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## Summary A command injection vulnerability exists in `@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm` when the CLI is invoked with the `--workspace <value>` option while the environment variable `npm_execpath` is unset or empty. User‑supplied `--workspace` values are passed to a subshell without proper sanitization, enabling attackers to inject arbitrary OS commands. This issue corresponds to **CWE‑78**: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command. The vulnerability was fixed in version [

## Summary Blocky accepts and caches forged DNS answers while `dnssec.validate: true` is enabled. The issue has two related exploit paths: 1. **Basic DNSSEC validation bypass.** If an untrusted upstream returns an unsigned positive answer for a DNSSEC-signed public domain, Blocky classifies the response as `Insecure` solely because the response contains no RRSIG records. It does not first check the DS/DNSKEY chain to determine whether the queried name is below a signed delegation. The forged u

### Summary `Concurrent::AtomicReference#update` can enter a permanent busy retry loop when the current value is `Float::NAN`. The issue is caused by the interaction between: - `AtomicReference#update`, which retries until `compare_and_set(old_value, new_value)` succeeds. - Numeric `compare_and_set`, which checks `old == old_value` before attempting the underlying atomic swap. - Ruby NaN semantics, where `Float::NAN == Float::NAN` is always `false`. As a result, once an `AtomicReference` conta

### Summary `Oj.load` is vulnerable to heap corruption when parsing a JSON string longer than 2 GB. An integer overflow in `buf_append_string` (`buf.h:61`) converts the string length to a large negative `size_t`, causing `memcpy` to copy an astronomically large amount of data out of bounds. This crashes the process and can corrupt adjacent heap memory. ### Version - **Software**: oj gem - **Affected**: all versions with `ext/oj/buf.h` and `ext/oj/parse.c` - **Latest tested**: 3.17.1 (confirme

### Summary `Oj::Parser` in SAJ mode does not protect cached object keys (≥ 35 bytes) from garbage collection. A Ruby callback that triggers GC inside `hash_end` can cause the key string to be reclaimed while the C parser still holds a pointer to it. The subsequent access to the freed string VALUE results in a segfault, confirmed by an RIP pointing to address `0x4242` (a canary-style pattern suggesting control over the freed memory's content). ### Version - **Software**: oj gem - **Affected**

### Summary `Oj::Parser` in usual mode does not mark `array_class` and `hash_class` references during garbage collection. If GC runs after the class is assigned but before a parse, the class object is reclaimed, leaving the parser holding a dangling VALUE. The subsequent `parse` call dereferences the freed object, producing a segfault. ### Version - **Software**: oj gem - **Affected**: all versions with `ext/oj/usual.c` / `ext/oj/parser.c` - **Latest tested**: 3.17.1 (confirmed present) ###

### Summary `Oj::Parser#parse` in usual mode with `create_id` enabled is vulnerable to heap corruption via a negative-size `memcpy`. When a JSON object key is exactly 65,535 bytes long, an integer truncation in `form_attr` (`usual.c:63`) converts the length to `-1` before passing it to `memcpy`. This causes `memcpy` to copy `SIZE_MAX` bytes (interpreted as a huge `size_t`), corrupting heap memory and crashing the process. ### Version - **Software**: oj gem - **Affected**: all versions with `e

Kozou compiles a PostgreSQL schema into an Admin UI, a REST API, and an MCP server. Several hardening gaps in the bundled HTTP surfaces and the scaffolded dev stack are fixed in **1.8.1**. ## Issues 1. **MCP HTTP server lacked DNS-rebinding protection.** The Streamable HTTP transport is unauthenticated and loopback by default. Without `Host`/`Origin` validation, a malicious web page in the operator's browser could rebind a hostname it controls to the loopback address and drive the MCP endpoint

### Impact When the proof key recovered from the RSTR can be observed by a party that is not the legitimate client, that party can impersonate the authenticated Windows principal for the lifetime of the SCT (default ~10 hours) and decrypt or forge any subsequent WS‑SecureConversation traffic that uses keys derived from the SCT. #### Preconditions Using security mode TransportWithMessageCredential with client credential type Windows, along with session establishment (which triggers use of WS-Sec

### Impact The attacker, with one captured signed SOAP envelope from a victim and no other privileges, can invoke arbitrary operations on the service as the victim principal for the lifetime of the captured signing key. There is no rate limit on replays. The DetectReplays setting on transport-security bindings does not mitigate the issue because the attack does not reuse the original timestamp — the fresh timestamp in the wsse:Security header is what the replay-detection logic inspects. ### Pat

### Impact The relying application is given a ClaimsPrincipal for a subject whose authority over the assertion the sender never proved. There are two distinct exploit shapes: - Holder-of-key downgrade. An attacker who obtains a holder-of-key SAML assertion that was issued without KeyInfo (issuer bug, custom STS shape, or assertion captured from an interaction where KeyInfo was elided) can present it to the service and be authenticated as the assertion’s subject without producing the proof key th

### Impact When a service is configured to validate SAML tokens using a method other than X.509 certificate signing, the final signature verification is skipped. #### Preconditions The service is configured to authenticate using SAML tokens and an out of band token resolver (commonly the IssuerTokenResolver of IssuedTokenServiceCredential) holds a non-X.509 SecurityToken whose key identifier the attacker can reference in the assertion’s `<KeyInfo>` - for example a `BinarySecretSecurityToken` re

### Impact An unauthenticated remote attacker can pin one server thread‑pool worker at 100 % CPU per connection. With a few connections, the CPU usage can be exhausted. #### Preconditions An attacker being able to reach a service which is exposing an endpoint using one of NetTcpBinding, NetNamedPipeBinding, or UnixDomainSocketBinding. ### Patches Fixed in CoreWCF v1.8.1 and v1.9.1 ### Workarounds None

### Summary `Oj::Parser#parse` is vulnerable to a heap use-after-free when a SAJ/SAJ2 callback mutates the input JSON string during parsing. The C engine holds a raw `const byte *` pointer into the Ruby string's internal buffer. If a callback (e.g. `hash_start`) resizes the string — for example by calling `String#replace` with a longer value — Ruby reallocates the string buffer and frees the old one. The C parser's pointer is left dangling; the next character read at `parser.c:607` is a use-aft

### Summary `Oj::Doc` iterators (`each_value`, `each_child`, `each_leaf`) are vulnerable to a heap use-after-free. When a Ruby block yielded during iteration calls `doc.close` or `d.close`, the document's heap memory is freed while the C iterator is still running. When control returns from the block, the iterator reads from the freed region, producing a use-after-free accessible from pure Ruby. ### Version - **Software**: oj gem - **Affected**: all versions with `ext/oj/fast.c` - **Latest tes

### Summary `Oj.dump` in object mode is vulnerable to a heap buffer overflow when serializing Exception objects with a large `:indent` value. The serializer allocates a buffer sized for the object's attributes but does not account for the indent bytes added on each write. With `indent: 5000`, the accumulation of 5,000-byte indent strings overflows the 13,150-byte heap allocation, corrupting adjacent heap memory. ### Version - **Software**: oj gem - **Affected**: all versions with `ext/oj/dump

### Summary `Oj::Doc#each_child`, when invoked recursively over a deeply nested JSON document, overflows a fixed-size stack buffer and aborts the process. This is a denial of service reachable from untrusted JSON. ### Details Two-step chain in `ext/oj/fast.c`: 1. **`doc_each_child` (~line 1501)** increments `doc->where` past the `where_path[MAX_STACK = 100]` array with no bounds check, and never restores it (`doc->where--` is missing). Calling `each_child` recursively from inside th

## Summary `jupyterlab-git` 0.53.0 (latest, 2026-04-30) uses `fnmatch.fnmatchcase()` in `GitHandler.prepare()` (`jupyterlab_git/handlers.py:91`) to enforce the admin-configured `excluded_paths` security control. Because `fnmatchcase` is unconditionally case-sensitive, an authenticated user on a case-insensitive filesystem (macOS APFS, Windows NTFS) can bypass the exclusion by varying the case of the URL path segment — e.g. requesting `/git/project/Secrets/...` instead of `/git/project/secrets/.

Overview Amazon Web Services (AWS) Security has identified a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) issue in the jupyterlab-git JupyterLab extension that can lead to remote code execution (RCE). The issue exists in the PlainTextDiff.ts component, where the createHeader() method passes Git filenames directly to innerHTML without sanitization when rendering diffs for renamed files in commit history. This allows an adversary to craft a filename containing arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes when an