Security Feed

Discourse is an open-source discussion platform. Prior to 2026.6.0, 2026.5.1, 2026.4.2, and 2026.1.5, secure uploads could be exposed by pull_hotlinked_images when an attacker knew the secured upload URL and the secure_uploads site setting was enabled. This issue is fixed in versions 2026.6.0, 2026.5.1, 2026.4.2, and 2026.1.5.

Discourse is an open-source discussion platform. Prior to 2026.6.0, 2026.5.1, 2026.4.2, and 2026.1.5, restricted tag and tag-group names attached to publicly readable categories as allowed_tags, allowed_tag_groups, or required tag groups could leak to anonymous and unauthorized users through category and group endpoints. This issue is fixed in versions 2026.6.0, 2026.5.1, 2026.4.2, and 2026.1.5.

Protection mechanism failure in Visual Studio allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally.

### Impact A privilege escalation vulnerability affects Woodpecker instances using the **Kubernetes backend**. The pipeline option `backend_options.kubernetes.serviceAccountName` was passed directly to the pod spec without any admin gating. **Who is impacted:** any operator running the Kubernetes backend. Any user with **Push** permission on a connected repository can run pipeline pods under an arbitrary ServiceAccount in the pipeline namespace, gaining that account's RBAC permissions. If a p

### Summary Non-admin operators (role `user`) can set `allow_private: true` on their own managed webhook subscription (`POST`/`PATCH /api/v1/webhook-subscriptions`). No admin check exists on this field. At delivery time, `allow_private` switches the dispatcher to an unguarded HTTP client, bypassing the private/loopback/link-local SSRF guard — letting a low-privilege operator make the server request internal addresses. ### Details `internal/api/webhooks.go:67` (`handleCreateWebhookSubscription

### Summary nebula-mesh revokes a host by adding its certificate fingerprint to a per-CA blocklist and shipping that list to every other agent on each poll. Slack's Nebula enforces certificate revocation ONLY through the `pki.blocklist` list in `config.yml` (no CRL/OCSP). The project's own code states this: `internal/pki/durations.go:15` — "Revocation via the blocklist remains the immediate security control." The server side is fully implemented (computes per-CA blocklist via `GetBlocklistForC

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb/client: fix possible infinite loop and oob read in symlink_data() On 32-bit architectures, the infinite loop is as follows: len = p->ErrorDataLength == 0xfffffff8 u8 *next = p->ErrorContextData + len next == p On 32-bit architectures, the out-of-bounds read is as follows: len = p->ErrorDataLength == 0xfffffff0 u8 *next = p->ErrorContextData + len next == (u8 *)p - 8

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: Reject wrapped offset in kvm_reset_dirty_gfn() kvm_reset_dirty_gfn() guards the gfn range with if (!memslot || (offset + __fls(mask)) >= memslot->npages) return; but offset is u64 and the addition is unchecked. The check can be silently bypassed by a u64 wrap. The dirty ring backing those entries is MAP_SHARED at KVM_DIRTY_LOG_PAGE_OFFSET of the vcpu fd, so the VMM can rewrite the slot and offset fields of any entr

## Summary Anyquery's `server` mode lacks input sanitization and access control over its built-in SQLite virtual table modules (e.g., `csv_reader`, `log_reader`). Unauthenticated attackers connecting to the MySQL-compatible server port can create virtual tables pointing to local files on the system (e.g., `/etc/passwd`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`). This allows full Local File Read (LFR) capabilities, compromising sensitive system configurations and credentials. ## Details Anyquery utilizes the `hashicorp/

## Impact Operator session tokens are stored in plaintext in the `operator_sessions` table (the `token` column is the PRIMARY KEY). The session token is a 32-byte random hex value sent directly in a cookie and valid for 24 hours. - `internal/models/operator.go:61` — `OperatorSession.Token` holds the plaintext token. - `internal/store/sqlite_operators.go:590` — `CreateOperatorSession` inserts `sess.Token` verbatim. - `internal/store/sqlite_operators.go:603,642,681,698` — lookups/updates/deletes

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nat: use kfree_rcu to release ops Florian Westphal says: "Historically this is not an issue, even for normal base hooks: the data path doesn't use the original nf_hook_ops that are used to register the callbacks. However, in v5.14 I added the ability to dump the active netfilter hooks from userspace. This code will peek back into the nf_hook_ops that are available at the tail of the pointer-array blob used by the

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pppoe: drop PFC frames RFC 2516 Section 7 states that Protocol Field Compression (PFC) is NOT RECOMMENDED for PPPoE. In practice, pppd does not support negotiating PFC for PPPoE sessions, and the current PPPoE driver assumes an uncompressed (2-byte) protocol field. However, the generic PPP layer function ppp_input() is not aware of the negotiation result, and still accepts PFC frames. If a peer with a broken implementation or

## Impact The web handler `renderMobileBundle` (`internal/web/handlers.go:1325`) passes the real `*pki.CAResolver` directly into `mobilebundle.Build`. Inside `Build` (`internal/mobilebundle/builder.go:54`), `resolver.LoadByID` decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a `*pki.CAManager`, but `Build` never calls `CAManager.Wipe()` on any return path (success or any of the error paths at lines 56, 62, 68, 80, 86, 92, 98, 102, 109, 118, 150). As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes throug

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: fix OOB write to userspace in sctp_getsockopt_peer_auth_chunks sctp_getsockopt_peer_auth_chunks() checks that the caller's optval buffer is large enough for the peer AUTH chunk list with if (len < num_chunks) return -EINVAL; but then writes num_chunks bytes to p->gauth_chunks, which lives at offset offsetof(struct sctp_authchunks, gauth_chunks) == 8 inside optval. The check is missing the sizeof(struct

## Summary Anyquery's `server` mode does not restrict outbound HTTP requests initiated by its built-in SQLite virtual table modules (e.g., `json_reader`, `log_reader`). Unauthenticated attackers connecting to the MySQL-compatible server port can create virtual tables pointing to internal network endpoints or Cloud Metadata IPs (e.g., `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`). This allows attackers to perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), bypassing external firewalls to scan internal port

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Drop all SCM attributes for SOCKMAP. SOCKMAP can hide inflight fd from AF_UNIX GC. When a socket in SOCKMAP receives skb with inflight fd, sk_psock_verdict_data_ready() looks up the mapped socket and enqueue skb to its psock->ingress_skb. Since neither the old nor the new GC can inspect the psock queue, the hidden skb leaks the inflight sockets. Note that this cannot be detected via kmemleak because inflight socket

ModSecurity is an open source, cross platform web application firewall (WAF) engine for Apache, IIS and Nginx. Prior to 3.0.16, the multipart/form-data request body parser in libmodsecurity silently removes embedded line breaks from non-file form-field values before exporting them to ARGS and ARGS_POST because src/request_body_processor/multipart.cc overwrites reserved bytes in m_reserve instead of appending the current buffer. This creates a parser differential between ModSecurity and backend a

### Summary Ech0's i18n middleware runs on every HTTP request and constructs a fresh `*goi18n.Localizer` from the raw `Accept-Language` header without imposing any size or shape filter. `goi18n.NewLocalizer` calls `golang.org/x/text/language.ParseAcceptLanguage` on the value internally. The underlying parser has quadratic-time behaviour on long lists of malformed language tags. The CVE-2022-32149 guard that golang.org/x/text added in v0.3.8 caps the number of `-` characters in the input at 1000