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The FBI and CISA have updated their March warning about Russian intelligence phishing Signal accounts, and the operators have added a step: they now coax targets into handing over their Signal Backup Recovery Key. Hand it over once, and the attacker can restore the account's backup, read the private and group message history, and take over the account. Worse, the key keeps working.

### Summary The remark42 image proxy fetches an arbitrary remote URL and re-serves the response from remark42's own origin. The download path decides whether the fetched resource is an image by looking only at the `Content-Type` header the remote server claims — it never inspects the actual bytes. The serving path then derives the response `Content-Type` by sniffing those bytes with `http.DetectContentType`. An attacker hosts a URL that sets `Content-Type` to `image/png` but returns an HTML/Jav

### Impact The `limit container paths directive` in `apptainer.conf` is intended to allow a system administrator limit the paths from which containers can be run, under setuid mode. Due to incorrect matching of a path string, sibling directories with similar names may incorrectly be allowed. For example, the configuration: ``` limit container paths = /data/safe ``` Will also allow containers in /data/safe-but-unsafe to be run. ### Patches The issue is patched in apptainer version 1.5.1. ###

## Summary When an application using Pydantic AI opts a URL into `force_download='allow-local'` (which disables the default block on private/internal IPs) **and runs on a network that routes the affected IPv6 transition forms (NAT64- or ISATAP-configured networks)**, the cloud-metadata blocklist could be bypassed by encoding the metadata IP in an IPv6 transition form that the previous fix did not decode — IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::a.b.c.d`), the NAT64 RFC 8215 local-use prefix (`64:ff9b:1::/48`)

Nx is a monorepo solution for TypeScript and polyglot codebases. From 17.0.4 until 22.7.2 and 23.0.0-beta.2, the local HTTP server started by nx graph sent Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on every response, letting any website a developer visited read the server's responses cross-origin — including the full project graph and the output of the /help endpoint, which runs a target's configured help command. The practical impact is typically cross-origin information disclosure, but can be arbitrary c

Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. From 1.37.0 until 1.37.5 and 1.38.3, the HTTP OAuth2 filter (envoy.filters.http.oauth2) can leave an in-flight async token exchange attached to a downstream stream that has already been torn down. A late AsyncClient completion can still invoke OAuth2Filter methods that use StreamDecoderFilterCallbacks after that object’s lifetime has ended, causing undefined behavior, worker crashes (availability loss), and us

Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. From 1.37.0 until 1.37.5 and 1.38.3, when the %REQUESTED_SERVER_NAME(X:Y)% is used in log format and host related options is specified, like HOST_FIRST, SNI_FIRST, it's possible to crash Envoy when the specified host header is missing in the request headers. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.37.5 and 1.38.3.

Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. From 1.36.0 until 1.36.9, 1.37.5, and 1.38.3, a Use-After-Free (UAF) vulnerability leading to a sudden segmentation fault exists in Envoy's ext_authz HTTP filter when processing per-route authorization overrides concurrently with rapid downstream client disconnects. During standard request lifecycles, Envoy instantiates the ext_authz filter with a foundational authorization client object (client_). If a matche

Incorrect link resolution by display name in the custom PowerShell VPN editor in Devolutions Remote Desktop Manager 2026.2.5 through 2026.2.11 allows an authenticated attacker with write access to a shared workspace to execute a PowerShell script in another user's context via a display name collision with an existing VPN script link.

### Summary An arbitrary file write exists in the Incus client when a malicious image server returns a crafted `Incus-Image-Hash` header. This can lead to arbitrary command execution as root on the server. ### Details - `cmd/incusd/images.go:611-684` handles `source.type=url` by HEADing the user-supplied URL, reading `Incus-Image-Hash` and `Incus-Image-URL`, and passing them to `imageDownload()` as `Alias` and `Server`. - `cmd/incusd/daemon_images.go:91-92` defaults `fp` to the caller-contr

### Impact The `preAuthEncoding` function in `@sigstore/core` uses Node.js `'ascii'` encoding when converting the PAE (Pre-Authentication Encoding) string to bytes. This allows `payloadType` to be mutated after signing without invalidating the signature, breaking the type-binding guarantee that DSSE is designed to provide. In `packages/core/src/dsse.ts`, the PAE function builds a string containing `payloadType` and then encodes it with `Buffer.from(prefix, 'ascii')`. In Node.js, `'ascii'` enco

## Summary `(*backend).CreateCustomVolumeFromBackup` in [`internal/server/storage/backend.go`](https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/985a1dedf9f3e7ba729c93b654905ed510de25c2/internal/server/storage/backend.go) contains an unguarded `*time.Time` dereference on the `ExpiresAt` field of every volume-snapshot entry in an imported custom-volume backup. An authenticated user with `can_create_storage_volumes` permission on any project can crash the `incusd` daemon by uploading a backup tarball whose `volu

### Summary Improper validation of user-provided backup compression algorithm leads to argument injection in the constructed command line. This leads to an arbitrary file write on the host, possibly leading to arbitrary command execution. ### Details Incus validates `compression_algorithm` by parsing it into fields and checking only the first token against an allowlist: ```go fields, err := shellquote.Split(value) ... if !slices.Contains([]string{"bzip2", "gzip", "lz4", "lzma", "pigz", "pzs

## Summary `(*backend).createDependentVolumesFromBackup` in [`internal/server/storage/backend.go`](https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/d768f81c0a1d985f35ae56219519822b080bf5e3/internal/server/storage/backend.go) contains a cluster of unguarded pointer derefs on every dependent-volume entry's `VolumeSnapshots[i]`, `Volume`, and `Pool` sub-fields. An authenticated user with `can_create_instances` permission on any project can crash the `incusd` daemon by uploading an instance backup tarball whose `

## Summary The S3 protocol upload endpoint is vulnerable to path traversal and allows creation of arbitrary files on the host. This behavior could lead to arbitrary command execution. In `internal/server/storage/s3/local/multipart.go`, user-controlled upload ID is appended to the uploads directory unsanitized; https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/40dd4f151d52c06b178482aa2518abfb9df3e6fb/internal/server/storage/s3/local/multipart.go#L33 ## PoC ### Setup ``` # Expose the S3 API and create a buck

### Summary A specially crafted image or instance backup can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution. ### Details For container images, `internal/server/storage/utils.go` calls `archive.Unpack(imageFile, destPath, ...)`. The tar extraction path in `shared/archive/archive.go` excludes device nodes, but it does not reject a top-level `templates` symlink. For instance backups, `internal/server/storage/drivers/driver_dir_volum

### Summary Instance snapshots ignore the `restricted.containers.lowlevel=block` setting; allowing for arbitrary command execution on the Incus server by abusing lowlevel hooks such as `raw.lxc` and `raw.qemu`. ### Details Instance snapshots ignore the `restricted.containers.lowlevel=block` setting; allowing for arbitrary command execution on the Incus server by abusing lowlevel hooks such as `raw.lxc` and `raw.qemu`. As snapshots can be moved from one server to another, a malicious instanc

### Summary The `record-output` parameter of the `/instances/$name/exec` endpoint stores the output of the command in the `exec-output` directory of the instance. If `exec-output` is a symlink, file named `exec_UUID.stdout` and `exec_UUID.stderr` can be written to an arbitrary location where the `.stdout` file will contain arbitrary content. This behavior can be abused for arbitrary command execution. ### Details When an image is unpacked, top-level symlinks are extracted as is; allowing for

### Summary A specially crafted image can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution. ### Details Incus validates an image as soon as it sees a normal `metadata.yaml` and a `rootfs/` entry, but full extraction can later process a duplicate top-level `rootfs` symlink. Later, the stopped-container file API opens `d.RootfsPath()` and passes that file descriptor to `forkfile`, which chroots to it. ``` metadata.yaml rootfs/ rootfs