Security Feed

### Summary `AgentRuntime` promises scoped file access under a configured sandbox `basePath`, but its path containment checks use raw string prefix tests. A sandbox base such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox` also matches a sibling path such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox_evil/secret.txt`. An agent/user that can call `AgentRuntime.readFile()` or `AgentRuntime.listDir()` can read or list files outside the intended sandbox when the target path is in a sibling directory sharing the base path prefix. This

PathFilter's deny-list glob patterns are anchored, so `.git`, `.obsidian`, and `node_modules` were only blocked at the vault root. Nested copies inside the vault (e.g. `tools/cli/node_modules/...`, `tools/somerepo/.git/config`, a nested `.obsidian/`) were fully traversable via isAllowed/isAllowedForListing. Impact: a nested `.git/config` (remote URLs / embedded tokens) and nested `.obsidian` contents could be read, under the same prompt-injection threat model as GHSA-j99q-93c9-h869 (an attacker

PathFilter's deny-list glob patterns are anchored, so `.git`, `.obsidian`, and `node_modules` were only blocked at the vault root. Nested copies inside the vault (e.g. `tools/cli/node_modules/...`, `tools/somerepo/.git/config`, a nested `.obsidian/`) were fully traversable via isAllowed/isAllowedForListing. Impact: a nested `.git/config` (remote URLs / embedded tokens) and nested `.obsidian` contents could be read, under the same prompt-injection threat model as GHSA-j99q-93c9-h869 (an attacker

On OpenBao 2.5.4 and 2.5.2(and likely earlier versions also), an authenticated caller with write access to `transit/keys/*` can crash the OpenBao server by issuing a single key-creation request that combines an asymmetric `type` (`rsa-*`, `ecdsa-*`, `ed25519`) with `derived: true`. The server returns no HTTP response and the process terminates (exit code 2). This is a remote, low-complexity denial-of-service against the OpenBao server. Mount the transit engine: `curl -sS -X POST -H "X-Va

## 1. Description ### Component `sdk/helper/ldaputil/client.go` — the shared LDAP utility library used by both the LDAP authentication backend and OpenLDAP secrets engine to construct LDAP search filters and bind DNs. ### Root Cause The LDAP utility contains a **function selection error** that causes incorrect escaping of user-controlled input in LDAP filter construction. Two lines construct the `bindDN` using `EscapeLDAPValue()`: ```go // Line 191 — UPN Domain path bindDN = fmt.Sprintf("%s

## Summary A Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) issue previously existed in the Text Widget in Board of Outerbase Studio where unsanitized HTML could be rendered using `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` ### Steps to Reproduce 1. Create a new dashboard. 2. Add a **Text widget**. 3. Insert the following payload: ```html <img src=x onerror="alert('XSS Executed\nToken: ' + localStorage.getItem('ob-token'))"> ``` ### Architectural Context Outerbase Cloud and its backend services were discontinued in 2025

### Summary The logout button does not clear the session. The previous user stays logged in unless another user explicitly logs in. ### Details Not in auto login mode. Hosted on localhost. `access_token_lf` remains present in both Local Storage and Cookies. `refresh_token_lf` remains present in Cookies. **Root cause:** the `/logout` endpoint deleted the authentication cookies without matching the original `httponly`/`samesite`/`secure`/`domain` parameters, so the browser kept them; additionall

### Impact `ServerFilters.DigestAuth` and the underlying `DigestAuthProvider` both defaulted their `nonceVerifier` parameter to `{ true }` — i.e. every nonce was accepted regardless of value, age, or prior use. Any deployment using the default configuration had **no replay protection** on Digest authentication; a captured `Authorization: Digest …` response could be replayed indefinitely against the same protected resource. The nonce-verification mechanism in Digest auth is the primary anti-rep

### Impact The previous `BasicCookieStorage` did not enforce RFC 6265 scoping rules around cookie domain, path, and `Secure` attribute. A client using a single storage instance to talk to multiple origins could have cookies leak across domains, or have `Secure` cookies sent over plain HTTP — the deprecation message states it bluntly: *"BasicCookieStorage has no domain/path/scheme scoping and leaks cookies across origins. Use DefaultCookieStorage instead."* **Who is affected:** any client using

### Impact `reverseProxy()` and `reverseProxyRouting()` matched configured vhosts by substring on the `Host` header (`Contains` matcher) by default. The intended use of these functions in http4k is **outbound dispatch** (e.g. matching AWS service subdomains, per the `Contains` docstring) and **test-time composition** of fake backend networks. In either of those contexts the matched `Host` is set by the calling application, not by an external attacker, so the loose match has no exploit surface.

## Summary There is a medium severity vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider that causes affected routes to fail open. When an Ingress explicitly enables BasicAuth or DigestAuth through the supported `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-type` and `auth-secret` annotations, but the referenced auth Secret cannot be resolved or parsed, Traefik logs the resolution error, skips installing the authentication middleware, and still emits a router to the backend service. A route that

## Summary The `ansi.js` Handlebars helper in allure-generator passes user-controlled `statusMessage` and `statusTrace` values from test result files through the `ansi-to-html` library and wraps the output in Handlebars `SafeString` without HTML escaping. Since `ansi-to-html` does not escape HTML entities by default, an attacker who can influence test result content (e.g., via crafted JUnit XML failure messages) can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when anyone views the generated Allur

## Summary The built-in HTTP server started by `allure serve` and `allure open` is vulnerable to path traversal. The server resolves request URI paths directly against the report directory without normalizing or validating that the resolved path stays within the report directory. An attacker who can reach the server can read any file accessible to the Allure process by sending a request containing `../` sequences. ## Details When `allure serve` or `allure open` is executed, `Commands.setUpSer

## Unauthenticated OAuth Context Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens ### Summary The local OAuth helper FastAPI server bundled with `dbt-mcp` exposes the `GET /dbt_platform_context` endpoint without any form of authentication or host-origin validation. After a user completes the OAuth login flow against dbt Cloud (cloud.getdbt.com), the endpoint returns the full `DbtPlatformContext` object — including the victim's `access_token` and `refresh_token` for the dbt Platform API — verbatim to any cal

### Impact The go.qbee.io/transport library is affected by a symlink-chain path traversal vulnerability in its extractTar routine. The library's path validation is strictly lexical and fails to account for on-disk symlinks created earlier in the extraction process. Consequently, a crafted tar archive can be used to write or overwrite files one directory level above the intended extraction path. In the case of qbee-agent, which runs with root privileges, this vulnerability permits a root-privile

### Summary The CartController defines a RateLimiter behavior that is only activated when the 'number' POST/GET parameter is explicitly provided. ### Details When an attacker submits coupon codes against the session-based cart (without passing a 'number' parameter), no rate limiting is applied. This allows unlimited attempts to guess coupon codes. **Vulnerable Code** <img width="864" height="90" alt="resim" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a5197f10-f1fd-4331-93f9-9479d0ceebba"

### Summary The `Order::setPaymentAmount()` method accepts any float value without enforcing a minimum positive amount. The PaymentsController casts the user-supplied 'paymentAmount' parameter directly to float with no lower-bound check. ### Details When the store has 'Allow Partial Payment on Checkout' enabled, a user can submit a payment amount of $0.00 or even a negative value, potentially marking orders as paid without a valid transaction. <img width="690" height="80" alt="image" src="h

### Summary `ujson.dumps()` (or `ujson.dump()` or `ujson.encode()`) have a `reject_bytes=False` option. When set, they may accept malformed or truncated UTF-8 byte sequences, silently rewriting them into different Unicode characters instead of rejecting them. This leads to input validation bypass and data integrity issues. ### Details The expected behavior is that for `x` being any bytes string, `x == ujson.loads(ujson.dumps(x, reject_bytes=False)).encode(errors="surrogatepass")` should always