## Summary pnpm allows a transitive dependency alias from registry package metadata to contain path traversal segments. During install, pnpm later uses that alias as a filesystem path when linking dependency nodes. As a result, a registry package can cause `pnpm install - ignore-scripts` to replace paths in the current project with symlinks to attacker-controlled dependency package directories. `.git/hooks` is only one useful target. The same primitive can replace other project-local paths tha
### Summary `ExAws.SNS.verify_message/1` fetches the signing certificate from the `SigningCertURL` field of the incoming SNS message without validating that the URL uses HTTPS or that its host is an AWS-owned SNS certificate domain. An unauthenticated attacker who can POST to any endpoint that calls `verify_message/1` can supply an attacker-controlled `SigningCertURL`, sign a forged SNS message with their own RSA key, and cause the function to return `:ok`, completely bypassing SNS signature ve
Blnk API key endpoints had an authorization issue that allowed non-master API keys to perform key-management actions outside their intended authorization boundary. In affected versions, API key operations trusted caller-controlled request values for owner and scope decisions. As a result, a non-master API key could potentially manage keys for another owner by supplying a different owner value, or create a more privileged API key by requesting broader scopes than it already had. This has been f
## Summary `js-toml` versions up to and including **1.1.0** parse hexadecimal / octal / binary integer literals via a hand-written `parseBigInt` loop that multiplies a `BigInt` accumulator by the radix once per input digit. Each iteration performs a `BigInt * BigInt` operation on an accumulator that grows linearly with the number of digits already consumed, so the whole loop is **O(n²)** in the literal length. The lexer regex places **no upper bound on the literal length**, so a single TOML doc
## Summary Four authorization bypass vulnerabilities in Symfony LiveComponent actions allow any authenticated user within a company to access, modify, or delete other users' API tokens and notification transport settings. The root cause is that LiveComponent actions accept entity IDs without verifying ownership, while the listing methods correctly filter by user. ## Findings ### 1. Cross-User API Token Revocation (MEDIUM) **File:** `src/UserBundle/Twig/Components/ApiTokens.php`, lines 50-55
### Impact The fix for GHSA-4jjr-vmv7-wh4w was incomplete. It addressed the issue in the query builder, but the same protection was not applied to in-memory collection sorting. Manipulating sort parameters could result in the loss of content and assets. This requires a front-end template that passes request input into a tag's sort parameter. It is not exploitable by default — a template would need to be explicitly set up to sort by a visitor-controlled value. ### Patches This has been fixed
### Summary `pontedilana/php-weasyprint` guarded the output filename against the `phar://` stream wrapper with a case-sensitive blacklist: ```php if (0 === \strpos($filename, 'phar://')) { throw new \InvalidArgumentException('The output file cannot be a phar archive.'); } ``` PHP stream wrappers are **case-insensitive**, so `PHAR://`, `Phar://`, etc. bypass the check and reach `fileExists()` (`file_exists()`) in `prepareOutput()`. On PHP 7 (which the library still supports — PHP 7.4+), th
### Summary [CVE-2026-47067](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47067) is an atom table exhaustion vulnerability (CWE-770) in hackney's URL parser (`src/hackney_url.erl`). `hackney_url:parse_url/1` converts every URL scheme it encounters into a BEAM atom via `binary_to_atom/2`. Because BEAM atoms are never garbage-collected and the atom table has a hard limit of 1,048,576 entries, an attacker who can feed URLs with attacker-chosen scheme prefixes — directly as request targets, as webhook
### Summary The WebSocket client in `src/hackney_ws.erl` imposes no upper bound on memory consumption across three distinct code paths. In each case, an attacker-controlled WebSocket server can exhaust the connecting process's memory without any authentication or special client configuration. ### Details **1. Handshake response buffer (`read_handshake_response/3`)** The function accumulates received bytes into a growing buffer waiting for `\r\n\r\n`. The per-receive timeout resets on every c
### Summary `hackney_h3:await_response_loop/6` in `src/hackney_h3.erl` accumulates the HTTP/3 response body in memory without any size cap. The `after Timeout` clause is a per-message inactivity timer, not a wall-clock deadline: every received `stream_data` chunk, housekeeping `select` message, or `settings` frame resets it. A malicious HTTP/3 server that drips one small chunk every `Timeout - 1` ms with `Fin = false` and never terminates the stream keeps the loop alive indefinitely while the a
### Summary The SOCKS5 transport in `src/hackney_socks5.erl` correctly applies the caller-supplied timeout to the SOCKS5 negotiation phase, but then upgrades the tunnel to TLS using `ssl:connect/2` (the two-argument form), which defaults to `infinity`. The `Timeout` value is in scope at that call site but is never forwarded. A hostile or man-in-the-middled SOCKS5 proxy that completes the SOCKS5 handshake normally and then stalls the TLS exchange will pin the connecting Erlang process and socket
### Summary [CVE-2026-47066](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47066) is an infinite loop (CWE-835) in hackney's Alt-Svc response header parser (`src/hackney_altsvc.erl`). When an HTTP server returns an `Alt-Svc` header whose value begins with a non-token byte (e.g. `!`, `@`, `=`, `;`), the parser enters a tight tail-recursive loop that pins an Erlang scheduler at 100% CPU and permanently hangs the calling connection process. Because the parser is invoked synchronously on every HTTP res
# Streamable HTTP mode exposes LINE Desktop read/send tools without MCP authentication ## Summary `line-desktop-mcp` supports a `--http-mode` Streamable HTTP transport for use with clients such as n8n. In this mode the server binds to `0.0.0.0` and exposes the MCP `/mcp` endpoint without an MCP-layer authentication check. Any network client that can reach the port can initialize a session, list tools, and call tools that read LINE Desktop chat history or send LINE messages through the already
### Summary `pontedilana/php-weasyprint` builds the shell command for WeasyPrint by passing the binary path through `escapeshellarg()` first and then checking the *quoted* result with `is_executable()`. On POSIX `escapeshellarg('/usr/local/bin/weasyprint')` returns `'/usr/local/bin/weasyprint'` with the single-quote characters as part of the string, so `is_executable()` looks for a file whose actual name includes those quotes. That file never exists, the "safe" branch is dead code, and the raw
## Advisory / Disclosure # phpMyFAQ 4.1.3 — incomplete fix for the admin-API IDOR/privilege-escalation class **Target:** thorsten/phpMyFAQ (composer: `thorsten/phpmyfaq`, `phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq`) **Affected:** <= 4.1.3 (the 4.1.3 security fix is incomplete; siblings remain) **Class:** CWE-862 Missing Authorization / CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management / CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key **Methodology:** M1 incomplete-fix audit (sibling-walk of the 4.1.3 fix for GHSA-xvp4-p
## Summary The HTTP MCP JSON-RPC endpoint at `/mcp` requires only OAuth `read` scope for all requests, then dispatches `tools/call` directly to handlers that include mutating tools. A read-only OAuth client can call `store_memory` and `delete_memory` through MCP even though the corresponding REST endpoints require `write` scope. ## Technical Details `src/mcp_memory_service/web/api/mcp.py` declares `mcp_endpoint` with `user: AuthenticationResult = Depends(require_read_access)`. For `tools/call
## Summary A directory traversal vulnerability exists in the production static file server of `better-helperjs` (`<= 3.0.5`). Attackers can read arbitrary files located in adjacent directory structures that share the same string prefix as the intended static root directory. ## Details The framework utilizes a custom static file server engine used when running in `NODE_ENV=production` (`src/ssr/site-server.ts`). Inside the `safeStaticPath()` method, the requested path is checked against the stat
## Impact `Psl\H2\ServerConnection` does not validate that the total bytes received in DATA frames match the `content-length` header declared in the HEADERS frame, in violation of RFC 9113 §8.1.1. A malicious client can: - Send more DATA bytes than declared, smuggling additional content past application-level size limits. - Send fewer DATA bytes than declared and close the stream early, causing applications that trust the declared length to behave incorrectly. The vulnerability is only reacha
## Summary A NULL pointer dereference vulnerability exists in `PDFParser::CreateFilterForStream()` when processing a PDF stream with `/Filter /LZWDecode` and a `/DecodeParms` dictionary that does not contain the `EarlyChange` key. This causes an access violation (0xC0000005) and crashes the process. ## Affected Version muhammara <= 6.0.4 (latest) ## Vulnerability Details **File:** `src/deps/PDFWriter/PDFParser.cpp` line 2107 ```cpp if (inDecodeParams) { PDFObjectCastPtr<PDFInteger> ear
### Summary Sending an excessively large header by an attacker could lead to a server-side DoS attack. ### Details The current sniff implementation does not explicitly specify the upper limit for HTTP headers. Attackers can continuously send excessively large headers without including \r\n\r\n, leading to ServerDoS and OutOfMemory errors. ### PoC server.yaml ``` listen: 127.0.0.1:8443 tls: cert: poc_server.crt key: poc_server.key auth: type: password password: sniff-poc-password s