` directly from user input without calling `Company::getIdForCurrentUser()`, the standard company-scoping function used by every other controller in the codebase. A non-superadmin user can move assets across company boundaries, breaking multi-tenancy isolation. ### Patches Patched in https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/commit/d58fda626e8febfeff4cabbc20ba03edfc411e18

### Impact A user who can edit other users could reset a superadmin's 2FA. ### Patches Patched in 8.5.0

### Impact The CSV user import in update mode bypasses user-edit authorization. A user with only the `import` permission can overwrite any non-admin user's email by uploading a CSV, then trigger a password reset to take over the account. `UserImporter.php` checks the `canEditAuthFields` gate and tries to strip auth fields from the model: ```php // app/Importer/UserImporter.php:107-114 if (Auth::check() && (! Gate::allows('canEditAuthFields', $user))) { unset($user->username); unset($us

# Open Redirect in Flask-Security ## Summary `flask_security.utils.validate_redirect_url()` can allow an attacker-controlled redirect URL when subdomain redirects are enabled. The bypass uses a backslash inside the URL authority/host: ```text http://evil.com\.whitelist.com http://evil.com%5C.whitelist.com ``` Python's `urlsplit()` parses the full authority as `evil.com\.whitelist.com` or `evil.com%5C.whitelist.com`. Because the value ends with `.whitelist.com`, `validate_redirect_url()` acc

### Impact `POST /two-factor` had no rate limiting, lockout, or attempt counter. An attacker with valid credentials can submit unlimited TOTP guesses. The TOTP implementation accepts the current code plus one step on either side (`config/google2fa.php window=1`), so at any instant 3 of 1,000,000 codes are accepted. After a correct guess the attacker holds a fully authenticated session. If the instance is configured with 2FA in optional mode (`two_factor_enabled='1'`), the attacker can additiona

Missing Authorization in API CategoryController — CVE-2026-24421 fixed BackupController by adding userHasPermission(PermissionType::BACKUP). The same fix was NOT applied to 4 other write endpoints in the public API. All 4 only call hasValidToken() (shared API key) but never call userHasPermission(), allowing any API token holder to perform admin operations regardless of their user permissions. ## Summary CVE-2026-24421 fixed BackupController by adding: $this->userHasPermission(PermissionType

## Summary If a symlink already exists under the `.terraform/providers` directory where a provider package needs to be installed, `tofu init` would follow that symlink and install the new package content into it. If an attacker can coerce an operator into running `tofu init` in a directory whose contents are attacker-controlled, they can include such a symlink along with instruction to install an attacker-controlled provider package at the path of that symlink, which would then cause OpenTofu

Any schema can contain a file upload form field, so Filament applies Livewire's `WithFileUploads` trait to the Livewire component the schema is embedded in. However, some schemas, such as the panel login form, do not require file uploads, and exposing unauthenticated temporary file uploads on these components is not an acceptable risk. On these components, an unauthenticated attacker could upload arbitrary files to the application's temporary storage, which could be abused to exhaust disk space

### Summary An unprivileged process can easily trigger the `processPIDEvents` goroutine to be blocked indefinitely, preventing the goroutine from analyzing any new ELF file. The goroutine stays blocked in the `openat2` syscall forever and the profiler can no longer work properly, it is a denial of service. ### Impact The impact is limited to denial-of-service on the ebpf-profiler agent: - There has to be a malicious workload albeit unprivileged. - No exfiltration of data. No loss of data. ##

### Impact A user with only users.edit AND api permissions can send a PATCH to /api/v1/users/{their_own_id} and grant themselves any permission except admin and superuser — for example `assets.view`, `assets.create`, `reports.view`, import, etc. ### Patches Patched in https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/pull/19024

### Impact The GET /api/v1/{object}/selectlist API endpoint is missing an authorization check. Any user who can log into Snipe-IT - regardless of permissions - can retrieve a paginated list of all user accounts using only their web session cookie. No API token or elevated permissions are required. This exposes usernames, display names, employee numbers, and user IDs for every active account in the system if FMCS is not enabled, and within the company they belong to if FMCS is enabled. ### What

The codec-ohttp implementation of draft-ietf-ohai-chunked-ohttp does not verify that a cryptographically-signed final chunk was received before the outer HTTP body terminates. An on-path adversary (the OHTTP relay itself, or any MITM on the relay↔gateway or relay↔client transport) can forward a prefix of a legitimate chunked-OHTTP message—cut at a non-final chunk boundary—and close the outer body cleanly, producing no decryption error and no exception in the receiving application.