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### Summary vcrpy deserializes YAML cassette files with PyYAML's object-constructing loader (`yaml.CLoader` / `yaml.Loader`) instead of the safe loader (`yaml.CSafeLoader` / `yaml.SafeLoader`). A cassette containing a `!!python/object/apply:` (or similar) tag therefore executes arbitrary Python code the moment the cassette is loaded — including through the normal `VCR().use_cassette()` path, before any HTTP interaction is replayed. This is **not** limited to environments lacking the libYAML C

## XML Entity Expansion (Billion Laughs) DoS in XMLSitemapParser ### Summary `ultimate-sitemap-parser` version 1.8.0 and earlier parse attacker-controlled XML content using Python's `xml.parsers.expat` without any restriction on DTD declarations or recursive entity references. An attacker who can serve a malicious sitemap can trigger exponential XML entity expansion (the "Billion Laughs" attack), causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption in the victim process. No authentication, user intera

## Gzip Decompression Bomb Bypasses Sitemap Size Limit ### Summary `ultimate-sitemap-parser` enforces a 100 MiB size limit on sitemap responses, but applies it only to the **compressed** bytes received over the network. When a `.gz` sitemap is fetched, `usp/helpers.py:239` calls `gzip_lib.decompress(data)` with no output-size cap, allowing an attacker-controlled server to serve a small gzip-compressed payload (~549 KB) that expands to over 120 MiB in process memory. This completely bypasses th

### Summary The user supplied class value is fed directly into the sprintf call that creates HTML. You can add a quote to escape the class and then inject arbitrary html/javascript to the final output. ### Details The template [here](https://github.com/StarCitizenWiki/mediawiki-extensions-EmbedVideo/blob/a573a16d925ee0ea0d34b360856dc8ab0b88f822/includes/EmbedService/EmbedHtmlFormatter.php#L138) adds a figure with a class that is substituted in. This value is provided to sprintf [here](https://g

### Summary When passing an unknown service name to embedvideo, an error message is rendered containing the invalid service name. The service name is not sanitized and can contain HTML. ### Details There is a hardcoded list of allowed services in a switch statement inside `EmbedServiceFactory#newFromName` [here](https://github.com/StarCitizenWiki/mediawiki-extensions-EmbedVideo/blob/a573a16d925ee0ea0d34b360856dc8ab0b88f822/includes/EmbedService/EmbedServiceFactory.php#L105). When the service na

### Summary `convert()` builds the nested tree by using each flat record's `id` and `parent` field values directly as object keys, with no guard against `__proto__` / `constructor` / `prototype`. A record whose `parent` is the string `"__proto__"` makes `temp[parent]` resolve to `Object.prototype`, and the following `initPush(...)` writes attacker-controlled data onto the global prototype. Any application that passes attacker-influenced records to `convert()` is affected, and the base prototyp

## Summary A command injection vulnerability exists in `@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm` when the CLI is invoked with the `--workspace <value>` option while the environment variable `npm_execpath` is unset or empty. User‑supplied `--workspace` values are passed to a subshell without proper sanitization, enabling attackers to inject arbitrary OS commands. This issue corresponds to **CWE‑78**: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command. The vulnerability was fixed in version [

## Summary Blocky accepts and caches forged DNS answers while `dnssec.validate: true` is enabled. The issue has two related exploit paths: 1. **Basic DNSSEC validation bypass.** If an untrusted upstream returns an unsigned positive answer for a DNSSEC-signed public domain, Blocky classifies the response as `Insecure` solely because the response contains no RRSIG records. It does not first check the DS/DNSKEY chain to determine whether the queried name is below a signed delegation. The forged u

### Summary `Concurrent::AtomicReference#update` can enter a permanent busy retry loop when the current value is `Float::NAN`. The issue is caused by the interaction between: - `AtomicReference#update`, which retries until `compare_and_set(old_value, new_value)` succeeds. - Numeric `compare_and_set`, which checks `old == old_value` before attempting the underlying atomic swap. - Ruby NaN semantics, where `Float::NAN == Float::NAN` is always `false`. As a result, once an `AtomicReference` conta

Kozou compiles a PostgreSQL schema into an Admin UI, a REST API, and an MCP server. Several hardening gaps in the bundled HTTP surfaces and the scaffolded dev stack are fixed in **1.8.1**. ## Issues 1. **MCP HTTP server lacked DNS-rebinding protection.** The Streamable HTTP transport is unauthenticated and loopback by default. Without `Host`/`Origin` validation, a malicious web page in the operator's browser could rebind a hostname it controls to the loopback address and drive the MCP endpoint

### Impact When the proof key recovered from the RSTR can be observed by a party that is not the legitimate client, that party can impersonate the authenticated Windows principal for the lifetime of the SCT (default ~10 hours) and decrypt or forge any subsequent WS‑SecureConversation traffic that uses keys derived from the SCT. #### Preconditions Using security mode TransportWithMessageCredential with client credential type Windows, along with session establishment (which triggers use of WS-Sec

### Impact The attacker, with one captured signed SOAP envelope from a victim and no other privileges, can invoke arbitrary operations on the service as the victim principal for the lifetime of the captured signing key. There is no rate limit on replays. The DetectReplays setting on transport-security bindings does not mitigate the issue because the attack does not reuse the original timestamp — the fresh timestamp in the wsse:Security header is what the replay-detection logic inspects. ### Pat

### Impact The relying application is given a ClaimsPrincipal for a subject whose authority over the assertion the sender never proved. There are two distinct exploit shapes: - Holder-of-key downgrade. An attacker who obtains a holder-of-key SAML assertion that was issued without KeyInfo (issuer bug, custom STS shape, or assertion captured from an interaction where KeyInfo was elided) can present it to the service and be authenticated as the assertion’s subject without producing the proof key th

### Impact When a service is configured to validate SAML tokens using a method other than X.509 certificate signing, the final signature verification is skipped. #### Preconditions The service is configured to authenticate using SAML tokens and an out of band token resolver (commonly the IssuerTokenResolver of IssuedTokenServiceCredential) holds a non-X.509 SecurityToken whose key identifier the attacker can reference in the assertion’s `<KeyInfo>` - for example a `BinarySecretSecurityToken` re

### Impact An unauthenticated remote attacker can pin one server thread‑pool worker at 100 % CPU per connection. With a few connections, the CPU usage can be exhausted. #### Preconditions An attacker being able to reach a service which is exposing an endpoint using one of NetTcpBinding, NetNamedPipeBinding, or UnixDomainSocketBinding. ### Patches Fixed in CoreWCF v1.8.1 and v1.9.1 ### Workarounds None

## Summary `jupyterlab-git` 0.53.0 (latest, 2026-04-30) uses `fnmatch.fnmatchcase()` in `GitHandler.prepare()` (`jupyterlab_git/handlers.py:91`) to enforce the admin-configured `excluded_paths` security control. Because `fnmatchcase` is unconditionally case-sensitive, an authenticated user on a case-insensitive filesystem (macOS APFS, Windows NTFS) can bypass the exclusion by varying the case of the URL path segment — e.g. requesting `/git/project/Secrets/...` instead of `/git/project/secrets/.

Overview Amazon Web Services (AWS) Security has identified a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) issue in the jupyterlab-git JupyterLab extension that can lead to remote code execution (RCE). The issue exists in the PlainTextDiff.ts component, where the createHeader() method passes Git filenames directly to innerHTML without sanitization when rendering diffs for renamed files in commit history. This allows an adversary to craft a filename containing arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes when an

### Summary Stanza 1.12.0 attempts to safely load PyTorch checkpoint files using `torch.load(..., weights_only=True)`, but automatically falls back to the fully unsafe `torch.load(..., weights_only=False)` when the safe load raises `pickle.UnpicklingError`. Because the `UnpicklingError` condition is fully attacker-controllable, any `.pt` file that contains a single unsupported pickle global will trigger it. An attacker who can place a malicious pretrain or model file on disk (via supply-chain

### Summary The Konnected integration registers an HTTP endpoint, `KonnectedView` (`homeassistant/components/konnected/__init__.py`), that is marked as **not requiring authentication** (`requires_auth = False`). A comment next to that line says auth is instead handled "via the access token from configuration." That promise is only half true: - **Write requests (POST and PUT)** are handled by `update_sensor()`, which *does* check the request's `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header against the